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This thesis is composed by three essays and applies econometric methods to analyze different
economic research questions using microeconomic data. The first essay (chapter 2) analyzes
consumer searching behavior in a grocery context. The second essay (chapter 3) studies
the implications of the introduction of a bonus scheme in a principal-agent context using
data from furniture sales. The third essay (chapter 4) proposes an empirical strategy to
estimate the impact that a worsening in banks’ wholesale funding opportunities (such as the
Italian sovereign debt crisis of 2011) has on borrowers’ ability to repay their loans. Chapter
5 concludes the thesis and provides some directions for future work.
The first essay (chapter 2), written jointly with Stephan Seiler, estimates the effect of time
spent searching in a supermarket on consumers’ expenditure. The analysis is implemented
using a unique data-set obtained from radio frequency identification tags which are attached
to supermarket shopping carts. This allows us to record consumers’ purchases as well as the
time they spent in front of the shelf when contemplating which product to buy, giving us
a direct measure of search effort. We estimate the effect of extending search on the price
consumers pay within a category while controlling for a host of confounding factors such
as category-level price variation over time and measurement error. Our results show that
an additional minute spent searching lowers category-level expenditure by $1.40. Extending
search-time by one standard deviation allows consumers to appropriate 8 percent of the
possible category-level price savings.
The second essay (chapter 3) uses data on the staff of a furniture firm to show that,
when a fixed bonus scheme conditional on revenues was introduced, it increased the revenues
generated by all sales employees, but I find no significant heterogeneous effect of the bonus
scheme depending on whether the employee is given control over price or not. The essay also
shows that giving the sales staff control over price does not significantly increase revenues.
1
The effect of the bonus scheme and of price delegation on gross profits minus paid bonuses,
commissions, and wages were similar. These results are robust to a number of checks, and
are consistent with a model of moral hazard and price delegation.
The third essay (chapter 4), written jointly with Marco Gallo, Giacinto Micucci and
Francesco Palazzo, proposes an empirical strategy to estimate the impact that a worsen-
ing in banks’ wholesale funding opportunities has on the ability of firms to repay their loans.
We exploit the Italian sovereign debt crisis of July 2011 as a significant funding shock to
Italian banks. This chapter investigates whether this severe shock to credit supply hampered
borrowers’ ability to repay their loans. We find that, following the funding shock of July
2011, one standard-deviation increase in our measure of firms’ exposure to banks’ financial
distress increases their probability not to honour their loans by about 0.4% (i.e., the size of
the credit channel). Our results also suggest that the aggregate demand channel led to a
2.4% increase in the share of non-performing loans.
Chapter 5 concludes and discusses the limitations of the current work and provides some
directions for future research.
2
Chapter 2. Consumer Search: Evidence
from Path-Tracking Data
Abstract
We estimate the effect of consumer search on the price of the purchased product in a physical
store environment. The analysis is implemented using a unique data-set obtained from
radio frequency identification tags which are attached to supermarket shopping carts. This
allows us to record consumers’ purchases as well as the time they spent in front of the
shelf when contemplating which product to buy, giving us a direct measure of search effort.
Controlling for a host of confounding factors such as category-level price variation over
time and measurement error, we estimate that an additional minute spent searching lowers
price paid by $1.70. We also find that search intensity varies substantially across product




When consumers make a purchase decision they might often not be aware of prices for
all products due to informational and cognitive constraints. In many categories a large
number of products are available and obtaining relevant information can be a costly process.
In a grocery shopping context, consumers can search across stores, time their purchase in
order to benefit from temporary price reductions and search across various products within
a particular store when standing in front of the shelf. In this chapter we focus on the
final part of this decision process: the consumer’s search-effort when processing information
and comparing products and prices immediately before putting the chosen product into her
shopping cart. Specifically, our goal is to estimate the effect of the extent of consumers’
search activity within a particular product category on the price they pay.
A key challenge in analyzing consumer search behavior in a physical store environment
lies in the fact that it is very hard to observe and record which products the consumer was
considering before picking one particular product from the shelf. This differs from studies
that use online data such as De Los Santos et al. [2012], Chen and Yao [2012] or Koulayev
[2014] where one typically observes the sequence of searches. An alternative in a brick
and mortar environment would be to provide consumers with eye-tracking equipment as in
Stu¨ttgen et al. [2012]. This provides a great level of detail but has the disadvantage of
disrupting the “natural” shopping experience of the consumer. In this chapter we therefore
propose an approach to understanding search behavior without such an intervention. To
this end we use “path-tracking” data obtained from shopping karts that are equipped with
radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags combined with store-level data on purchases and
product prices.1. The data allows us to measure the time a consumer spends in front of a
particular category before deciding to purchase a specific product. This gives us a direct
measure of the extent of the consumer’s search activity.2
The central contribution of this chapter is to demonstrate how the benefits from search
(per unit of time) can be estimated using data on the total duration of search as well as the
1A further source of data on consumer search behavior / considerations is represented by survey information
directly levied from consumers. This kind of data is used in Draganska and Klapper [2011] and Honka
[2014]
2Apart from RFID other technology such as video capture (see Hui et al. [2013a]) or smart-phone wi-fi
signals might also be used to measure search-time in a similar fashion. Speaking with experts in the
industry we were told that most systems are not precise enough, too costly or difficult to implement due
to privacy concerns. Also RFID is not frequently used in practice because implementation costs are high.
4
price of the chosen product. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work to gather data
on search effort and to estimate search benefits in a physical store environment. We find
that an additional minute spent searching lowers expenditure by $1.70. The magnitude is
economically significant: Extending search-time by one standard deviation in each product
category lowers total trip-level expenditure by $1.80 or 7 percent for the average shopping
trip. Given that we are analyzing very frequently purchased products, the potential unre-
alized savings are large and suggest that consumers engage in a limited amount of search
activity. Secondly, we leverage the fact that we observe consumers searching across a large
set of product categories, a unique feature of our data. Consumers face very different price
distributions across categories and the potential search benefits therefore differ substantially.
We would expect a rational consumer to extend her search-time in such a way that the
marginal benefits from search are equated across categories. However, we find this not to be
the case with search intensity being lower relative to the benefits from search in categories
with high price dispersion as well as categories with short inter-purchase spells. The number
of products as well as the average price-level of the category instead are not correlated with
marginal search benefits. Taken together our results suggest that given the limited amount
of search activity, marketing tools that influence the search process such as displays and
feature advertising can have a strong impact. Moreover, such marketing tools are likely to
be more effective in categories which are characterized by low search intensity.
In order to guide our empirical analysis, we rely on the canonical sequential model of
consumer search. Using the model we show that consumers’ search-time is affected by the
total number of products being promoted within a category on a given day. When consumers
are faced with a distribution that contains a larger number of low prices they will find a
sufficiently low price faster. We test this empirically and find that within categories weeks
with more promotions are characterized by shorter search-spells. Furthermore, consumers
also pay lower prices when more promotions are available, thereby creating an endogeneity
concern for the relationship of search-time and price paid. Secondly, our data records the
time spent in the vicinity of the product category, which is a noisy measure of actual category-
level search activity. The presence of this measurement error will lead to attenuation bias
in an OLS regression setup. In order to deal with both concerns we instrument search-time
with the consumer’s walking speed before reaching the product. Speed is highly negatively
correlated with search-time. We interpret this correlation as being driven by underlying
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variation in search costs: Consumer with higher search costs will walk faster and search
less at each pickup. Speed is a valid instrument as it is determined before the actual search
process and therefore before the consumer can learn about prices. Furthermore measurement
error in search-time is unlikely to be correlated with speed which allows us to eliminate the
attenuation bias.3
Our work is closely related to a series of papers by Hui, Bradlow and Fader (Hui et al.
[2009a], Hui et al. [2009c], and Hui et al. [2009b]) which introduced path-tracking data to
the academic literature. Relative to their work, which jointly describes the path as well as
purchase decisions of consumers, we make little use of the actual path the consumer takes.
Instead, we focus more narrowly on the consumer’s search process when standing in front
of the shelf containing a particular product category.4 In addition to the path-data, we also
make use of detailed product-level price and purchase data that we are able to link to the
path-tracking data-set. The combination of the two data sources allows us to analyze how
consumers spend time in the store (recorded by the path-data) impacts the purchases they
make (measured in the sales data). In this way we are able to link the novel information we
can get out of the path-tracking data to the literature on consumer search and consideration
set formation. To the best of our knowledge when analyzing consideration sets in a physical
store context (see for example Roberts and Lattin [1991], Andrews and Srinivasan [1995],
Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker [1996], Mehta et al. [2003] and Seiler [2013]), the search
process was usually unobserved. In this chapter we instead have a direct measure of the
extent of search activity.5
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a detailed
explanation of the data used in our analysis followed by descriptive statistics in section 2.3.
In section 2.4, we provide a theoretical framework to guide our empirical strategy, which is
presented in section 2.5. In section 2.6, we present the main results, followed by robustness
checks in section 2.7. In section 2.8 we provide some interpretation for the magnitude of the
3Note that the measurement error in search-time might be due to the consumer looking at other nearby
categories, leaving her cart behind or spending time doing something unrelated to search. There is a
possibility that an event that led slows the consumer down will influence her speed prior to pick-up as
well as the search-time recorded at the pick-up. We run a set of robustness check to deal with this
particular issue.
4Another application of path-data is the analysis of unplanned purchases in Hui et al. [2013b].
5A small number of studies on consumer search in a physical store environment such as Cobb and Hoyer
[1985] or Dickson and Sawyer [1990] and Hoyer [1984] employed teams of trained investigators, who
observed consumers in the store and recorded their search-time manually. This allows them to record
search-duration albeit only for a relatively small sample of consumers.
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estimated effect and explore heterogeneity in search intensity across categories. Finally we
make some concluding remarks.
2.2. Data
We use data from a large store in Northern California that belongs to a major supermarket
chain.6 The complete dataset comprises three pieces: (1) sales data from the supermarket,
(2) a store-map with information on product-locations, (3) data on the path a consumer took
through the store for a subset of trips over a period of 26 non-consecutive days.7 Importantly,
we are able to link the path-data to the corresponding purchase baskets from the sales data
with the help of the store map. In Section (A.1) of the appendix we provide details on how
the two pieces of data are combined.
2.2.1. Purchase data
We have complete purchase data for all consumers that visited the store during the 26 days
for which we also observe the path-data. This part of the data is a standard supermarket
scanner data-set similar to the IRI dataset (see Bronnenberg et al. [2008]) for instance. At
the consumer-level we observe the full basket of products as well as the price paid for each
item. Unfortunately, prices for items that do not come in specific pack-sizes (e.g. fresh fruit,
vegetables, meat etc.) are not reported in meaningful units (i.e. per kilogram for instance).
We are therefore unable to use those products in our analysis. Apart from these problematic
products we are going to use data across about 7,500 unique products belonging to roughly
150 different product-categories which are stocked in the store. Over our sample period we
observe a total of about 220,000 shopping baskets. However, the path-data is only available
for a subset of those.
2.2.2. Path data
In addition to the sales data we also have data on the path that consumers took when
walking through the store. The paths are obtained using RFID tags that are attached
6We are not able to disclose the identity of the supermarket. The store has a fairly typical format with a
trading area of about 45,000 square-feet and a product range of 30,000 UPCs.
7The days in the path data are 8/24/2006 - 8/29/2006 and 9/7/2006 - 9/26/2006.
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to consumers’ shopping karts and baskets (see Sorensen [2003]). Each RFID tag emits a
signal about every 4 seconds that is received by a set of antennas throughout the store.
Based on the signal, triangulation from multiple antennas is used to pin-point the precise
location of the consumer. The consumer’s location is then assigned to a particular point on
a grid of so-called ”traffic-points” which is overlaid onto the store-map. The points used to
assign consumers’ locations are four feet apart from each other, allowing for a fairly granular
tracking of the consumer. For every path we observe a sequence of consecutive traffic points
with a time stamp associated to each point.8
Not all shopping karts and baskets in the store are equipped with RFID tags however.
We therefore only observe path-data for a subset of about 7 percent of all store visits. This
is somewhat limiting as we rarely observe multiple trips for the same consumer despite the
fact that we have more of a panel dimension in the purchase data. We will discuss how this
affects our analysis later when we present the empirical strategy. Second, even if a shopping
basket is matched to the path-data, it is possible that not all purchased items in the basket
have a match in the path-data. This can happen for instance if the consumer leaves her cart
or basket behind and the item pick-up can therefore not be captured in the data.
The primary variable of interest derived from the path-data is the time a consumer spends
stationary at a certain point in the store when picking up a product. An individual item
purchase, or more precisely the “pick-up” of the item from the shelf, constitutes the unit
of observation in our regressions and we observe a total of around 29,000 pick-ups in the
data. Using the store map we match the grid of traffic points to product locations that
are within reach of the consumer from a given traffic point.9 For a given path and set of
products in the basket at the check-out we can then use the store map to determine when the
product was picked up by the consumer as well as how long she spent in front of the shelf.
In other words, the item pickup is defined as the moment in time the consumer walked past
a specific product that we later see in her purchase basket. In order to compute search-time,
we measure the time elapsed between (1) the moment the consumer is first located on a
traffic point assigned to the product and (2) the point in time when she moves on to a traffic
8If a consumer moves further than to an adjacent traffic point between signals, the movement over traf-
fic points in between the signals is interpolated. As the signal is emitted at a high frequency little
interpolation is necessary for most trips.
9The linkage between traffic- and product-points is provided in the data. Mostly any product location is
associated with two or three traffic points. However, at a few special locations such as the end of an aisle
more traffic points can be associated with a given product location.
8
point outside of the assigned area. Figure (2.1) illustrates graphically how search-time is
assigned to a product pick-up. This metric gives us a measure of time spent in the vicinity
of the product which was ultimately purchased. For convenience of exposition we will refer
to this metric as search-time. However, we recognize that it is a noisy measure of actual
search activity and the consumer might have been doing other things at the same time. The
presence of such measurement error will inform our empirical strategy later.10
Secondly, we compute the speed at which the consumer moves during various parts of her
trip using time-stamps and distances between consecutive traffic points. Speed, although
not the primary focus of this chapter will play an important role in our empirical strategy.
2.3. Descriptive Statistics
All of our analysis is going to be conducted within product categories. In other words we
model how a consumer’s search activity within a category affects the particular product she
buys from that category. In total we have around 150 categories which are defined as groups
of products that are naturally substitutes for each other but not with other products outside
of the category. Examples for categories defined in this way are Bacon, Beer and Bird Food.
Due to a relatively small amount of observations per category, we pool data across categories
for most of our analysis. In all pooled specifications we control for a set of category fixed
effects.
2.3.1. Search Time
The main novelty of the work lies in the introduction of a direct measure of in-store search-
time. For each item picked up during a shopping trip we can compute the extent of the
consumer’s search activity as described in the previous section. Figure (2.2) shows the
histogram for our search metric. The variable is roughly log-normally distributed with a
mean of 10.3 seconds and a standard deviation of 8.5 seconds.
In order to explore where the variation in search time originates from we take the data from
29,000 item pick-ups and regress time spent searching on a set of category fixed effects. These
10Furthermore, we only observe the movement and stationarity of the cart, but not the consumer herself.
To the extent that karts or baskets are left behind, this might also contribute to measurement error in
the duration of stationary periods. This is something we explicitly deal with in the empirical analysis.
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would play an important role if specific product locations and/or category characteristics such
as the price dispersion or the number of available products were the source of systematic
differences in search behavior. With a full set of category fixed effects we find an r-square of
0.064. When adding a set of trip fixed effects into the regression as well the r-square goes up
to 0.57. However, this is to a large extent due to the fact that we have many trips with only
a small number of matched item pick-ups in the data. When we constrain the sample to
trips with over 5 items in the basket, the r-square of a regression with category and trip fixed
effects decreases to 0.38. In other words there is substantial variation, about two-thirds, in
search behavior for the same consumer within a given shopping trip. The rich within-trip
variation is going to be helpful for conducting some important sensitivity checks later on.
Figure (2.3) analyzes further how search-time varies both within and across trips. Specif-
ically, we plot for trips of different duration the average search-time within each decile of
the trip. Unsurprisingly, we find that longer trips are characterized by substantially longer
periods of search. A change of 15 minutes in total trip-length leads to about a 1 second
increase in the average search-time per item pick-up.11 Interestingly, the extent of search
activity evolves non-monotonically over the duration of each trip. Regardless of the trip’s
total duration, we find an inverted u-shape of search-time across deciles. The within-trip
differences are of a similar magnitude as the across trip ones. For example for trips of up to
15 minutes, average search-time varies between 6.5 second at the first decile to a maximum
of 9.5 seconds at the sixth decile. Generally, most of the variation within shopping trips
comes from shorter search spells in the first two deciles as well as the last two deciles. There
is less variation in search-time in the middle part of the trip.
2.3.2. Speed (and its relationship to search-time)
The speed at which consumers walk during the shopping trips plays an important role in our
identification strategy as it will serve as an instrument for search-time. Figure (2.4) shows
a histogram of speed, the unit of observation is a minute-long interval within a shopping
trip. Speed is approximately normally distributed with a mean of 2.12 feet per second and
a standard deviation of 0.75 feet per second. This corresponds to roughly half the average
11Note that most of the trip duration variation is due to consumers walking a longer distance through the
store. Only 6 percent of total time in the store is spent searching on the average trip. The positive
relationship between category-level search-times and trip duration is therefore not one that occurs by
construction.
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walking speed of an adult which is about 4.3 feet per seconds. Speed varies substantially
both across and within trips. Analogous to search-time we plot speed across deciles of the
trip for shopping trips of different length in Figure (2.5). The graph shows the mirror image
of what we saw in the case of search-time: the longer the total trip duration the slower do
consumers walk at any given point in the trip. Second, speed is fastest at the very beginning
and the end of the trip. The relationship between the length of search spells and speed is
quite intuitive and presumably reflects that consumers which are in more of a rush will both
walk faster and also spend less time contemplating which product to pick. Our interpretation
is that both variables reflect underlying variation in search costs / opportunity cost of time.
We explicitly exploit this relationship for our identification strategy.
In order to investigate the relationship between speed and search-time in more detail we
regress search-time at each pick-up on the consumer’s walking speed over the 60 seconds
preceding the pick-up. Specifically, we calculate our speed-instrument as feet per second, i.e.
by dividing the distance the consumer walked within the minute leading up to the product
pick-up by 60 seconds.12 This yields a highly significant coefficient of -3.60 with a standard
deviation of 0.10 and an F-stat of 1,267 and constitutes the first stage regression of the
baseline IV-specification we estimate later. We confirm, as figures (2.3) and (2.5) suggest,
that the relationship holds both within and across trips: In column (2) of Table (2.1) we
regress pick-up specific search-time on speed over the 60 seconds prior to the pick-up and
include a set of trip fixed effects. In column (3) we regress average trip-level search-time on
average trip-level speed. For both the across- and the within-regression we find a significant
correlation with F-stats of 572 and 618 respectively. In later sensitivity checks we will make
use of these relationships and isolate only within (across) trip variation in order to estimate
the benefits from search.
Note that we interpret speed variation within the trip as representing changes in consumer
search costs over a very short period of time. This contrasts with a notion of search costs
as being a consumer-specific trait that varies little over time. We think however that the
observed variation of speed and search-time over the course of the shopping trip does indicate
that consumers’ capacity and willingness to process information varies considerably within
the trip. Alternatively search costs could vary for each consumer across different product
categories and the within-trip patterns in speed and search-time reflects the sequence in
12In the case of the first pick-up happening less than 60 seconds into the trip, we use speed between the
beginning of the trip and the first pick-up.
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which those categories are visited. While the sequence of categories might affect search-time
it is less clear why speed would be affected by it. We also directly test whether the pattern are
driven by the store layout by regressing speed and search-time on location dummies. Results
are reported in Table (A.1) in the appendix and we find that within-trip search and speed
patterns are similar even after controlling for product location.13 Furthermore, our main
analysis controls for category fixed effects which will take out any category-specific variation
that might be caused by certain categories being visited earlier or later during the typical
trip. Finally, our results are also robust to using speed at the trip-level as an instrument at
which point any within-trip dynamics have no influence on the estimated coefficient.
2.3.3. Price Dispersion and Possible Savings from Search
In order to quantify the possible benefits of search, we report the category-specific differences
between the highest and the lowest price in the category. Because prices for the same product
vary substantially over time, we compute the difference between the minimum and maximum
price for each day/category combination. We then compute the average of this variable across
days for each category. The first row of Table (2.2) reports the distribution of the min-max
price difference across categories. On average there is a price difference of $4.21, but this
varies across the set of about 150 categories. At the 25th percentile the price difference is
equal to $1.78 and it rises to $5.26 at the 75th percentile. We also report the percentage
difference of the lowest daily price relative to the highest daily price in the category in the
second row of the same Table.
Because there is substantial variation in prices due to promotional activity we also report
some descriptive statistics on the time series variation in prices. For the purpose of this
exercise we define a promotion as a daily price which lies at least 15 percent below the
maximum price of that product over our sample period. Similar to the calculation for the
price difference, we compute the share of promoted products for each day/category pair and
then take the average across days for each category. The distribution across categories is
reported in the third row. On average about 30 percent of UPCs within a category are on
promotion. Furthermore, even within our short time window many different products go
on promotion. In order to capture this, we compute the percentage of UPCs that went on
13The tables reports regressions of speed and search-time on dummies for each decile of the trip as well as
dummies for trips of different duration (0 to 15 minutes, 15 to 30 minutes, etc.). When we add location
fixed effect to the regression the coefficients on the dummies are very similar.
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promotion at some point during our sample period for each category. The average across
categories is almost 60 percent which is substantially higher than the daily share of promoted
products indicating that the identity of the set of promoted products changed frequently.
Taken together, the large within-category price dispersion as well as the substantial degree
of promotional activity suggest that there are gains from search. The average category-level
saving of $4.21 might seem relatively small compared to other (non-CPG) product categories,
however relative to the amount of total shopping expenditure it is not trivial. Consumers
buy on average 8 products on a shopping trip, which would allow for maximum savings of
roughly $34. Furthermore, these gains can be realized by consumers on each shopping trip,
i.e. on a very regular basis and are therefore of a large overall magnitude.
2.4. A simple model of sequential search
In this section we outline the predictions of the canonical sequential search model described
in McCall [1970] and describe how the model maps onto our specific context and data. We
make some minor modifications to the model in order to adapt it to our setting and data.
Note that the model is not estimated structurally but we use it to guide the estimation
strategy.
In the sequential search model consumers receive draws from a distribution of utilities and
optimally decide when to stop searching. In our context, consumers search across products
within a category. For simplicity of exposition we outline a pure price search model, i.e.
consumers care only about price but not about other product characteristics. We will discuss
the implications of relaxing this assumption later on.
Assume a consumer gets gross utility v if she consumes any product within the category.
Further, assume the consumer incurs a search cost cproduct when evaluating an additional
product and receives a draw from the price distribution F (p) with support [p, p] for each
search attempt. The optimal stopping rule is a time invariant threshold-rule λ (i.e. the
consumer will accept any price below λ) which maximizes the consumer’s value function14
14We ignore discounting due to the short amount of time that consumers spent searching in a given category
in our data. We also assume that v is high enough such that the consumer searches at least one option.
We interpret this as the consumer being committed to buying in the category but deciding which specific
product to pick from within the category.
13
EV = −cproduct +
∫ λ
p
(v − p)dF (p) + (1− F (λ))EV (2.1)
Alternatively one can interpret the optimal stopping rule as the value of λ which equates
the marginal benefit with the marginal cost of searching
∫ λ
p
(λ− p)dF (p) = cproduct
One can easily see that the optimal threshold λ is increasing in search costs cproduct.
Intuitively, a higher search costs will make the consumer less picky and therefore willing
to accept a higher price.
In the standard search model we can think of cproduct as representing the cost of resolv-
ing uncertainty about one more option. In our data however, we are not able to measure
the number of options evaluated, instead we only know the extent of search activity mea-
sured in real time. In order to adapt the model to our setting we model the search cost of
evaluating one more alternative as cproduct = TimePerSearch ∗ ctime, the product of time
needed to search one option (TimePerSearch) and the opportunity cost of time (ctime).
TimePerSearch represents the efficiency of the search process. It might (as any of the
other model primitives) vary across consumers. For simplicity of exposition we ignore any




(λ− p)dF (p) = TimePerSearch ∗ ctime (2.2)












therefore the expected time spent searching is given by
E(SearchT ime) = TimePerSearch ∗ E(N) = TimePerSearch
F (λ)
(2.4)
Note that λ is the optimal stopping rule defined by equation (2.2) and is therefore a func-
tion of TimePerSearch. A larger amount of time needed to make an additional search will
increase search costs and therefore increase the stopping threshold λ, making the consumer
willing to accept higher prices.
2.5. Identification Strategy
One way to think about our empirical strategy is the following: Our lives would be easy if
all the observed differences in search-time were caused by differences in consumers’ search
costs ctime. In this case we would have low search cost consumers choosing a lower stopping
threshold which would lead them to search for a longer amount of time and pay a lower
price on average. In this scenario we could simply estimate the relationship between search-
time and price paid by OLS. Put differently, the object of interest that we want to estimate
is the effect that an increase in search-time caused by a decrease in search costs has on
price. As we outline in more detail below, there are likely to be factors other than search
cost variation which affect the joint-distribution of search time and price paid. The OLS
estimate is therefore unlikely to allow us to recover the desired causal estimate.
In the absence of direct information on search costs any variable that is correlated with
search costs can be used as an instrumental variable to shift search-time.15 As long as the
instrument is uncorrelated with other factors that affect the price paid, the IV will allow us
to estimate the causal effect of search time on price. Moreover, the IV is useful because it
translates the search cost movement into more meaningful units: dollars saved per unit of
time spent searching.
In our baseline specification we use the speed at which the consumer is walking before
picking up the product as an instrument. As we have shown in Section (2.3.2) speed is
highly correlated with search-time both within and across trips. Our interpretation is that
15No paper that we are aware of has direct data on consumers’ search costs. A typical approach is to use a
structural model in order to back out search costs under some set of assumptions. We do not take this
approach here.
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variation in search costs is driving both speed and search-time. For instance on a trip on
which the consumer has a higher opportunity cost of time, she will both walk faster and spend
less time searching for each product. In other words speed and search costs are correlated
because they are both affected by a latent third variable: search costs. However, search-
time is also influenced by other factors such as the prices the consumer samples during the
search process. Speed is arguably not affected by these factors and can therefore serve as an
instrument.
In the following sections we lay out evidence in support of our exclusion restriction in more
detail. In particular, two prominent reasons that would introduce bias into an OLS regression
are variation in category-level promotional activity over time as well as measurement error
in search-time. We believe that the speed instrument does a good job in overcoming these
issues. In robustness checks and extensions we consider further sources of bias such as
heterogeneity in preferences over product characteristics other than price and incorrect price
expectations.
2.5.1. Category-level Price Variation over Time
Consumers form expectations knowing that prices vary both across products and over time.
The latter dimension is particularly important in the grocery shopping context due to the
presence of high frequency price movements. As was shown in Section (2.3) price reductions
due to promotions are very common in our data. Both dimensions are embodied in the price
distribution governing the expectation process F (p). On any given day t there exists a price
distribution Ft(p) across products that is (in most cases) not known to the consumer
16, but
that will influence the length of the search process as well as the expected price. Formally
this situation corresponds to the threshold value of the stopping rule being determined by
F (p) whereas the expected number of searches and the expected price are a function of
Ft(p)
17
16It could be known to the consumer in some circumstances such as information about promotions being
available through feature advertising. We will address this issue later.
17Strictly speaking both E(SearchT ime) and E(p) are also still a function of F (p) which determines the











Days with more promotional activity are characterized by a price CDF with more weight
in the left part of the distribution. This leads to a lower expected search duration as can
be easily seen from the equation above. The impact on E(p) is in principle ambiguous
and depends on how the mass of the probability density function moves with respect to
the threshold. When more products are promoted this will lead to more prices lying below
λ. However, depending on where those prices lie within the truncated distribution will
determine whether the expected price paid increases or decreases. With our data we are able
to directly test whether changes in Ft(p) have any impact on search-time and price. We do
this by regressing time spent searching (and price paid) by consumer i in category c on day t
on the fraction of products promoted within the category and a set of category fixed effects
as well as day fixed effects
SearchT imeict = α ∗ FractionPromotedProductsct + ξc + δt + εict (2.5)
Priceict = α˜ ∗ FractionPromotedProductsct + ξ˜c + δ˜t + ε˜ict (2.6)
where ξc (ξ˜c) denotes the category fixed effect and δt (δ˜t) the day fixed effect. The predictions
outlined above correspond to a negative coefficient α in the first regression. The prediction
for α˜ instead is ambiguous. Note that controlling for category fixed effects is important here
as promotional activity and search might vary across categories for a host of other reasons.
Table (2.3) shows that we indeed find a negative and significant coefficient when regressing
search-time on our measure of promotional activity, confirming the prediction of the search
model. The regression also provides some first evidence that our search metric varies in an
intuitively plausible way.18 When regressing search-time on the share of promoted UPCs
we get a negative and significant coefficient. In terms of magnitude, a movement from no
18Note that we are less concerned with measurement error in search-time in this regression as search is used
as the dependent variable. Later search-time will appear as an explanatory variable and measurement
error will play a more important role.
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promotions in the category to all products being promoted would lower search-time by one
second which corresponds to a 10 percent decrease. Although the theoretical predictions
regarding the effect on price paid are ambiguous we do find a negative and significant effect
as reported in columns (2) and (3). Quantitatively, price paid is about 19 percent lower in
full promotion weeks versus no promotion weeks.19
The analysis above shows that the variation in promotional activity potentially leads to
a correlation of search-time and price which is unrelated to the consumer’s search cost as
a driver of the extent of search activity. An OLS regression will therefore not allow us
to estimate the causal effect of search activity on price paid. In order to deal with the
endogeneity problem we need an instrument that shifts search-time by affecting search costs
but that is unrelated to the extent of category-level promotional activity at any given point
in time. Speed does qualify as an instrument as long consumers do not have any price
information before arriving at the shelf. If consumers do have information about pricing
before they arrive at the shelf, from promotional flyers and/or in-store displays, this might
influence their expectation and potentially violates the exclusion restriction. However, even
in this case, the IV is only invalid in the case where consumers adjust their walking speed to
the price information, by hurrying to the shelf with the promoted product for instance. We
don’t think that this scenario is very likely but it is hard to rule out entirely. We deal with
this issue in greater detail in the robustness check section later in the chapter.
2.5.2. Measurement Error
In our data we are able to measure time spent in the vicinity of the product category,
which presumably is a noisy measure of actual category-level search activity. In particular,
measurement error in search-time might arise for a variety of reasons: the consumer might
19Note, that apart from promotional activity having an impact on the set of prices being available, it could
also affect the probability with which a particular price is drawn. This is an issue specific to our setup as
all product prices are visually “accessible” on the shelf immediately. Promotions might therefore provide
visual cues that draw the consumer’s attention to the promoted product. This would be captured by
a shift in the CDF from which prices are drawn which would now assign more probability weight to
products which are promoted on the particular day. In a pure price search model most typically the
probabilities of drawing a particular price are uniformly distributed across products. In our case there
might be reason to think of promotions as shifting the probability of drawing a certain product. This
type of effect would also lead to a negative correlation of promotional activity with search-time. Most
likely both mechanism contribute to the negative coefficient α estimated in the above regression. For
the purpose of the empirical exercise in this chapter we do not attempt (or need) to disentangle the two
channels.
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be looking at other categories nearby, leave her cart behind or simply spend part of the time
engaging in search-unrelated activity. In other words we are not dealing with measurement
error that arises simply from imperfections in the data recording process. Instead, search-
time as recorded in the data can be seen as a proxy for actual search effort. As usual, the
presence of this measurement error will lead to attenuation bias in an OLS regression setup.
Given the nature of our data this issue could potentially be quite severe.
As long as we think of measurement error as arising from local and isolated occurrences
such as the consumer leaving the cart behind or contemplating a purchase in another nearby
category, using speed as an instrument will alleviate the problem. Potentially the issue is
more complicated in our context as things that slow the consumer down during her search
process might also affect her speed leading up to the search incidence. This could occur
for instance if the consumer slows down because her attention is grabbed by a display in a
particular aisle. This might impact her behavior over a longer time window during the trip.
In particular she might walk more slowly as well as spend more time near the product due
to the distraction created by the nearby display. In other words the same measurement error
might also affect the instrumental variable. This kind of issue is most likely to contaminate
speed over the time period right before the pick-up. In order to alleviate concerns we there-
fore use lagged versions of our speed instrument in a robustness check. In particular, we
implement a set of regressions using different time-spans over which the lagged measure is
computed. Second, we also run a sensitivity check in which we use trip-level average speed
as an instrument. In other words we are using only across trip variation in speed in order
to estimate the impact of search. We consider this a very conservative approach to dealing
with measurement error as events affecting individual pick-ups are unlikely to be correlated
with speed over the entire shopping trip.
2.5.3. Chance and Search Spell Duration
There is another issue, specific to our context, which might cause attenuation bias in a similar
way as measurement error. A sequential searcher can be more or less lucky in how quickly she
comes across a price draw which lies below her stopping threshold. However, the expected
price conditional on having already searched a certain number of times remains unchanged.
In other words whether the consumer searched only once or 10-times, conditional on not
having stopped yet, the expected price is always equal to the unconditional price expectation
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at the beginning of the search process:





where p denotes the price of the actually purchased product, p1 to pk denote the price draws
for the k options searched so far (without having stopped). The intuition for this result can
be easily obtained from the basic dynamic optimization problem in equation (2.1). As long
as prices above the threshold are drawn, the consumer always finds herself back in the same
situation with an unchanged value function when making the decision to continue searching.
To fix ideas, assume that there is a set of consumer with identical search costs (in terms
of both ctime and TimePerSearch) and therefore identical threshold value λ. The actual
duration of their respective search spells will in general be different, although the expected
duration is the same, and this difference depends entirely on the sequence of price draws they
receive. Furthermore consumers with longer spells will not pay different prices on average
because the expected price conditional on the number of unsuccessful searches is the same
as the unconditional expected price. We therefore have variation in the duration of search
spells which is uncorrelated with price.
Remember that we want to find the effect of search-time on price caused by a change in
search costs. In other words we want to know how much less a consumer pays who searches
more on average because she is pickier. We therefore want to get rid of the variation in
search duration which is caused by similarly picky consumer being more or less lucky with
their price draws. In a similar vein as measurement error the chance-induced variation in
search spell duration would lead to an underestimated effect of search-time on price. It seems
safe to assume that the speed instrument is not correlated with chance during the search
process and the IV should therefore deal with this issue.
2.6. Main Results
In order to analyze the impact of search time on the price paid within a category we run the
following regression
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pijt = β ∗ SearchT imeijt + ζc + εijt (2.7)
Where pijt denotes the price consumer i pays for product j which she purchased on day
t. ζc denotes a category fixed effect, the subscript c denotes the category which product j
belongs to. εijt denotes the error term. A full set of category fixed effects is used across all
our specifications as we want know whether within a given category longer search leads to a
consumer picking a lower priced product. We cluster standard errors at the customer-level
to allow for an arbitrary within-customer correlation of the error terms. Results are reported
in Table (2.4)
We start by running the above regression by OLS. Doing so, we find a negative and
significant effect of search time on price. The coefficient is equal to -0.0057, in other words
an additional second of search time leads to a half a cent lower price. An additional minute
spent searching would therefore lower the price paid by about 30 cents. However, as described
in the previous section, the coefficient on search-time might be biased for various reasons.
We therefore implement an IV-strategy using the consumer’s walking prior to reaching the
product as an instrument. We outlined in the previous section why speed should deal with
both the endogeneity of search-time as well as measurement error.
As reported before in Section (2.3.2), the first stage regression of search time on speed
reported in column (2) is highly significant with an F-stat of 1,267. Column (3) reports the
coefficient of the effect of our (instrumented) measure of search time on price. We find a
negative and significant effect of -0.0275 which is over 4-times larger than the OLS estimate
of -0.0057 showing that the issues described above had a substantial impact on the magnitude
of the OLS coefficient. Quantitatively the point estimate of the IV corresponds to about a
$1.7 drop in price for an additional minute searched. We will return to an interpretation of
the effect magnitude later, after probing the robustness of our result with a set of sensitivity
checks.
2.7. Robustness checks
We use the sequential search model in order to systematically run through a battery of
robustness checks. Despite the fact that we do not structurally estimate the search model, it
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nevertheless provides a natural starting point to guide the sensitivity analysis. In particular
we consider how variation in each of the model primitives influences search-time and price
paid as well as how it relates to the consumer’s walking speed, our instrument. The search
model is quite parsimonious, therefore the set of model primitives we have to consider is
small and comprises the price distribution Fp and search efficiency (TimePerSearch). We
further investigate several extensions of the simple model: (1) a model where consumers have
preferences over non-price characteristics and therefore search not only for a lower price, (2)
deviations from rational expectations which influence the consumer’s perceived benefit from
searching and (3) the scenario where consumer have information about prices before arriving
at the product location in the store. Finally, we also provide a more in-depth discussion of
issues related to measurement error in search-time.
2.7.1. Search over other product attributes
One threat to the validity of our estimation lies in the fact that consumers are likely to not
only consider price but rather search over a whole set of product characteristics. As products
in most categories are quite differentiated and consumers presumably have heterogeneous
tastes over product attributes it is natural to ask how this interferes with our analysis.
In the search model this would be captured by the product valuation term v becoming
consumer-product-specific




where uij = (vij−αip) denotes utility which is a function of both price and brand preferences.
αi denotes the individual-specific price coefficient and vij represent the consumer specific
valuation of product j. G(u) is the cumulative density function that describes the distribution
of utilities across products.20 In this framework consumers will find higher utility products as
they search longer. A higher utility could be achieved either by a lower price or by finding a
product which is preferable along other product dimensions, i.e. that has a higher realization
of vij.
20Note that the threshold now denotes the minimum utility level at which the consumer will stop searching.
In the price search model the threshold denoted the maximum price at which to stop.
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First note that the presence of preferences over other product characteristics does not per se
invalidate our analysis. Consider for instance the situation where consumers have preferences
over brand characteristics beside price and that the former are randomly distributed across
consumers. The higher the weight on non-price characteristics the lower will be the effect
of search-time on price, but it does not introduce bias into our analysis. If instead product
tastes are not randomly distributed, this could potentially pose a problem, in particular if
product preferences are correlated with search costs across consumers. For instance one could
imagine that lower income consumers have a stronger preference for lower prices relative to
quality and also have lower search costs. These consumers would be searching longer and
also pay lower prices due to their preferences. This would lead to an upward bias (in absolute
terms) in the effect of search-time on price.21
We tackle this issue in two ways. First, we run a robustness check which controls for
individual- and trip-specific differences in search and purchase behavior by including a set of
trip fixed effects. This sensitivity check leverages the fact that there is substantial variation
in both speed and search-time over the course of a consumer’s shopping trip (see Section
(2.3)). In this way, we are only identifying the effect of search from within trip variation
across categories. In other words, we identify our main coefficient of interest from consumers
paying lower than average prices in categories in which they search more relative to their
average search-time across categories on the particular trip. Note that this approach is more
conservative than using consumer fixed effects. However, because most consumers do not
appear multiple times in the path-data, the two approaches are very similar. The results
from this regression are reported in Column (2) of Table (2.5). We replicate our baseline
specification without fixed effects in Column (1) for easier reference. The effect of search-
time on price when including trip fixed effects is -0.0206 (standard error of 0.0088), which is
similar to the results of our baseline specification.22
Note that the robustness check deals with preference heterogeneity only as long as a con-
sumer’s taste for quality relative to price is common across categories. If instead consumers
have a strong preference for quality over price only in some categories, but not in others,
21This issue is not unique to our setting. We are not aware of a structurally estimated search model
that allows for a flexible joint distribution of search costs and price sensitivity which would capture the
dynamics described above.
22Note that the number of observations for this robustness checks varies slightly relative to the baseline IV
regression. This is due to the fact that we drop trips for which only one item pickup is recorded when
we include trip fixed effects. We re-estimated the baseline model using without the single-item trips (not
reported) and find that the change in the sample size does not affect our results.
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then trip fixed effects do not fully address the issue. We see no reason why search costs
would in general be category-specific, however it could be the case that consumers are more
likely to buy certain categories towards the beginning, end or middle of their trip. However,
even if preferences were category specific for whatever reason, this would only be an issue
if search-costs were also category specific in a way that would create a spurious correlation.
I.e. categories in which consumers have stronger preferences over quality would have to be
categories for which search costs are higher in order to overestimate the effect. Also, we
later show that results are very similar when using a specification which only uses across
trip variation in search-time. Any within-trip dynamics could not possibly contaminate the
results in this alternative specification.
Second, we re-run our main specification, but change the dependent variable: Instead of
price paid we use an indicator variable that is equal to one if the consumer picked a product
that was on promotion. Note that the number of observations is smaller as we need to observe
regular purchases of a particular product in order define when it went on promotion. This
is only possibly if the product is purchased relative frequently. As before, the instrument is
strongly correlated with search-time with an F-stat of 529. The results slightly differs from
our baseline first stage only due to the difference in the number of observations used.23 In
the second stage the magnitude of the coefficient (standard error) on search-time is 0.0041
(0.0016), i.e. an additional minute spent searching increases the likelihood of finding a
promotion by 25 percentage points (0.0041 ∗ 60 = 0.246). As in our baseline case, we find
a much larger effect when instrumenting search time relative to the OLS case. Finally, we
also estimate the effect on the promotion dummy when including a set of trip fixed effects.
When doing so we obtain a coefficient (standard error) of 0.0044 (0.0024).
Using only time variation in product-specific prices due to promotions does mitigate some
of the concerns raised above. In particular, if quality differences are only reflected in different
baseline prices, then this approach deals with concerns arising from preferences over quality
relative to prices. The specification using a promotional dummy shows that our effect is not
estimated purely from consumers with longer search spells buying products with lower base
prices which are presumably of lower quality. Instead it is the case that longer search spells
make it more likely for a consumer to buy a promoted product. It could of course be the
23We replicated the baseline regression using only the observations for which the promotion dummy is defined
and find results that are not significantly different from the ones using the full sample. This reassures as
those issues of sample selection are unlikely to contaminate the analysis.
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case that lower quality products go on promotion more often and that is the reason why we
find consumers with longer search spells purchasing on promotion more often. In our data
we find however no relationship between price and promotional frequency. To test this we
regress the fraction of days a product is promoted on the baseline price and a set of category
dummies. The regression is run at the product-level for the set of 5,848 UPCs for which we
are able to define the promotion dummy. The coefficient on the baseline price is very small
and insignificant with a coefficient (standard error) of 0.0016 (0.0018).
2.7.2. Measurement Error and Alternative Instruments
In our data we are able to measure how much time the consumer spends in the vicinity of
a product she purchased before picking it up from the shelf. This is however only a proxy
for “true” search-time as the consumer might spend only part of her time in the product’s
vicinity on search. She might leave the cart or basket behind, some of the recorded time
in the category’s vicinity might be spent looking at other nearby products or simply not
engaging in any search related activity at all. The assumption for our identification strategy
to work is that whatever factor affects our search-time proxy is of a very immediate nature
and therefore only affects search-time, but not the consumer’s shopping behavior prior to
arriving at the category. If this is true, then speed leading up the pick-up is correlated with
“true” search-time because both reflect variation in the consumer’s search costs. On the
other hand, speed would in this case not be correlated with time spent on non-search related
activity that we capture as part of our proxy variable.
In our context it is conceivable that some part of the measurement error in search-time is
correlated with speed leading up to the pick-up. This could occur for instance if the consumer
slows down because her attention is grabbed by a large display in a particular aisle. This
might impact her behavior over a longer time window during the trip. In particular she might
walk more slowly as well as spent more time near the product due to the distraction created
by the nearby display. Although we do not think that such a scenario is very likely to occur,
we do run a set of robustness checks to further explore the issue. Specifically, we re-run our
baseline estimation with a slightly different instrument: we use speed lagged by 10 second,
i.e. speed from 70 second up to 10 seconds before the pick-up. In this way we are allowing
measurement error to affect speed directly before the pick-up as we are cutting out the part
of the consumer’s trip that is closest to the actual pick-up. We repeat the same exercise for
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longer lags of 20 and 30 seconds as well. The results are reported in Columns (2) to (4) of
Table (2.6). In comparison to our baseline case, reported in the first column of the same
table, the effect is similar. When increasing the lag, the coefficient on search-time increase.
This is consistent with the idea that the lags are able to get rid of issues of measurement
error. However, none of the coefficients using the lagged instruments is significantly different
from our baseline specification. We also lose some precision when employing lagged variables
due to the fact that the instrument is slightly weaker the more seconds we exclude. This
is unsurprising as speed directly before the pick-up presumably has the highest correlation
with pick-up time.
Second, we implement an IV-regression that uses only trip-level variation for identification
and constitutes probably the most conservative way to deal with the type of measurement
error present in our data. We try to explicitly capture the idea that longer trips with more
purchases tend to be trips on which the consumer is less in rush, i.e. has lower search
costs. She therefore walks more slowly and search-spells are longer as we have shown in the
descriptive statistics earlier. In order to use this variation we simply use average speed at
the trip-level as an instrument, rather than speed immediately prior to the pick-up. The
type of measurement error that is most likely to occur is relatively localized likely to affect
only a small part of the trip. Measurement error from individual instances during the trip
is therefore likely to be averaged out at the trip-level. Even if there is measurement error
at the trip-level, we see little reason why it would be correlated with average speed over the
whole duration of the trip. The results from this regression are reported in the last column
of Table (2.6). Our instrument is somewhat weaker as we are not using within-trip variation,
but still strong in absolute terms with an F-stat of 580. Our second stage coefficient on
search-time is significant and of similar magnitude as our baseline specification: The point
estimate is equal to -0.0299 with a standard error of 0.0142.
2.7.3. Price Distribution and Expectations
A model primitive that has a key influence on search behavior is the price distribution
F (p). We already discussed endogeneity concerns which arise from the fact that category-
specific price distributions vary over time due to the fact that different products go on
promotion at different points in time. We now turn to other two issues related to the
price distribution. Firstly, we consider the effect of consumers having biased expectations
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about the price distribution. Secondly, we investigate the consequences of consumers having
information about daily prices, and in particular promotions, before engaging in search. The
latter is likely to arise in our setting due to the presence of feature advertising and in-store
displays which provide price information to the consumer before she arrives at the shelf and
starts searching.
Incorrect Consumer Expectations
A dimension in which consumers’ behavior might differ from the stylized model is in the way
they form expectations about prices. As in any search model, expectations play a crucial
role because they determine the marginal benefit of searching and therefore the optimal
amount of search activity.24 In our search model a deviation from rational expectations can
be captured by the fact that the optimal stopping rule would be based on an incorrect price
distribution. In other words the optimal price threshold λ would solve∫ λ
p
(λ− p)dF˜ (p) = cproduct (2.8)
where F˜ (p) represent the price distribution used to form expectations. In the case of non-
rational expectation F˜ (p) will be different from the actual price distribution F (p). Note, that
when the consumer engages in search, prices are still drawn from the true price distribution
F (p), however the stopping threshold might differ from the one of a rational consumer. F˜ (p)










It is easy to see that more pessimistic expectations will lead to shorter search spells as well
as a higher expected price paid. The negative correlation between search-time and price that
our estimation captures could therefore be in part due to heterogeneity in expectations across
24In virtually all structural models of search, consumers are assumed to know the true price distribution.
Indeed, imposing the expectation process is usually necessary for identification in any dynamic model,
including models of search.
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consumers. However, this is actually “good” variation in the data rather than a confounding
factor that might interfere with a causal interpretation of our estimates. To see this, note
that expectations only influence search-time and price paid through their influence on the
stopping threshold λ. Overly optimistic consumers do overestimate the marginal benefit
from search and therefore search longer and pay a lower price on average. Moreover, it
is always possible to mimic the behavior of an overly optimistic consumer with a rational
consumer that has a lower opportunity cost of time, i.e. one could lower the marginal benefit
but increase the marginal cost in order to keep the stopping threshold unchanged. In other
words it matters little to our estimation whether optimism or low search costs make the
consumer less picky.25
Information obtained before searching
Prices at the daily level are likely to be, at least partially, observed by some set of con-
sumers due to feature advertising and in-store displays. This affects behavior in two ways.
Consumers with prior knowledge about daily prices will base their expectations on this infor-
mation whereas other consumers form expectations based on the distribution of prices over
time and across products. This issue is very similar to the case of consumers having biased
expectations. As discussed above, any type of variation in expectation formation does not
cause any problems in terms of causal inference.
Apart from promotional activity having an impact on the set of prices being available
and on consumers’ expectations, it could also affect the probability with which a particular
price is drawn. This is an issue specific to our setup because all product prices are visually
“accessible” on the shelf immediately. Promotions might therefore provide visual cues that
draw the consumer’s attention to the promoted product. This could happen either because
the consumer knows about the promotion and specifically tries to find to particular product or
because promotional signs on the shelf capture her attention. Formally such an effect would
be captured by a shift in the CDF from which prices are drawn which would now assign
more probability weight to products which are promoted on the particular day.26 This type
25Note that if there is any such variation in expectations in the data, our IV-strategy (in particular in
conjunction with trip fixed effects) will most likely not make use of it. It does seem unlikely that
consumers’ category-specific price expectations do influence their walking speed leading up to the pick-
up within the particular category.
26In a pure price search model most typically the probabilities of drawing a particular price are uniformly
distributed across products.
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of effect would lead to a negative correlation of promotional activity with search-time similar
to the effect of variation in F (p) over time discussed earlier.
Our instrument is valid as long as prior knowledge of prices does not alter the speed at
which consumers walk leading up to the item pick-up, by hurrying to the shelf with the
promoted product for instance. We don’t think that this scenario is very likely. Even if
it did occur, our sensitivity check using trip-level speed as an instrument is unlikely to be
affected by price knowledge in one particular category. The fact that our results are robust
to this particular test indicates that prior price knowledge is unlikely to pose a threat to
identification.
2.7.4. Differences in search-efficiency
The final model primitive whose influence on our analysis we need to look at is TimePerSearch,
the efficiency of the consumer’s search process. Most likely there is variation across consumers
in how much time they need in order to resolve uncertainty regarding a specific number of op-
tions. The first order effect of a decrease in TimePerSearch is that it lowers the consumer’s
search cost and therefore leads to a lower stopping threshold λ. In other words, consumers
which search more efficiently are willing to wait for a lower price draw as it is less costly
for them to evaluate additional options in the search process. Search efficiency only affects
price via this channel. The impact on search-time is however more complicated. On the one
hand search-time will be longer due to the fact that a more efficient consumer is pickier,
i.e. has a lower λ. At the same time however search-time is lower simply because it takes
less time to evaluate an additional option. This is easy to see from equation (2.4), where
TimePerSearch enters in the numerator and λ (which is a function of TimePerSearch) in
the denominator. The consequences of variation in search efficiency for our estimation are
similar in nature to a measurement error problem. Ideally we would like to measure variation
in the extent of search activity in terms of the number of options evaluated, but we only
observe search effort in real-time. The total search duration can be decomposed into two
components: the number of options evaluated and the time it takes to evaluate each option.
The former has an impact on price paid, but the latter does not. Variation in search-time
due to differences in search efficiency therefore causes attenuation bias in our estimate.
Because search efficiency is a latent concept, it is very hard to assess how much this issue
could affect estimation. We are less sure in this case that our speed instrument is able to
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purge out the problematic variation in search efficiency. It is conceivable that consumers
which are less efficient when searching also generally walk at a lower speed. However, most
likely TimePerSearch is a consumer-specific trait and does not vary across categories within
a trip. Our specification with trip fixed effects should therefore be able to deal with the
issue.27
2.8. Effect Magnitude and Cross-Category Heterogeneity
We find returns from searching that are fairly large with roughly $1.70 per minute. However,
because our measure of search-time is distributed with a mean of 10 seconds and a standard
deviation of 8 seconds, a minute constitutes a strong linear extrapolation relative to the
typical search time. In this section we therefore provide some guidance on how to interpret
the magnitude of the effect.
By the nature of the search problem, the relationship between search-time and price paid
is necessarily a non-linear one. Figure (2.6) illustrates this relationship when varying con-
sumers’ search costs. In terms of our search model, we can trace out how lowering search
costs leads to a lower stopping thresholds (λ) which in turn increases expected search-time
and decreases expected price (see equations (2.2 to (2.4)). The relationship is non-linear
with extensions in search-time from a lower level being associated with larger gains in terms
of finding lower prices. Moreover the potential gains within a category are bounded by the
lower bound of the price distribution. Given the shape of this relationship, the magnitude
of our estimate will depend on whether consumers in our data search relatively little (repre-
sented by the red scatter-plot) or a lot (the blue scatter-plot). In the latter case the average
consumer realizes more of the potential gains from search and the incremental benefit at
the margin is smaller. We can therefore interpret our estimates as the average consumer’s
marginal benefit from search or the unrealized potential gain from extending search by an-
other second. Due to the local nature of the effect and non-linear shape of the relationship
a linear extrapolation is a good approximation only for small changes in search-time.
In order to study the non-linearity of the relationship more directly we also re-estimate
our baseline model with an additional quadratic search-time term. When doing so we find
a coefficient (standard error) of -0.092 (0.041) for the linear term and 0.00166 (0.00097) for
27Even if there was variation in TimePerSearch within a trip this would if anything lead to an underesti-
mation of the effect of search-time on price.
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the quadratic term. The sign on both terms is as expected and consistent with the shape in
Figure (2.6).
2.8.1. Interpreting the Effect Magnitude
Due to the reasoning above we have to be careful not to extrapolate out linearly too far.
In this vain we use some back-of-the-envelope calculation in order to compute how large
the gains from search can be within a given trip using the non-linear relationship estimated
above. Extending search-time by one standard deviation from its mean, i.e. from 10 to
18 seconds, lowers price by 36 cents28. The average consumer purchases 8 products on a
typical trip and could therefore save about $2.90 in total when extending search-time by
one standard deviation in each product category. This constitutes roughly 11 percent of the
typical total shopping basket size of $27. Another way to quantify potential savings from
search is to put them into the broader context of the total time budget allocated to the
shopping trip rather than just the time spent searching. Consumers spend on average 23
minutes in the store and spend only about 80 second, i.e. 6 percent of their trip, searching.
Extending search time by one standard deviation (from the mean-level) in each category,
i.e. by 64 seconds, corresponds to a 4.5 percent increase in total shopping time and lowers
expenditure by $2.90. Relative to the average trip-level expenditure of $27 this translates
into an elasticity of expenditure with respect to shopping time of -2.3 at the trip-level.
Second, the magnitude of the benefits from search we find are in line with search cost
estimates of papers that estimate search costs structurally. Although our approach is different
in nature, it is fairly straightforward to compare our estimates to structural estimates of
search costs. In the typical empirical search model, search costs are identified as the monetary
value that is equal to the marginal benefit from searching another option.29 In our case we
directly estimate the marginal benefit from search. Therefore the only missing element to
compare estimates is an assumption about how much time searching another option takes.
De Los Santos et al. [2012] find search costs of $1.35 in the internet book market, Honka
[2014] estimates a cost of $80 for acquiring an additional car insurance quote, Koulayev
[2014] reports a search cost of around $6 that a consumer needs to incur to flip to another
28(−0.0921 ∗ 18 + 0.0017 ∗ 182)− (−0.0921 ∗ 10 + 0.0017 ∗ 102) = −0.3638
29Strictly speaking the search cost magnitude has to be equal or higher than the marginal benefit at the
point where the consumer stops, but lower at all previously searched options. This identifies search cost
bounds. Point identification usually comes from functional form.
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page when using an online meta-searcher for hotel bookings.30 If we assume that each of
the search activities in those papers takes about a minute, our estimate of $1.70 saved per
minute (or $2.90 saved per trip) is roughly of a similar magnitude. The one estimate that is
considerably higher is Honka [2014], possibly due to the fact that procuring a car insurance
quote might take longer. Of course, the markets for which search costs are estimated differ
in many ways and one would therefore not expect to necessarily find search costs of exactly
the same magnitude.
Note that we cannot easily translate monetary savings into welfare gains as we do not
model preferences over product characteristics other than price. We therefore do not know
how much price gains weigh in the consumer’s utility function relative to brand preferences
along other dimensions. This is a shortcoming of this study due to the nature of our data.
Pooling data across many categories and products makes it difficult to model preferences
over other product characteristics for almost 30,000 UPCs. This also affects the comparison
with the structural search cost estimates above. If the monetary gain is only part of the full
utility gain then search costs might actually be larger than the purely monetary benefit we
estimate.
2.8.2. Cross-Category Heterogeneity in Search
Contrary to most studies that we are aware of in the search literature, we are able to use
data from a large set of about 150 categories of grocery shopping products. This allows us to
analyze whether consumers’ search efforts vary across categories and if so whether category
characteristics are correlated with variation in search activity.
The starting point to an investigation of search patterns across categories is to ask why we
would expect to see any difference in search behavior at all. In terms of the model presented
earlier, the two drivers of search duration are search costs and search benefits, where the
latter depend on the degree of price dispersion in the category. If, for ease of exposition,
we assume for the moment that search costs do not vary by category, price dispersion is the
one key category characteristic which should influence how much consumers engage in search
activity. The top graph of Figure (2.7) illustrates the search-time / price relationship for two
categories, one with high and another with a low degree of price dispersion. In the high price
30All papers allow for some form of heterogeneity in search costs, the reported values roughly correspond to
the average value of search costs in the respective paper.
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dispersion category the gain from extending search by a small amount are large for any given
level of search-time. This translates into the slope of the curve being steeper at any level of
search activity.31 This implies that if a consumer were to search the same amount of time
in both categories, then she would forgo higher potential benefits from search in the high
dispersion category relative to the low dispersion one. In other words she could reallocate
her search-time across the two categories in order to achieve lower total expenditure. For a
rational consumer our model would therefore predict that she will search for longer in the
high dispersion category and that the benefits from search at the margin are equated. In
this section we set out to test this prediction: do consumers adjust their search-time across
categories in reaction to differences in the benefits from search and do they do it in such a
way that marginal benefits are equalized?
In order to implement such a test, we compute price dispersion at the category-level and
split our sample into pick-ups of products from categories with above and below median price
dispersion. We start by testing whether search-time differs systematically for purchases in
categories with different degrees of price dispersion. To this end we regress search-time on a
constant as well as a dummy for whether the purchased item belongs to a high (above median)
price dispersion category. Results are reported in column (2) of Table (2.7). Consistent with
the prediction outlined above we find a positive and significant effect of 0.907. Relative to an
estimated constant of 9.770 this represents a roughly 10 percent increase in search-time. In
order to rule out that this difference originates from different types of consumers buying in
different categories, we report results from a regression with trip fixed effects in column (3)
and find a very similar coefficient magnitude. While we think that consumer pool differences
across categories are unlikely to be quantitatively important in the grocery shopping context,
it is re-assuring to see that we find a very similar coefficient magnitude in this specification.
Next, we run our baseline IV-regression of price paid on search-time but also include an
interaction of the high price dispersion dummy with search-time.32 Relative to our baseline
regression, which is reported in column (1) of the table, we estimate an insignificant negative
coefficient on search-time and a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term.33
31For ease of exposition and without loss of generality we assume that the two categories have the same
minimum price.
32We use speed and speed interacted with the high price dispersion dummy as instruments.
33Note that the interaction term on its own is significant only at the 10 percent level. However, the effect
of search for high dispersion categories, i.e. the search-time coefficient plus the interaction term, is
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level (coefficient (standard error) of -0.0360 (0.0065))
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This implies that the marginal returns from search are significantly higher in categories with
high price dispersion. The difference is also economically significant with estimated gains
of $2.16 versus $0.9 per minute for the two types of categories. Together with the results
from columns (2) and (3) our analysis shows that consumers do extent their search time
when benefits are higher, but not enough to equate marginal benefits between categories.
Consumers therefore have higher unrealized search benefits in high price dispersion categories
and in relative terms “leave more money on the table” in those categories. At the end of this
section we explore in more detail how those differences can be explained.
We next investigate whether other category characteristics apart from price dispersion
have an influence on search behavior. For this purpose we picked a set of another three
characteristics for which we considered it to be possible to see differences in search effort.
Specifically we analyze (1) average inter-purchase spell duration to see whether the frequency
at which a product is purchased influences search behavior, (2) average price-level to test
whether consumers search more in more expensive categories, (3) number of products to
analyze whether product proliferation might make search more difficult. We run the same set
of regressions as we did for price dispersion difference by defining the category-level median
for each characteristic in turn. Results are reported in Table (2.8). We find that longer
inter-purchase spells, higher average-price and a larger number of products are all associated
with an increase in average search-time. However, only for the case of purchase frequency
do we find any difference in marginal search benefits. For the other two characteristics
the interaction effect is insignificant and very small in magnitude. Interestingly, in terms
of purchase frequency we find that consumers search significantly more in categories that
they purchase less frequently. Moreover, they extend their search-time in such a way that
the marginal benefits from search are lower. In other words, they exhaust the benefits
from search more in categories (such as laundry detergent) with longer inter-purchase spells
relative to categories with shorter spells (like milk).
Taken together we conclude from the above regressions that there is a substantial amount
of variation in the amount of search activity as well as the extent to which search benefits
are realized across categories. Most importantly, we find that higher price dispersion cate-
gories are characterized by higher marginal search benefits. This could be explained either
by consumers’ search cost being higher in categories with more dispersion or by consumers
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under-estimating the potential benefits.34 Regardless of the source, the more limited amount
of search indicates that marketing activity which interferes with the search process such as
features and displays might be more important and effective in categories with high disper-
sion. Other category characteristics like the number of UPCs in the category or purchase
frequency do not enter the search model outlined in Section (2.4) directly. Instead, they only
influence search behavior to the extent that they correlate with price dispersion or if they
affect search costs or perceived search benefits. We find significant differences in search ben-
efits only for categories with higher inter-purchase spells which are characterized by more
search benefits being realized and therefore lower benefits at the margin. This pattern is
consistent with the idea that consumers make a more conscious effort to search in categories
they buy from less often. Similarly to high dispersion categories it might therefore be more
effective to influence the search process through marketing activity in frequently purchased
categories more so than in less frequently purchased ones.
2.9. Conclusions
We estimate the effect of search intensity on the price a consumer pays within a particular
category using data from RFID tags on supermarket shopping carts. Recording search in a
physical store environment is generally challenging and even our detailed data is only able
to capture total search-time, but not which options the consumer evaluated. The technology
does however have the advantage of not interfering in any way with the consumer’s natural
shopping experience and might be the best possible way to gain insights into consumer search
in a brick-and-mortar store. To the best of our knowledge this work is the first to use direct
data on search effort to analyze consumer search within a brick-and-mortar environment.
We employ a reduced-form approach to estimate the effect of search intensity on the
price a consumer pays within a particular category. We find that an additional minute of
search lowers expenditure by about $1.4. The gains from search are substantial, increasing
category-level search-time by one standard deviation in each purchased category leads to a
6 percent reduction in total shopping basket expenditure. This result is robust to a host of
34Finally, it could also be the case that the pool of consumers differs across categories. We think this
is generally not likely to be a major issue in consumer packaged goods. Furthermore the fact that
search-time differences are very similar when including trip fixed effects also suggests that consumer pool
differences are not driving the observed differences in search behavior.
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sensitivity checks which deal with possible confounds such as variation in prices over time
and preferences over product characteristics other than price. Due to the limited amount of
observations per category in the data our evidence comes from regressions which are pooled
across categories. Going forward, with path-data over a longer time-horizon for only one
category it should be possible to model the search process in more detail (possibly by means
of a structural model). In particular, our approach only looks at the effect on price paid
and does not directly analyze the role of other product characteristics. We are therefore not
able to make any statements about the effect of search on consumer utility. However, we
believe that the effect of search-time on price is a dimension of the search process which is
particularly relevant for informing optimal supply-side behavior. Our findings imply that,
due to the limited amount of search, the use of marketing tools such as feature advertising and
in-store displays can be very effective. Furthermore, firm behavior that influences consumer
search interacts in an interesting way with pricing decisions. Because more search makes
finding a lower price or promoted product more likely, firms have an incentive to encourage
search when running a promotion.35
Finally, our setting allows us to explore heterogeneity in search behavior across categories.
This is of particular interest from a managerial perspective because it speaks to the fact
that marketing tools which influence search might be more effective in some categories than
others. We find that consumers’ unrealized search benefits are higher in categories with
higher price dispersion as well as categories with shorter inter-purchase spells suggesting
that the role of feature advertising and in-store displays might be particularly important for
this set of categories.
35The data and empirical approach could also be used to study seasonal variation in search behavior which
(as posited by Haviv [2013]) might be a source of counter-cyclical pricing.
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Table 2.1.: Correlation between Search-Time and Speed
(1) (2) (3)
Sample All Item All Item Trips
Pick-ups Pick-ups
Dependent Variable Pickup-specific Pickup-specific Trip-level
Search-Time Search-Time Search-Time
Speed 60 Second -3.600*** -3.260***
Prior to Pick-up (0.101) (0.136)
Average Trip-level -4.766***
Speed (0.171)
F-Stat 1,267 572 779
Trip FEs No Yes n/a
Observations 28,603 23,446 12,286
Notes. Reports coefficients of OLS regressions of search-time on
speed. Columns (1) and (2) use specific item pick-ups, column (3)
uses trips as the unit of observation. Trips with only one pick-up
are dropped in column (2). No further controls are added except
trip fixed effects for column (2). Standard error are clustered at the
consumer-level.
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Table 2.2.: Descriptive Statistics: Prices
Mean S.D. P25 Median P75
Absolute Difference between 4.21 3.52 1.78 3.21 5.26
Daily Min and Max Price
Percentage Difference between 0.66 0.23 0.53 0.71 0.84
Daily Min and Max Price
Fraction of UPCs promoted on 0.3 0.17 0.17 0.29 0.42
a specific day
Fraction of UPCs promoted 0.58 0.32 0.41 0.62 0.83
during the sample period
Notes. The unit of observation for all distributions of price differences
/ fractions of promoted items is a category. There are 150 categories
in our data.
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Table 2.3.: The Effect of Category-level Pricing on Search
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Search-Time Price Paid Log(Price Paid)
Share of Promoted UPCs within -0.965* -0.563*** -0.188***
the Category (0.542) (0.147) (0.036)
Average of the Dependent 10.322 3.268 0.894
Variable
Category FEs Yes Yes Yes
Day FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,603 28,603 28,603
Notes. Search-time at the item pick-up level is regressed on the number of pro-
moted item within the category of the purchased product. No further control
variables (other than the indicated fixed effects) are used.
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Table 2.4.: Baseline OLS and IV regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Type of Regression OLS IV: 1st Stage IV: 2nd Stage






Category FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,603 28,603 28,603
Trips 12,286 12,286 12,286
Consumers 7,882 7,882 7,882
Notes. Standard errors are clustered at the consumer-level.
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Table 2.5.: Robustness Check: Fixed Effect Regressions and Promotional Dummy as Depen-
dent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type of Regression IV: 2nd Stage IV: 2nd Stage IV: 2nd Stage IV: 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable Price Price Promotion Promotion
Dummy Dummy
Search-Time -0.0275*** -0.0206** 0.0041*** 0.0044*
(0.0064) (0.0088) (0.0016) (0.0024)
First Stage F-stat 1,267 572 475 336
Category FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trip FEs No Yes No Yes
Observations 28,603 23,446 19,718 14,498
Notes. Standard errors are clustered at the consumer-level in columns (1) and (3) and at
the trip-level in columns (2) and (4). Sample size changes due to the fact that we exclude
trips with only one pickup when including trip fixed effects and the promotion dummy is
only is defined only for products for which we see regular purchases.
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Table 2.6.: Robustness Check: Lagged and Trip-Level Speed Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type of Regression IV: 2nd Stage IV: 2nd Stage IV: 2nd Stage IV: 2nd Stage IV: 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable Price Price Price Price Price
Instrument Speed 60 Sec. Speed Lagged Speed Lagged Speed Lagged Trip-level
Before Pick-up by 10 Sec. by 20 Sec. by 30 Sec. Av. Speed
Search- -0.0275*** -0.0392*** -0.0446*** -0.0550*** -0.0299**
Time (0.0064) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.0142)
First Stage F-stat 1,267 406 222 144 580
Category FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28,603 26,159 24,892 23,840 28,603
Notes. Standard errors are clustered at the consumer-level.
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Table 2.7.: Cross-Category Heterogeneity: Price Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Above Median Price Dispersion Dummy (0.011)
0.907*** 0.849***
Above Median Price Dispersion Dummy (0.098) (0.129)
9.770*** n/a
Constant (0.069)
Category FEs Yes No No Yes
Trip FEs No No Yes No
Notes. Standard errors are clustered at the consumer-level in columns
(1) and (4) and at category-level in columns (2) and (3).
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Table 2.8.: Cross-Category Heterogeneity: Other Category Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Search-Time Search-Time Price
Inter- Search-Time -0.037***
Purchase (0.010)
Duration Search-Time * 0.023**
Above Median Dummy (0.011)
1.403*** 1.226***





Level Search-Time * -0.003
Above Median Dummy (0.010)
0.577*** 0.886***





UPCs Search-Time * -0.006
Above Median Dummy (0.011)
0.288*** 0.262**
Above Median Dummy (0.097) (0.127)
10.049*** n/a
Constant (0.068)
Category FEs No No Yes
Trip FEs No Yes No
Notes. Standard errors are clustered at category-level in columns (1)
and (2) and at the consumer-level in column (3).
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The picture illustrates a consumer traversing an aisle. Consumer location within the aisle is recorded on a
grid of traffic points. Products are located at specific locations on the shelf, which are coded up as a grid
of product points. Product points are matched to nearby traffic points. This allows to measure how long
a consumer remained near the product when picking it up. The dashed black line denotes the consumer’s
path when traversing the aisle.
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The picture illustrates the local nature of the estimated search benefit. The relationship between expected
price paid and search-time for varying levels of search costs is represented by the solid line. The relationship is
non-linear with extensions in search-time from a lower level being associated with larger gains. Moreover the
potential gains within a category are bounded by the lower bound of the price distribution. The magnitude
of our estimate depends on whether consumers in our data search relatively little (red scatter-plot) or a lot
(blue scatter-plot). In the latter case the average consumer realizes more of the potential gains from search
and the incremental benefit at the margin is therefore smaller.
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The source of differences in search benefits is variation in the degree in price dispersion. The graph shows
the relationship between search-time and price paid for two categories with high (low) price dispersion
respectively. For ease of exposition in the lower bound of the price distribution is assumed to be the same.
The high price dispersion category is characterized by higher incremental benefits from search which lead
to a steeper slope of the curve at every level of search-time (illustrated in the top graph). If search costs
are identical across categories, then consumers should equate the benefits from search across categories by
extending their search-time in the high dispersion category (illustrated in the bottom graph).
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What is the effect of a performance-related pay scheme when it is used in combination with
price delegation? Using data on the staff of a furniture firm, I show that when a fixed bonus
scheme conditional on revenues was introduced, it increased the revenues generated by all
sales employees, but I find no significant heterogeneous effect of the bonus scheme depending
on whether the employee is given control over price or not. Moreover, I show that giving
the sales staff control over price does not significantly increase revenues. The effects of the
bonus scheme and of price delegation on gross profits minus paid bonuses, commissions, and
wages were similar. These results are robust to a number of checks, and are consistent with
a model of moral hazard and price delegation.
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3.1. Introduction
This is one of the first works that provides empirical evidence on the incentive problem
between a firm and the staff of its sales force when the latter are given control over the
price1. When the firm cannot perfectly observe the efforts of its sales staff, misalignment of
objectives between the firm and the employees can lead to under-provision of services to the
end-customers. Similarly, if the firm gives the sales employees control over the price, interest
conflicts between the two parties might induce the sales staff to set a sub-optimal level of
price, with consequences for the firm’s profitability. This is especially the case when a firm
incentivizes its sales staff with a pay that is conditional on revenues, like the one I analyze
in this chapter. Consider the situation where a firm compensates its sales staff with a fixed
salary, commissions as a share of revenues, and a fixed bonus conditional on revenues (see
Figure 3.1). This compensation scheme creates conflicts between the interests of the firm,
which maximizes profits, and those of the employees, who maximize utility and do not take
account of the firm’s costs. In addition to the classic moral hazard problem (see Bolton and
Dewatripont [2004]), a revenues-based pay gives the employee an incentive to set the price
below the level that the firm would optimally set when it sets the price centrally. On the one
hand, Weinberg [1975] shows this conflict does not arise when salesmen are paid a commission
based on gross margin and are given control over price2. On the other hand, gross profits
are a noisier measure than revenues for detecting the employee’s effort, as the former also
include costs. This is the setting where the firm studied in this chapter operates. The firm
prefers bearing the cost associated with the price distortion generated by revenues-based pay
because it believes profits are too noisy a measure of the employee’s effort and, thus, will
not be a good performance-measure for tackling moral hazard issues. To eliminate the price
distortion created by revenues-based pay, the firm could set the price centrally. However,
by setting the price centrally, the firm prevents the employee from exploiting some private
information she might have about the customers that can be valuable for the firm’s pricing3.
1The only paper I found that explicitly studies the interaction between bonuses and price delegation is the
laboratory experiment designed by Ham and Lim [2013], though the aim of their paper is to understand
reciprocity motives in the principal-agent relationship and how this relates to price delegation. Moreover,
Ham and Lim’s work studies the impact of the bonus scheme only when the principal gives the agent
control over price but not when the principal sets the price centrally.
2In this chapter I study bonuses but the logic is the same as for the case of commissions.
3Examples that highlight the importance of the employee’s private information can be found in the finance
literature. Baron [1982], for instance, studies investment banking advising and distribution services when
the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot
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In summary, the firm faces a trade-off between attenuating moral hazard and extracting
more consumer surplus by allowing the employee to price discriminate the customers based
on her private information.
I present a stylized principal-agent model between a firm and its sales employee. The
model accommodates moral hazard, as the firm cannot perfectly observe the efforts exerted
by its employee. The model further allows for the possibility that the employee has private
information about the market that can be valuable to the firm. In this setting, I study the
implications of augmenting the power of incentives in the employee’s compensation scheme
via the introduction of a bonus scheme which is conditional on revenues. In particular, I
study how the employee responds to the bonus scheme under two scenarios. Firstly, I study
the equilibrium of the model when the firm gives the employee control over price. Secondly,
I study the equilibrium when the firm sets the price centrally. The model predicts that
the bonus scheme increases revenues and gross profits when the customers are responsive to
services provision (represented by the agent’s effort). If the employee has private information
that is valuable to the firm (what I call innovative news), the model predicts that revenues
and gross profits are larger when the firm gives the employee control over price. The model
also predicts that, the greater the disparity between the employee’s private information and
what the firm normally expects about the customers’ willingness to pay, the stronger the
impact of the bonus scheme on revenues and gross profits is when the firm gives the employee
control over price.
I then take the theory to the data. This work exploits a quasi-natural experiment that
took place at a furniture manufacturing company between 2003 and 2011. In 2006, the fur-
niture firm introduced a bonus system to almost all its sales employees. In 2010, the firm
started to gradually phasing out the bonus system, eliminating it completely at the end of
2012. Another interesting feature of the data is the variation in price delegation. The firm
sells office furniture to dealers or directly to companies. The sales-staff who directly serve
the end-customers are given control over price, while the firm sets the price centrally in the
dealers channel. I exploit this additional variation in the decision rights delegated to the
sales staff for assessing the implications of price delegation on employees’ performance.
The empirical identification comes from the quasi-experimental setting where the firm oper-
ated. Talking to the firm, the sales director admitted the firm tested the impact of bonuses
observe the distribution effort expended by the banker.
57
on employees’ performance. Thus, bonuses should be independent of employees’ individ-
ual characteristics that are observable to the firm. Although we do not observe individual
characteristics (a part from gender), the panel structure of the data allows to controlling
for unobservable individual characteristics that may be correlated with the bonus scheme or
with price delegation.4
Using a reduced-form approach, this work uses ordinary least squares for estimating the
impact of the bonus scheme on a set of performance measures, such as revenues and gross
profits. I also study the implications of price delegation and the possibility that the bonus
scheme has a heterogeneous effect on the outcome variables depending on whether the firm
sets the price centrally or not. I find that the bonus scheme has a positive and significant
impact on revenues, gross profits, gross profits minus commissions bonuses and salary, and
on quantity. For example, offering the bonus scheme increases quarterly revenues by about
70% relative to the mean value. I also find the bonus scheme has a negative impact on the
price. In the setting of the theoretical model discussed in this chapter, these results suggest
that furniture sales are responsive to non-price sales efforts. The estimates also show that
there is no significant heterogeneous effect of the bonus scheme depending on whether the
employee has control over price or not. I also find that price-delegation has no significant
impact on any of the outcome variables studied here. In the context of the theoretical model,
these results are a sign of the employee having private information that is not sufficiently
different from what the firm usually expects (that is, the employee’s private signal does not
reveal innovative news). These results are robust to a number of checks.
I believe the context where the furniture firm operates is suitable for the study of the
incentive problem and of price delegation because of the presence of the firm’s corporate-
clients segment. The firm generates 90% of its revenues from corporate clients such as
British Airways or The London School of Economics. Dealing with these customers involves
a certain degree of uncertainty regarding their needs because of the complexity of the design
projects they request. Thus, employees can gather valuable information about the needs of
the corporate clients on a case-by-case basis. This makes the decision to give the employee
control over price interesting.
This paper is related to the literature in human resource management as summarized in
4The use of individual fixed effects does not fully control for the selection issues that might exist in the
assignation of the price delegation as only one employee in our data changes pricing regime passing from
the direct channel to the dealers channel.
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Bloom and Van Reenen [2010]; to a series of papers in the multi-tasking literature such as
Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], Baker [1992] and Baker [2002], Griffith and Neely [2009];
to the literature in insider econometrics such as Lazear [2000], Bandiera et al. [2007], Misra
and Nair [2011], and summarized in Ichniowski and Shaw [2012], which explores how econo-
metric methods can be used to assess productivity of managerial practices within firms by
combining observational or experimental data with non-quantitative information provided
by the management of the firm; and to Paul Oyer’s literature on fiscal year ends and non-
linear incentive contracts Oyer, P. [1998] and Oyer, P. [2000] as the bonus scheme studied
here is indeed a non-linear incentive scheme. Finally, this work is related to the industrial
economics literature in resale-price maintenance and vertical contracting such as Romano
[1994] and Mortimer [2008]; to the marketing literature on sale-force compensation such as
Coughlan and Sen [1989], Frenzen et al. [2010], Ghosh et al. [2013], and John et al. [2013].
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the context
where the furniture manufacturing firm operates and provides a theoretical framework to
guide the empirical strategy. Section 3.3 provides a detailed explanation of the data used in
our analysis followed by descriptive statistics. In section 3.4, I explain the empirical strategy
and show the main results of the chapter. Section 3.5 discusses a number of empirical issues
that might challenge the findings of this chapter. Finally, section 4.8 concludes.
3.2. Context and theory
3.2.1. Context
The firm in our data is one of the national HQ’s of a large furniture manufacturing company
(henceforth, the firm) that sells home and office furniture. The firm sells furniture either
through authorized dealers or directly to the end-customers. The dealers channel and the
direct channel generate approximately the same amount of revenues. The customer base is
divided by retail customers and corporations, accounting respectively for about 10% and 90%
of total revenues generated by the firm over the entire sample. The dealers channel generates
10% of the firm’s total revenues from retail customers and 40% from corporate clients,
while the direct channel generates 50% of the firm’s total revenues from corporate clients
only. Clients in the corporations segment usually hire external consultants for managing
the complexity and risks involved in their interior design projects. I find this information
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useful for justifying the potential role of the employees’ private information regarding the
preferences of the corporate clients (i.e., their willingness to pay).
For each channel, the firm recruits employees and provides them with compensation plans
aimed to achieving its end-goals. Talking to the sales director, it emerged that the firm follows
very simple contracting rules when they hire potential employees. I can summarize the hiring
process as follows. At the beginning of each year, the firm and each employee (individually)
sign the employment contract. At this stage, the firm offers the full compensation plan to the
employee and tells her the tasks she is expected to do under the employment contract. The
compensation plan includes a fixed salary (determined at this stage) and the commissions the
employee will get as a share of the revenues she generates. The compensation plan might also
include the possibility for the employee to get a bonus conditional on achieving a certain level
of revenues (see the different bonus schemes used by the firm in section B.1 of the Appendix).
The threshold on revenues is revealed to the employee at the contracting stage and there
is no possibility to renegotiate it for the entire duration of the contract, unless exceptional
events such as the recent financial crisis occur. The possibility of renegotiating the targets
on revenues in case of exceptional events does not affect the predictions of the theoretical
model presented below, as these rare events occur with very low (i.e., zero) probability and
do not affect the employee’s expected payoff5. Finally, the firm tells the employee what tasks
she is expected to do. Examples of such tasks include managing existing customers as well
as finding new customers.6 At this stage, the firm also tells the employee whether she is
given control over price or not.
Every year the process is repeated for both the new employees and those who already work
for the firm. Some people may argue whether the firm and the employee can negotiate some
characteristics of the compensation plan. Talking to the firm, the sales director consults with
the employees who already work in the firm regarding what they expect about future trends
in the market. Hence, the employee’s beliefs are somehow incorporated in the employment
contracts. However, the sales director also responds to other guidelines imposed by the
5Given the information provided by the furniture firm, there were no renegotiation of targets over the entire
sample. However, one can argue that the firm could have had a strong incentive to reduce the targets at
the end of 2008 as the shock induced by the collapse of Lehman Brothers might have induced corporate
clients to cancel some of their orders. For 2009 things look more reliable as the firm set the targets for
2009 at the end of 2008 taking into consideration the new landscape. This leaves 2008 as the only year
where the furniture firm might have renegotiated the targets and should be taken into consideration as
a possible issue in the data.
6To this end, the firm trains the employees regarding products and sales practices
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top management of the firm’s world HQ. Thus, employment contracts can be seen as a
compromise between the goals of the whole group and the view of the national HQ which
is primarily determined by the views of the sales director, the chief financial officer, the
managing director and, in part, by the employees’ expectations about future market trends.
3.2.2. Theory
I develop a stylized model of the firm to analyse the impact of the bonus scheme in equation
3.2 on the equilibrium mean of a set of performance measures both under the case where the
firm sets the price centrally and under the case where the firm gives the employee control
over price. The model is tailored to fit the context where the furniture firm operates. The
firm’s hierarchy has two layers: the top executives (finance, managing and sales directors)
who represent the firm, and the employees. For expositional ease, I assume there is one top
executive (i.e., the firm) and one employee. The division of tasks can be summarized as fol-
lows. The firm designs the employment contract deciding whether to include a bonus scheme
or not and whether to delegate the pricing to the employee or to centralize it. The employee
chooses how much time to dedicate to existing customers or for finding new customers, as
well as how to spend the allocated time (i.e., sales efforts). Moreover, the employee might
negotiate the price with the customer if she has the right to do so. To account for the
possibility that the employee might have private information that is valuable to the firm, I
assume that the employee receives a perfect signal that shifts the mean of the distribution
of the market demand.
Formally, consider a situation where a risk-neutral firm hires a risk-neutral person (i.e.,
the employee) for selling its product. The market demand for the product is represented by
the function
q˜ = q + 
= a− bp+ dE + 
(3.1)
where p is the price of the product, E represents the non-price efforts exerted by the
employee (unobservable to the firm), and a, b and d are non-negative scalar parameters
which represent the intercept and the marginal effects of the demand function. The variable
 represents a random shock that is unobservable to both the firm and the employee. The
firm and the employee form beliefs about the range of values that the shock  can take. In
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particular, I assume that the firm believes  is a zero-mean random shock with cumulative
distribution function F . The employee, on her side, receives a perfect signal x such that the
distribution of  conditional on x is identical to F except for the mean which now equals µ
(that is, a horizontal shift in F ). In other words, the employee has an informational advantage
relative to the firm because she receives a signal x that tells her (with certainty) the true
mean of the distribution of . I motivate this assumption by the fact that the employee
can collect detailed information about the preferences of the customers when spending time
with them and, thus, incorporates this information in her decisions. In particular, when the
employee has control over price, she can use the information regarding customers for setting
the price. When the firm sets the price centrally it prevents itself from incorporating the
employee’s private information in the price. Note that if the employee has no informational
advantage, that is x = ∅, then the mean of the distribution F conditional on x will be zero,
µ = 0, same as the firm’s beliefs.
The firm compensates the employee with a fixed salary, W , commissions paid as a share
β of the revenues R˜ = q˜p, and an additional fixed bonus, B, if the revenues exceed a given
threshold R∗. Formally, the employee is compensated according to the function
W + βR˜, R˜ < R∗
W + βR˜ +B, R˜ ≥ R∗
(3.2)
For simplicity, I assume that the probability of revenues being larger or equal than the
threshold R∗ is a linear function of the deterministic part of revenues R. Formally
P(R˜ ≥ R∗) = αR (3.3)
where R is the deterministic part of R˜, and α is a positive scalar parameter that ensures
the probability is smaller than one.7
I represent this situation as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the risk-neutral firm
7You can think of α as a deterministic and decreasing function of the threshold R∗ which represents the
beliefs of both the firm and the employee. I am assuming symmetry of the beliefs, conditional on the
employee’s private signal being empty, for simplicity. Further, this model assumes revenues will never
be negative, though quarterly revenues happen to be negative for two observations in our data. For
the purpose of this work, I believe this model provides a simple framework in support of the empirical
findings.
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chooses the employment contract, which includes salary, commissions, the bonus and the
pricing schemes in order to maximize its expected profits. For simplicity, I consider the
salary W , the commission rate β, and the bonus-scheme pair (R∗, B) as fixed, that is, I do
not model how the firm would optimally choose the salary, the commission rate and the
parameters of the bonus scheme. This leaves the firm with two policies. Firstly, the firm can
choose whether to include a bonus scheme or no. Secondly, the firm can decide whether to
set the price, p, centrally or give the employee control over price. In summary, the firm has
four possible strategies in the first stage: offer no bonus scheme and set the price centrally,
offer no bonus scheme and give the employee control over price, do offer the bonus scheme
and set the price centrally and, finally, offer the bonus scheme and give the employee control
over price.
In the second stage, the risk-neutral employee chooses the level of sales effort, E, and poten-
tially the price p, to maximize her expected utility conditional on the employment contract
(set by the firm in the first stage) and the signal x she receives.
The firm’s payoff is
pi = R˜− C˜ −W − βR˜− 1(Bonus Y es) ∗ 1(R˜ ≥ R∗) ∗B (3.4)
where C˜ = cq˜ are the firm’s variable costs for producing q˜ units of the product and c is
the unit cost. 1(Bonus Y es) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm offers the
bonus scheme in the employment contract and zero otherwise8. 1(R˜ ≥ R∗) is an indicator
variable that equals one if the revenues generated by the employee will be greater or equal to
the threshold R∗ and zero otherwise (this captures the possibility that the firm’s costs might
change depending on the employee’s performance). Note the tilde on top of pi to indicate
the randomness of the firm’s payoff in equation 3.4. The employee’s payoff is







is the employee’s cost of exerting effort level E.9 Equation 3.5 makes no dis-
81(Bonus Y es) is a choice variable for the firm and it is known to the employee in stage two.
9Note that E
2
2 does not depend on any employee-specific parameter. This does not affect the interpretation
of the coefficient of effort, d, in the demand function. There, d represents the responsiveness of demand
to non-price efforts and solely depends on the preferences of the consumers. I simply do not model
heterogeneity in the employee’s ability as in Bandiera et al. [2007] or John et al. [2013] because employee’s
heterogeneity does not significantly alter the estimates when I control for employees’ time-invariant
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tinction between the asymmetry that arises in the distribution of the optimal level of effort
exerted by the employee before and after having achieved the threshold R∗ as documented
by John et al. [2013]. This simplification of the incentive problem does not change the im-
plication of the model as this work focuses on the interaction between incentives and price
delegation, instead of looking at gaming across time periods as in Oyer, P. [1998], Misra
and Nair [2011] and John et al. [2013]. In brief, the presence of the bonus scheme in the
context of the furniture firm analysed in this chapter can be interpreted as an increase of
the power of the incentives offered to the employee. This affects the trade-offs involved in
the principal-agent relationship.
I now solve the model. Conditional on its beliefs, the firm maximizes the expected value
of equation (3.4)
E(pi) = R− cq −W − βR− 1(Bonus Y es) ∗ αB (3.6)
Conditional on her beliefs, the signal x, and the employment contract, the employee max-
imizes her expected utility




I now show how the mean of the equilibrium outcomes is affected by the use of the bonus
scheme and its interaction with price delegation, and how the employee’s private information
affects the equilibrium. In Table 3.1, I report the equilibrium mean price and effort under
the different scenarios. Comparing the prices in Table 3.1, one can see how the bonus
and pricing schemes affect the equilibrium of the principal-agent problem. In particular,
the optimal price under delegation incorporates the true mean of the demand shock, µ,
in contrast to the case where the firm sets the price centrally. Thus, the optimal price
under centralized pricing is the same regardless of whether the employee has informational
advantage (µ 6= 0) or not (µ = 0). Also, the bonus scheme affects equilibrium prices via
the factor αB, which disappears from the solution when the firm does not offer the bonus
scheme as 1(Bonus Y es) = 0.
I now show how the bonus scheme and price delegation affect other performance measures
characteristics (see section 3.5). The model can be easily adapted to incorporate employee’s heterogeneity
in the level of productivity as in John et al. [2013] by setting q˜ = θq + , where θ is the productivity
parameter.
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such as revenues, gross profits and gross profits minus commissions, bonuses and salary.
Since the equilibrium outcomes are non-linear in the parameters, I prefer to calibrate the
model using the information available in the data.
3.2.3. Numerical analysis and model predictions
Using annual data for the firm’s sales-force, I replace some of the parameters that in this
model are considered as exogenous with their sample median.10 I replace the salary W with
its sample median of £35,000. The unit cost, c, is also replaced with its sample median
of £120. The commission rate is replaced with the sample median of the firm’s expected
commission rate for each employee, which equals 0.75%. For each employee, the expected
commission rate is computed by plugging the firm’s expected revenues into the compensation
scheme to get expected commissions and, then, by dividing the latter by the firm’s expected
revenues. The firm’s expected revenues were provided to me by the firm’s sales director. In
a similar way, I replace αB with the sample median of the firm’s expected commissions and
bonuses divided by the firm’s expected revenues minus the expected commission rate, which
equals 0.15%. The parameters of the demand function a and b are estimated from a linear
least-squares regression of (observed) quantity on price. Since price is determined by the
equilibrium between demand and supply, the estimate of the price coefficient of the demand
function, b, can be subject to the simultaneous-equation bias (for instance, see Hamilton
[1994]). I use unit cost as an instrumental variable for copying with the endogeneity of price
in the regression for the demand function. The estimates for the demand coefficients are
a = 14, 000 and b = 32. The remaining parameters, d and µ, cannot be directly estimated
from the data. I choose to calibrate d with the values 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 50
because they cover a wide range of admissible cases where prices and quantities are non-
negative in equilibrium (such that d < 60). In particular, cases where d is larger or smaller
than b are covered. I also calibrate the parameter µ in such a way to reflect different
information structures between the employee and the firm. For each given value of d, I solve
the model using seven values for µ. When the employee receives an empty signal (i.e. x = ∅)
µ = 0. When the employee receives a non-empty signal, the information revealed can be
either customary or innovative. The information is customary if µ is within a reasonable
10In this section, the symbol of the British pound sterling £ is used for expositional purposes only as the
real currency cannot be revealed for confidentiality issues.
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range of values, which I set to be between minus and plus one standard error of the least-
square estimate of the intercept, a, of the demand function: in our data, µ = −2, 355 and
µ = 2, 355.11 The information is innovative if µ is outside the rage of values I consider as
customary. I propose two ranges of innovative values for µ. The first range outside the
customary range is between minus and plus twice the standard error of the least-squares
estimate of a (i.e., µ = −4, 711 and µ = 4, 711). I consider the values µ = −4711 and
µ = 4, 711 to be innovative as they shift the intercept of the demand quite far from the
a = 14, 000 the firm expects. The last range of innovative values is plus ten-times the
standard error of the least-square estimate of a, µ = 23, 554, and a large negative values
which I set to µ = −5, 061.12 I consider µ = 23, 554 and µ = −5, 061 as exceptionally
innovative news as the firm might expect the intercept a to be so large/small with very
low probability. Below, I will show what role these different information structures play in
rationalizing the firm’s choice to give the employee control over price.
The Tables in Appendix B.2 provide the equilibrium outcomes of the model under dif-
ferent scenarios. Each Table provides sets of equilibrium outcomes for a given value of d.
Within each Table, there are twenty-eight sets of equilibrium outcomes which depend on the
information structure between the employee and the firm (seven cases), on whether the firm
offers the bonus scheme or not, and on whether the firms delegates the pricing or not. The
equilibrium outcomes I compute are the price p, the non-price effort E, and a set of expected
outcomes conditional on the different realization of the signal x such as the quantity q, the
revenues R = pq, the gross profits GP = R − C, and the gross profits minus commissions,
bonuses and salary GP − SC = GP − βR− αRB −W .
The main results I discuss in this chapter are (i) the impact of the bonus scheme on the
equilibrium, (ii) the impact of price delegation on the equilibrium, and (iii) the impact of
the interaction between the bonus scheme and price delegation on the equilibrium. These
results will be tested in section 3.3.
The impact of the bonus scheme on the equilibrium outcomes mostly depends on the
responsiveness of the firm’s customers to the non-price effort, which is represented by the
11As µ shifts the intercept of the demand function, it comes natural to think of the standard error of the
least-squares estimate of a as the delimiter of the range of most likely values µ can take.
12The asymmetry between µ = 23, 554 and µ = −5, 061 comes from the fact that, in this numerical example,
I want to exclude the possibility that quantity is negative. Therefore, the size of the negative values µ
can take is bounded by the non-negativity of quantity, and minus ten-times the standard error of the
estimate of a violates this constraint.
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demand parameter d. The higher the value of d, the stronger the impact of E in shifting
the demand is. The model suggests that the bonus scheme has a positive impact on all
equilibrium outcomes, including prices, only if d is sufficiently large. In our example, when
d > 5 offering the bonus scheme is always optimal for the firm, in GP − SC terms. On the
contrary, when d ≤ 5, offering the bonus scheme is never optimal for the firm, in GP − SC
terms. This is intuitive because, when the unobservable non-price effort E is ineffective (i.e.,
small d), there is no point for firm to incentivize the employee in this direction.
When d is sufficiently large, the revenues-based bonus scheme has a positive impact on price
as well. This result might seem surprising but it is a consequence of the fact that the optimal
level of effort E is increasing in the power of the bonus scheme, B, and the equilibrium price
increases with the effort level E.
Another interesting result is that the returns to offering the bonus scheme increase as d
increases. This result is also intuitive: when the unobservable non-price effort E is highly
effective (d is large), the potential benefits to incentivizing the employee in increasing E are
large. Note that these results are only slightly altered by the presence of price delegation
and by the information structure. The main implications still remain. Hence, the parameter
d, which in our model reflects the importance of moral hazard, determines the impact of the
bonus scheme on the equilibrium.
These results provide the first set of hypotheses to be tested in the data.
Hypothesis 1 Does the bonus scheme have a positive impact on the equilibrium level of R,
GP and GP − SC?
The impact of price delegation on the equilibrium outcomes is more complicated. The
impact of price delegation on revenues, R, is positive unless d is very large (in our example,
d = 50). When the firm gives the employee control over price, the employee will set p and E
to maximize her share of the revenues. When the price is set centrally, the firm maximizes its
profits which are a function of the firms’ variable costs. Thus, the maximum revenues under
delegation should be higher other things equal. However, when d is very large, the impact
of moral hazard is more severe. Looking at the Tables in Appendix B.2, we can see that
the (positive) difference between the equilibrium price set by the firm centrally and that set
by the employee under delegation increases significantly as the parameter d increases. Since
the effort E is an increasing function of p in equilibrium (both under delegation and when
the firm sets the price centrally), for very large value of d the level of effort E will not be
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high enough to shift the quantity demanded significantly to compensate the impact of a high
price. As a consequence, very low price and low effort will drive revenues under delegation
below the level the firm would achieve if the price is set centrally.13
The second set of outcomes includes the price p and the effort E. The impact of price delega-
tion on p and E mostly depends on the information structure. In particular, price delegation
reduces p and E relative to centralized pricing if the employee receives an empty signal (i.e.,
µ = 0) or if the employee receives a non-empty and negative signal (i.e., µ < 0). When the
signal is empty, price delegation reduces equilibrium price as the employee has incentive to
under-cut because it does not internalize the costs of the firm. Effort moves in the same
direction as price as E is in equilibrium increasing in price. When µ is negative, the em-
ployee optimally reduces the price to accommodate the news that the consumer’s willingness
to pay is lower than previously expected, though her pricing is still distorted because she
does not internalize the costs of the firm. On the contrary, equilibrium price is higher under
delegation if the employee receives a non-empty signal with a positive and innovative news
(in our example, µ ≥ 4, 711), unless d is very large. The first part of this result is intuitive.
As the signal reveals that the consumer is willing to pay more than previously expected, the
employee will, under delegation, incorporate this information into the pricing. Moreover, the
incentives to raise the price will be sufficiently large to off-set the employee’s incentive to
undercut only if the news is innovative (µ sufficiently large). What seems less intuitive is the
fact that equilibrium price is higher under delegation if the employee receives news unless d
is very large. Again, this is a consequence of the fact that the (positive) difference between
the equilibrium price set by the firm centrally and that set by the employee under delegation
increases significantly as the parameter d increases (see Appendix B.2)..14
I do not discuss the impact of price delegation on the quantity q because this is not
intuitive. The last set of outcomes I discuss in this paragraph includes the gross profits GP
and the gross profits minus commissions, bonuses and salary GP −SC. The impact of price
delegation on this set of outcomes again depends on the information structure. In particular,
price delegation always reduces GP and GP − SC if the employee receives an empty signal
13This result should not be taken literally as it might simply be the consequence of the simplistic functional
form chosen for the demand function.
14Again, this result should not be taken literally as it might simply be the consequence of the simplistic
functional form chosen for the demand function.
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(i.e., µ = 0). Moreover, delegation has a positive impact on GP and GP − SC only if the
employee receives an non-empty signal and the news contained in the signal is sufficiently
innovative (in our numerical example, this corresponds to µ ≥ 4, 711 or µ ≤ −4, 711). This
is intuitive. Delegating the price to the employee generates a negative externality on the
firm because of moral hazard. Therefore, delegation is profitable for the firm (in terms
of GP or GP − SC) only if the employee has some private information (µ 6= 0) that is
valuable to the firm (i.e., µ is sufficiently large in absolute value). In brief, giving the
employee control over price is optimal for the firm (in GP or GP − SC terms) only if the
employee has informational advantage over the firm and the information contained in the
signal is innovative. If the employee has private information that is valuable to the firm,
price delegation allows the employee to incorporate this information into the pricing and,
thus, to extract plenty of surplus from the customer to the benefit of the firm.
These results provide the second set of hypotheses to be tested in the data.
Hypothesis 2 Does price delegation have a positive impact on the equilibrium level of R,
GP and GP − SC?
I now show when the bonus scheme has heterogeneous effects on equilibrium outcomes
depending on whether the firm sets the price centrally or gives the employee control over
price. From our numerical example, the interaction between the bonus scheme and price
delegation has a positive impact on R, GP and GP − SC when µ is negative and the
employee receives a non-empty signal that reveals innovative news (i.e., µ ≤ −4, 711 or
µ ≥ −4, 711).15
These results provide the third and last set of hypotheses to be tested in the data.
Hypothesis 3 Does the bonus scheme have heterogeneous effects on the equilibrium level of
R, GP and GP − SC depending on whether the firm sets the price centrally or gives the
employee control over price?
15The employee increases effort E only if she receives a non-empty signal that reveals an extremely innovative
news. In our example, this corresponds to µ = 23, 554, ten-times the standard error of the least-squares
coefficient of the demand intercept a . I do not see this when µ < 0 has the size of negative shocks are
bounded by non-negativity constraints in equilibrium quantities.
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3.3. Data and descriptive statistics
This chapter makes use of detailed individual-level panel data from one of the national HQ’s
of a multinational furniture manufacturing company between January 2003 and December
2011. The data used in this chapter comes from two sources of information.
The first dataset contains annual data on the employment contracts signed between the
firm and the people employed in its sales force, with extremely detailed information regarding
compensations and tasks. The second dataset contains quarterly data on different measures
of employees’ performance such as revenues, gross profits, transaction prices and quantities,
as well as bonuses and commissions accumulated (and paid) at the end of each quarter. I
now discuss the annual data on employment contracts more in detail.
Before January 2006, the firm did not use bonuses for compensating its sales employees. In
January 2006, the firm introduced a bonus scheme based on (employee-level) revenues to al-
most all of the sales employees. In January 2010, the firm started phasing the bonus scheme
out. In January 2013, the firm abolished the bonus scheme completely. This is out-of-sample
information as the dataset stops on December 2011. Talking to the sales director, the firm
abolished the bonus scheme because it was perceived as ineffective. Table 3.2 clearly shows
how the bonus scheme was implemented over the sample period. The Table is divided in two
macro columns. The left-hand column (called Centralized pricing) shows how the bonus was
introduced for those employees who had no control over price. The right-hand column (called
Delegated pricing) shows how the bonus was introduced for those employees who did have
control over price. For each of these two macro columns, an observation is a year-quarter-
employee combination, while a contract is a year-employee pair. The number of observations
with B are year-quarter-employee combinations where the employment contract includes a
bonus scheme. In other words, B is an indicator variable, the bonus dummy, that equals
one if the contract includes a (conditional) bonus and zero otherwise. At the moment the
contract is signed, any employees’ performance is random. Thus, B represents an ex-ante
characteristic of the employment contract.
For the more curious readers, Table 3.3 provides each employee’s history with the firm and
clearly shows how the bonus scheme was implemented over the years. Each column repre-
sents the history of a specific employee. The rows represent the years. When the number
in the cell equals four (for quarters), the employee is employed by the firm in that year. If
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this number equals zero the employee is not employed by the firm.16 If the number four is
circled, then the contract includes a bonus scheme. If the cell is shaded, the contract gives
the employee control over price. Combining these different sources of information, one can
easily identify the sources of variation present in the data. Table 3.3 also shows how the
bonus regime changes over time for the same employee. To see this, consider employee M01
who stays in the firm from 2004 to 2006. M01 has control over price for the three years he
works at the firm and he is given a bonus scheme only in year 2006. An important question to
be considered is whether the bonus scheme was introduced randomly or not. Talking to the
firm, the sales director admitted the firm tried to assess the impact of bonuses on employees’
performance. Thus, the bonus scheme should be independent of employee’s characteristics
that are observable to the firm. Unfortunately, we cannot test whether this is true in the
data as gender is the only individual characteristic available. Table 3.4 summarizes the four
sources of variation in the data.
Another important question concerns whether the employees were randomly assigned the con-
trol over the price. The measure of price delegation used in this chapter coincides with the
definition of sales channel. Some employees serve dealers while others serve end-customers
directly. Pricing in the dealers channel is set at a central level through dealership contracts
signed at the beginning of each year, which prescribe quantity discounts and other commer-
cial terms and conditions. The employees in the direct channel have control over price as the
firm believes there are significant gains from using employees’ private information for better
price-discriminate end-customers. Nonetheless, the nature of the corporations segment man-
aged via the dealers channel (40% of total revenues) does not preclude the possibility that
employees in this channel might have valuable private information regarding the preferences
of their customers, as the dealers they serve may be in turn serving some corporate clients.
Thus, the sales skills required to operate in the two channels are in principle the same. Talk-
ing to the sales director, he recognizes that employees in the direct channel are recruited
in a similar way of those employed in the dealers channel. Unfortunately, our data lacks of
individual-level characteristics, such as education, age and work experience that could be
used to test any systematic allocation of the employees across the sales channels. In section
3.5, I try to assess the selection issues that can be embodied with both the assignation of
the bonus scheme as well as price delegation by controlling for employee-level annual targets
16This number is set equal to zero also for employee M05 in 2010 who was employed by the firm but is
dropped because of excessively different compensation scheme.
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on revenues as well as for employee fixed-effects.
The second dataset contains quarterly data on different measures of employees’ perfor-
mance such as revenues, gross profits, transaction prices and quantities, as well as bonuses
and commissions accumulated (and paid) at the end of each quarter. Table 3.5 reports basic
summary statistics of the outcome variables used in our empirical study. The unit of obser-
vation is a year-quarter-employee combination. For each employee, revenues are computed
by multiplying the quantity by the price per transaction, and then aggregating at the quar-
terly level. Gross Profits are revenues minus variable costs for producing the products sold
in each quarter. Gross Profits-SC equals to gross profits minus bonuses, commissions, and
salary paid at the end of each quarter. 17 All outcomes other than quantity are deflated
using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. For each employee, the unit price at the
quarterly level is computed as the ratio between total revenues over total quantity. Price is
missing for those quarters where an employee recorded nil revenues.18 I dropped two obser-
vations with negative revenues as these represent an exceptional event in the firm history:
the revenues were negative due to products returned by a large customer. Negative revenues
can regularly occur for individual transactions but (almost) never occur as the total over
the quarter. In section B.3 of the appendix, I show the main findings of the chapter when
the two observations with negative revenues are also included in the estimation. Table 3.6
reports the same basic summary statistics of the outcome variables aggregated at the annual
level (i.e., the unit of observation is a year-employee pair). I show also annual statistics for
providing a more informative view of the firm. In particular, Table 3.6 shows that Gross
Profits-SC were observed to be negative only once. This means that in a given year the
firm lost money on a specific employee. I believe this to be reasonable as it only represents
about 2% of the observations. Appendix B.3 also provides the percentiles of annual Gross
Profits-SC for further reference.
I conclude this section by providing the sample means of the outcome variables grouping
the employees according to the different treatments. Table 3.7 reports the mean and the
standard deviation of the outcome variables depending on whether the employment contract
includes the bonus scheme or not, using year-quarter-employee as a unit of observation.
Table 3.7 shows that the bonus scheme has a positive impact on the average value of the
17These are ex-post bonuses and commissions and can differ from the expected values that emerge ex-ante
from the compensation plan.
18In principle, I could use the firm’s list price though this is only available for a small subset of transactions.
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outcomes, with exception for price. In the context of the theoretical model of section 3.2.2,
this result suggests that the demand parameter d is sufficiently large, that is, the non-
price effort E effectively shifts the firm’s demand.19 Table 3.8 reports the mean and the
standard deviation of the outcome variables depending on whether the employee has control
over price or not, using year-quarter-employee as a unit of observation. Table 3.8 show the
average value of all outcomes. With exception for price, this is higher for those employees
who cannot independently set the price. In our theoretical model, this is consistent with
the product demand being extremely responsive to non-price effort E (large d) and with
the employee having not sufficiently innovative informational advantage over the firm. 20
The last set of descriptive statistics shown in this section appears in Table 3.9. There, I
report the mean of each outcome variable for the four treatment groups determined by the
combinations between the bonus scheme and price delegation. The Table is divided into two
macro columns. The left-hand column called Centralized pricing and the right-hand column
called Delegated pricing. Each macro column is divided into two sub-columns, one for those
observations where the firm offers the bonus scheme and another for those observations where
the firm does not offer the bonus scheme. Table 3.9 suggests that the introduction of the
bonus scheme has a heterogeneous effect across the two pricing groups. In particular, the
bonus scheme seems to have a higher average effect on Gross Profits and on Gross Profits-SC
for those employees who have control over price. This might be consistent with the presence
of significant informational advantage on the side of the employee, though the average impact
of the interaction between the bonus scheme and price delegation on revenues points to the
other direction. At this stage, it is important to recognize that there is the possibility of a
heterogeneous effect of the bonus scheme across the two pricing groups. Other factors such
as business-cycle fluctuations and within-year seasonality can affect the average effects of the
bonus scheme and of price delegation.
19Another interesting result is that the presence of the bonus scheme seems to reduce the dispersion of the
employees’ performance, something in contrast with the empirical findings in Bandiera et al. [2007]. I do
not investigate the impact of incentives on the dispersion of performance.
20Another interesting results is that price delegation seems to reduce the dispersion of the employees’ per-
formance, something apparently new in the literature. Again, I do not investigate the impact of price
delegation on the dispersion of performance.
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3.4. Empirical model and estimates
In order to analyze the impact of the bonus scheme and price delegation on the outcome
variables presented in the previous section, I use ordinary least squares to run the following
regression
Yit = α + β ∗Bit + δ ∗ PDit + γ ∗ PDit ∗Bit + ηt + εit (3.8)
Yit is a quarterly, individual-level outcome such as revenues or gross profits. Bit is an indi-
cator variable that equals 1 if employee i’s compensation at time t prescribes the possibility of
getting a fixed bonus if cumulated annual revenues up to time t exceed a given threshold, and
equals 0 otherwise.21 PDit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if employee i’s contract at
time t gives her control over price, and equals 0 otherwise. ηt are time fixed effects computed





where years,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if period t occurs in year s and equals
0 otherwise, and quarterj,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if period t occurs in the
j-th quarter and equals 0 otherwise. ηt is always included in all specifications because of the
presence of significant business-cycle fluctuations across years and of quarterly seasonality in
furniture sales. Appendix B.3 provides empirical evidence in support of this choice. I cluster
standard errors at the employee-level to allow for an arbitrary within-employee correlation
of the error terms. Results are reported in Table 3.10.
I find that the bonus scheme has a positive and significant22 impact on revenues, gross
profits, gross profits minus commissions bonuses and salary, and on quantity. For example,
offering the bonus scheme increases quarterly revenues by 252,729, about 70% increase rel-
ative the mean of 350,229. This increase looks quite large. There could be other factors
that may be driving this result, and the large variation in the outcome variables definitely
plays an important role: for example, standard deviation of quarterly revenues in our sample
is 269,244, about 80% of the sample mean. Despite the fact that the bonus scheme has
a negative impact on the price, these results suggest that the demand coefficient d in the
setting of the model of section 3.2.2 might be sufficiently large: that is, the firms’ customers
seem to be sufficiently responsive to the non-price sales effort, E. Thus, our findings provide
21Bit is an ex-ante characteristic of the employment contract and will equal one even if (ex-post) cumulated
annual revenues up to time t do not exceed the given threshold.
22At least at the 10%.
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some evidence in support of hypothesis 1.
There seems to be no significant evidence for the presence of a heterogeneous effect of
the bonus scheme depending on whether the employee has control over price or not. The
coefficient of the interaction Bonus ∗ PD is not statistically different from zero, except for
price. Thus, our findings do not provide evidence in support of hypothesis 3.
Table 3.10 also shows that price-delegation has a negative impact on revenues and on the
two measures of gross profits, though the coefficient of the price-delegation dummy, PD, is
not significantly different from zero. In the context of our theoretical model, I can interpret
these results as a situation where the employee might have some private information about
the customers’ willingness to pay, but this information is not sufficiently innovative to off-set
the distortion created by revenue-based incentives on pricing. In particular, looking at the
impact of price delegation on gross profits minus bonuses commissions and salary (column
(3) Table 3.10), I find some evidence that price delegation does not increase the profitability
of the firm. This result does not contradict other results in the literature. For example,
Stephenson et al. [1979] find that price delegation reduced profitability among a sample of
108 firms. On the other hand, Weinberg [1975] suggest that price delegation can increase
profits if the employees are compensated with commissions based on gross profits, instead of
revenues-based pay. In the context of the theoretical model of section 3.2.2, compensating the
employee with bonuses and commissions based on gross profits would reduce the distortion
on pricing created by revenues-based pay. For price delegation to have a positive impact on
gross profits, the employee’s private information when commissions are based on gross profits
would need to be less innovative than the information required under revenues-based pay.
In our data, there are 56 observations where the employees are paid with commissions based
on gross profits. Unfortunately, when the employee is compensated based on gross profits
she is never offered the bonus scheme and she always has control over price. To overcome
this shortcoming of the data, I restrict the sample to only those observations where the
employees are not offered the bonus scheme and they are given control over price. Of these
111 observations, 55 refers to employee-time pairs where the employee is compensated with
revenues-based pay, while the remaining 56 observations refer to cases where the employee
is compensated with pay based on gross profits or a mix between gross profits and revenues.
Table 3.11 reports the results from the ordinary least squares regression where the dependent
variable is one of the five outcomes discussed in this chapter and the independent variable is
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the indicator variable Revenues − based which equals 1 if, in a given year, the employee is
compensated with a revenues-based pay and zero if the employee is compensated with a pay
based on gross profits or a mix between gross profits and revenues. I find that compensating
the employee with revenues-based pay has no significant impact on the outcome variables.
This reinforces the findings in Table 3.10. Price delegation does not significantly increase
revenues or gross profits in the context of furniture sales even if the firm compensates its
sales-force with pays based on gross profits. Thus, our findings do not provide evidence in
support of hypothesis 2.
In summary, the findings of this chapter suggest that sales employees in the furniture
industry are responsive to revenue-based bonus schemes. These findings also suggest that
price delegation has not significant impact on employees’ performance.
3.5. Robustness checks
There are a number of empirical issues that might challenge the findings of this chapter. For
example, if the firm assigned the bonus scheme to those employees conditional on certain
individual characteristics, such as age education or work experience that are observable to
the firm, then the estimates presented in section 3.4 may be biased. Further, if the firm
correlated the assignment of the bonus scheme to other characteristics of the compensation
scheme such as target on revenues or salary, then the estimates may be biased.
The presence of systematic heterogeneity between the employees in direct channel (who have
the right to set price) and those in the dealers channel imposes additional challenges to the
identification strategy proposed in this chapter. One can think of a number of differences
between the direct channel and dealers channel. For example, the firm might sort employees
across the sales channels according to some individual characteristics which is observable to
the firm but not to the econometrician. The compensation plan may systematically differ
across the two sales channels: for example, the salary can be significantly lower/higher for
those employees in the direct channel; or, the price-elasticity of demand may differ across
the sales channels.
The use of quarterly data in our empirical investigation might impose additional challenges
to the findings of this chapter. As employment contract are set at the beginning of each
year and are valid for the entire year, by using quarterly data in the estimation I disregard
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the possibility of within-year dynamics in the behavior of the employees as a response to the
incentives provided by annual target on revenues.
Finally, the sample size and the presence of outliers can make the estimates less stable.
In this section, I propose a number of robustness checks that attempt to assess the potential
biases the aforementioned empirical issues can impose on the estimates found in this chapter.
The results I discuss in this section refer to the Tables in appendix B.3.
3.5.1. Individual characteristics
I include employee fixed-effects in the baseline model of equation 3.8. Employee fixed-effects
control for time-invariant observed and unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, such as
gender or ability. Thus, if the firm assigned the bonus scheme, or the control over price,
according to some time-invariant individual characteristics, the inclusion of employee fixed-
effects should significantly affect the estimates of the model 3.8. I find employee fixed-effects
do not significantly affect the coefficient of the bonus scheme nor they affect that of the price
delegation. 23
3.5.2. Target on revenues and salary
The furniture manufacturing firm designs complex compensation plans. These include salary
and commissions, as well as bonuses the employees can get conditional on achieving prede-
termined targets on revenues (see section B.1 of the appendix). The bonus scheme may be
correlated with some other dimension(s) of the compensation plan: for example, target on
revenues. Controlling for target on revenues is important because this measure takes account
of possible non-random allocation of customers or projects to some employees and, hence,
may contain important information regarding the firm’s beliefs about future market trends.
I find that the inclusion of target on revenues does not significantly affect the coefficient of
the bonus scheme nor does it affect the coefficient of the price delegation.
Salaries are another important part of employees’ compensation. It seems natural to think
the firm sets the salary and the bonus scheme altogether when it designs the employment
contract. Salaries may also contain information regarding employees’ characteristics such as
23The use of individual fixed effects does not fully control for the selection issues that might exist in the
assignation of the price delegation as only one employee in our data changes pricing regime passing from
the direct channel to the dealers channel.
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work experience and skills, or at least the firm’s beliefs about these. The inclusion of salaries
does seem to alter the magnitude of our estimates significantly, although the effect of the
bonus scheme on the outcomes is now stronger.
3.5.3. Heterogeneity across pricing groups
Individual characteristics can systematically differ across the two pricing groups. In appendix
B.3, I show that the distribution of gender, the only observable individual characteristic, is
sufficiently even across the two pricing groups.
The characteristics of the compensation plans can also differ systematically across the
two pricing groups. In appendix B.3, I show the mean of target on revenues, salaries,
expected commissions and other features of the compensation plans across the two pricing
groups. With exception for target on revenues and salaries, the other dimensions of the
compensation plans do not show marked differences across the two pricing groups. I also
show the distribution of the bonus scheme and the distribution of the size of the bonus for
the employees who were given the bonus scheme across the two pricing groups. Though the
employee who have control over price are 10% less likely to be offered the bonus scheme,
the size of the bonus for those who are offered the scheme looks quite similar across the two
pricing groups.
Another source of heterogeneity across the two pricing groups is the types of customers
served. The employees who cannot set the price independently serve dealers. These dealers
serve both retail customers (10% of the total revenues generated by the furniture firm) and
business customers (40% of the firm’s total revenues). The employees who have control
over price solely serve corporations. A simple statistics that summarizes differences in the
customer base across the two pricing groups is the price-elasticity of demand. In appendix B.3
I show that the price elasticity of demand differs across the two sales channels. Unfortunately,
the nature of the data does not allow to control for observed heterogeneity across the sales
channels because the price delegation indicator variable, PD, is perfectly collinear with the
sales channel fixed-effects. The different price elasticity may signal different customer bases




Given the small sample size, extreme values of the outcome variables can alter our estimates.
Moreover, the inclusion of dummy variables on the right-hand side of the regression tends to
weaken the robustness of linear regression estimators when the sample contains anomalous
observations (see Blankmeyer [2006]). I run different specifications using weighting methods
that control for outliers and find these do not significantly affect our findings (see appendix
B.3)
3.5.5. Within-year dynamics
Employment contract are set at the beginning of each year and last for the entire year: for
example, targets on revenues are set on an annual basis. The problem is that I use quarterly
data in the estimation. Although the quarter dummy variables partially control for within-
year dynamics, I need to run a stronger check to test whether the results are contaminated
by within-year dynamics created by the annual incentive scheme. Using annual outcomes
as dependent variable should control for within-year dynamics. Annual data should also
mitigate excessive within-year volatility in outcomes such as negative or large realizations of
revenues or gross profits. In appendix B.3, I show that the estimates of the main specification
using annual data look similar to those of the baseline model reported in Table 3.10. I believe
the annual model specification provides a very important robustness check because averaging
outcome variables for the entire year eliminates plenty of noise and excessive volatility that
is present when considering these variables at the quarterly level.
Finally, employees may “game” the compensation scheme by shifting output across years
(see Oyer, P. [1998]). Unfortunately, I do not have the variation between annual and fiscal
calendars as in Oyer, P. [1998] for testing the presence of “gaming” across years.
3.6. Conclusions
Using data on the staff of a furniture firm, I show that when a bonus scheme conditional on
revenues was introduced, it increased the revenues generated by all of the sales employees,
but I find no significant heterogeneous effect of the bonus scheme depending on whether
the employee is given control over price or not. Moreover, I show that giving the sales staff
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control over price does not significantly increase revenues. The effects of the bonus scheme
and of price delegation on gross profits minus paid bonuses, commissions, and wages were
similar. These results are robust to a number of checks, and are consistent with a model of
moral hazard and price delegation. We can interpret these results in light of the theoretical
model presented in this chapter. The results suggest that the agent might have some private
information but this is not enough to fully off-set the negative impact of moral hazard on
pricing.
Although these results are robust to alternative model specifications, empirical challenges
might be important. For example, the small sample size does not allow to perfectly control-
ling for all observed heterogeneity. Future works should provide more transparent evidence
by using larger data-sets, variation across firms and industries or even engineering ad-hoc
randomized-control trials that clearly generate the variation in the data necessary for iden-
tifying the implications of the bonus scheme and of price delegation.
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Figure 3.1.: Compensation scheme
 
Base salary 








Table 3.1.: Equilibrium outcomes
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E p E
Bonus Yes No advantage µ = 0
a
2b− (β + αB)d2 (β + αB)dp
(1− β − αB)a+ (b− [β + αB]d2)c
2(1− β − αB)(b− [β + αB]d2) (β + αB)dp
Advantage µ 6= 0 a+ µ
2b− (β + αB)d2 (β + αB)dp
(1− β − αB)a+ (b− [β + αB]d2)c
2(1− β − αB)(b− [β + αB]d2) (β + αB)dp
Bonus No No advantage µ = 0
a
2b− βd2 βdp
(1− β)a+ (b− βd2)c
2(1− β)(b− βd2) βdp
Advantage µ 6= 0 a+ µ
2b− βd2 βdp
(1− β)a+ (b− βd2)c
2(1− β)(b− βd2) βdp
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Table 3.2.: Frequency of employment contracts prescribing a bonus ex-ante - by year and
pricing rights
Centralized pricing Delegated pricing
Year Tot # obs # obs with B % obs with B Tot # obs # obs with B % obs with B
2003 16 0 0% 8 0 0%
2004 16 0 0% 12 0 0%
2005 16 0 0% 20 0 0%
2006 20 20 100% 20 16 80%
2007 16 16 100% 20 12 60%
2008 16 16 100% 20 16 80%
2009 16 16 100% 8 8 100%
2010 20 12 60% 0 0 N/A
2011 12 8 67% 0 0 N/A
Total 148 88 59% 108 52 48%
Notes. An observation is a year-quarter-employee combination. A contract is a year-employee pair.
The bonus dummy B describes the possibility for the employee to get extra money conditional on
performance. Thus, B represents an ex-ante characteristic of the employment contract. Not all
people employed in the firm’s sales force are included in this data. Reasons for this are missing data
and excessive heterogeneity in the contracts with lack of variation in the use of bonuses (namely,
these employees are compensated with a threshold on gross profits and no bonus is ever prescribed
to them).
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Table 3.3.: Employees’ history with the firm
Year Employee Total
F01 F02 F03 F04 F05 M01 M02 M03 M04 M05 M06 M07 M08 M09 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 M18
2003 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 24
2004 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 28
2005 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 36
2006 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 0 40
2007 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 0 36
2008 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 0 36
2009 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 24
2010 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 20
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 12
Total 4 4 4 12 16 12 8 8 8 20 4 8 20 12 20 4 4 36 16 8 8 16 4 256
Notes. F refers to female and M to male. Circles refer to contracts that prescribe a bonus. Shaded numbers refer to employees
who have control over price. In 2005, Ms F04 switched from not being able to set price to have the right to. In 2010 Mr M5 had
a mixed scheme and he was revoked the right to set prices. In 2011 Mr M5 had a scheme based on revenues and he still could
not set prices. I had to drop 9 employees because compensated on gross profits and a couple more because of missing info.
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Table 3.4.: Frequency of bonuses and pricing rights
Price delegation Bonus No Bonus Yes Total
No 60 88 148
(23.4%) (34.4%) (57.8%)
Yes 56 52 108
(21.9%) (20.3%) (42.2%)
Total 116 140 256
(45.3%) (54.7%) (100.%)
Notes. An observation is a year-quarter-
employee combination.
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Table 3.5.: Summary statistics of outcomes
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Qrt Revenues 254 350,229 269,244 0 1,209,114
Qrt Gross Profits 254 139,682 126,956 -47,975 990,857
Qrt Gross Profits-SC 254 126,724 124,779 -60,539 979,480
Qrt Quantity 254 1,838 1,771 0 15,507
Qrt Price 241 236 231 6 3,295
Notes. All outcomes are quarterly, individual-level data. Revenues are total
quantity times price. Gross Profits are revenues minus variable costs for pro-
ducing the product. Gross Profits-SC equals to gross profits minus bonuses,
commissions, and salary. All outcomes but quantity are deflated using country-
specific CPI with 2005 as base year. I dropped two observations with negative
sales. Price is missing for nil revenues.
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Table 3.6.: Summary statistics of annual outcomes
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Annual Revenues 64 1,384,100 883,283 172,470 3,781,046
Annual Gross Profits 64 552,265 409,998 50,784 2,602,684
Annual Gross Profits-SC 64 500,355 403,359 -39,697 2,554,629
Annual Quantity 64 7,280 5,550 648 27,442
Annual Price 64 211 72 87 498
Notes. All outcomes are annual, individual-level data. Revenues are total quantity times
price. Gross Profits are revenues minus variable costs for producing the product. Gross
Profits-SC equals to gross profits minus bonuses, commissions, and salary, which occur
to be negative once. All outcomes but quantity are deflated using country-specific CPI
with 2005 as base year.
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Table 3.7.: Mean and std. dev. by bonus
Bonus No† Bonus Yes‡
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Qrt Revenues 280,746 262,742 407,714 261,769
Qrt Gross Profits 123,418 151,047 153,138 101,486
Qrt Gross Profits-SC 110,976 150,623 139,752 97,084
Qrt Quantity 1,599 1,761 2,036 1,761
Qrt Price 241 326 232 110
Notes. All outcomes are quarterly, individual-level data. All outcomes but
quantity are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. I
dropped two observations with negative sales. Price missing for nil revenues.
† 115 observations except price with 106. ‡ 139 observations with except price
with 135.
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Table 3.8.: Mean and std. dev. by pricing rights
Centralized Pricing† Delegated Pricing‡
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Qrt Revenues 383,190 280,158 304,206 247,221
Qrt Gross Profits 148,413 138,771 127,491 107,790
Qrt Gross Profits-SC 136,336 136,323 113,302 105,765
Qrt Quantity 2,079 1,818 1,502 1,654
Qrt Price 227 281 249 127
Notes. All outcomes are quarterly, individual-level data. All outcomes but
quantity are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. I
dropped two observations with negative sales. Price missing for nil revenues.
† 148 observations except price with 142. ‡ 106 observations with except price
with 99.
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Table 3.9.: Mean of outcomes by bonus and pricing rights
Centralized Pricing Delegated Pricing
Bonus No Bonus Yes Bonus No Bonus Yes
Variable Mean† Mean‡ Mean†† Mean‡‡
Qrt Revenues 302,277 438,359 257,258 354,837
Qrt Gross Profits 142,791 152,247 102,285 154,675
Qrt Gross Profits-SC 132,373 139,039 87,634 140,984
Qrt Quantity 1,631 2,384 1,563 1,437
Qrt Price 275 196 204 295
Notes. All outcomes are quarterly, individual-level data. All outcomes but
quantity are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. I
dropped two observations with negative sales. Price missing for nil revenues. †
60 observations with exception of price with 56. ‡ 88 observations with exception
of price with 86. †† 55 observations with exception of price with 50. ‡‡ 51
observations with exception of price with 49.
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Table 3.10.: The effect of incentives and price delegation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 252,729** 71,689* 73,227* 1,871** -78*
(111,561) (39,824) (38,688) (687) (44)
PD -18,543 -21,468 -25,071 360 -74
(84,403) (39,292) (38,571) (617) (64)
Bonus*PD -61,656 20,512 23,970 -1,081 162**
(119,947) (47,051) (45,400) (765) (65)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy No No No No No
Other controls No No No No No
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 254 254 254 254 241
Notes. All outcomes are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. All specifica-
tions are clustered by employee to allow for serial correlation in individual error terms.
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Table 3.11.: Revenues-based vs mixed compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Revenues-based -180,046 -70,267 -67,940 -307 -49
(192,597) (88,441) (86,998) (1,402) (48)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy No Yes No Yes No
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 111 111 111 111 111
Notes. Other controls include the annual target on revenues. 56 observations refer to employees
compensated by a mix pay, and the remaining 55 refer to employees compensated with revenues-
based pay. All outcomes are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. All
specifications are clustered by employee to allow for serial correlation in individual error terms.
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Chapter 4. Credit Channel and
Non-Performing Loans:




We propose an empirical strategy to estimate the impact that a worsening in banks’ wholesale
funding opportunities has on firms’ ability to repay their loans. We exploit the Italian
sovereign debt crisis of July 2011 as a significant funding shock to Italian banks. In summer
2011 the yields on Italian bonds suddenly increased causing an immediate decline in the price
of government securities. Italian banks suffered significant losses as they hold a large share of
their assets in domestic government bonds. Moreover, as Italian bonds are used as collateral
in repo markets, the decline in bonds prices restricted wholesale funding opportunities and
it has likely led to a contraction in the credit supply. This paper investigates whether
this severe shock to credit supply hampered borrowers’ ability to repay their loans. To
capture how each bank has been affected by the sudden increase on Italian yields, we use
1This chapter was jointly co-authored with Marco Gallo, Giacinto Micucci and Francesco Palazzo at Bank
of Italy. The views expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of the Bank of Italy.
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the difference between each bank’s lending and retail funding over its total assets. This
measure captures each bank’s dependence on the wholesale funding market and, thus, its
exposure to the sovereign-debt shock. This credit crunch episode has likely involved all kinds
of borrowers (firms, households, government) and it has contributed to an overall reduction
in aggregate demand. To distinguish how much firms suffered from more restrictive credit
conditions rather than from a significant reduction in firms’ product demand, we consider
firms that borrow from stressed banks (i.e., banks that were more vulnerable to a wholesale
funding shock) to otherwise-similar firms that borrow from non-stressed banks and compare
their loan-repayment performance. To compare firms that are otherwise-similar, we control
for several firm-level characteristics and we create several geographic-product markets where
firms are likely to face the same demand shocks. We find that, following the funding shock
of July 2011, one standard-deviation increase in our measure of firms’ exposure to banks’
financial distress increases their probability not to honour their loans by about 0.4% (i.e.,
the size of the credit channel). Our results also suggest that the aggregate demand channel
led to a 2.4% increase in the share of non-performing loans.
98
4.1. Introduction
In the last two decades the interdependence between financial markets and economic activity
has been one of the most prolific research areas. Bernanke and Gertler [1989] and Kiyotaki
and Moore [1997] initiated a vast theoretical literature on the credit channel. They stress the
role of financial frictions between lenders and non-financial borrowers in amplifying business
cycles. Holmstrom and Tirole [1997], Stein [1998], Diamond and Rajan [2001] and Freixas
and Rochet [2008] extend the analysis to include financial friction between financial inter-
mediaries and their providers of funds (wholesale interbank funding, retail depositors).
Although the empirical literature has extensively documented co-movements between credit
aggregates and real economic variables, there are only a few empirical works that succeed
in disentangling credit demand and supply shocks. The seminal work of Khwaja and Mian
[2008] proposes an effective identification strategy that exploits asymmetric funding shocks
to banks in order to measures credit supply decisions with respect to identical firms. Di Patti
and Sette [2012], Gobbi and Sette [2013] and Bofondi et al. [2013] use a similar methodology
to measure heterogeneous credit supply restrictions across banks operating in Italy. The
first two consider the 2007-08 global credit crunch event and compare banks with different
balance-sheet characteristics; the latter considers the Italian sovereign debt crisis of July
2011 and compares Italian and foreign banks.
In this work we propose an empirical strategy to identify the impact that a deterioration
in banks’ funding opportunities has on firms’ ability to honour their credit contracts. Specif-
ically, we study whether a funding shock to the wholesale interbank market translates into a
deterioration of the borrowing status of enterprises in closer credit relationships with more
liquidity constrained banks. In a nutshell, our goal is to identify and quantify how shocks
to banks’ wholesale liquidity provision may be transmitted to the real sector, leading to ad-
ditional disruption in firms’ economic activity. Previous works on the transmission of credit
supply shock to the non-financial sector focus on overall credit supply. Our choice to study
non-performing loans is partially motivated by the direct implications that non-performing
loans have for banking regulation as their sharp increase poses a serious threat to financial
stability. This “jump” to final outcomes makes the credit shock identification problematic.
Khwaja and Mian [2008] identification strategy when the dependent variable is firms’ bor-
rowing status with respect to the whole banking sector cannot be directly applied because
it is not possible to exploit variation of the dependent variable across different lenders. To
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measure how the credit shock affected the borrowing status we ideally want to consider firms
that differ only in their lenders. Therefore, we devote extra care to select our sample and we
introduce additional controls on firm observed and unobserved characteristics.2
We consider the Italian sovereign debt crisis of July 2011 because it is an ideal case-study
of unanticipated shock to the wholesale funding opportunities of Italian banks. In July 2011,
Italian government bonds experienced a drastic price drop because of a very volatile political
and economic environment (see Figure 4.1). Importantly, Italian government bonds were ex-
tensively used by domestic banks as collateral in secured repo transactions in the wholesale
funding market. The decline in Italian bond prices and the contemporaneous increase in
haircuts and margin requirements severely affected banks costs to raise money on interna-
tional capital markets. This shock was particularly severe because collateralized borrowing
represented at the time of the shock the main wholesale venue to raise additional funds. In
fact, other venues were de facto shut down for Italian banks: unsecured short-term liquidity
had not recovered from the 2007-08 interbank market freeze, while longer term financing on
capital markets was prohibitively expensive. Although an increase in retail deposits might
have partially provided an alternative, the contemporaneous bank competition for deposits
makes it an expensive as well as slow alternative to wholesale funding. We think it is a rea-
sonable approximation to restrict attention to the banks’ different ability to access secured
wholesale funding. A priori we expect that the sovereign debt crisis is likely to have hit
harder financial institutions that heavily relied on wholesale funding. We therefore focus our
identification strategy on the banks’ reliance on wholesale funding which we measure with
the difference between each bank’s lending and retail funding over its total assets and call it
the funding gap.
The focus of our analysis is to empirically identify how the shock is transmitted to the real
economy. We encounter two main issues to empirically identify how the shock is transmitted
to the real economy. Firstly, we need to construct a measure of exposure to the shock at
the firm level. To this purpose, we compute a weighted average of the lenders’ funding gap,
weighting each lender with the credit granted by the bank to the firm over the firm’s total
credit granted in a given period. Secondly, it is difficult to disentangle the relative con-
tributions of weak product demand or heightened credit constraints. Periods of aggregate
credit contraction are positively correlated with economic downturns. In turn, more expen-
2Although our identification strategy involves a higher risk of model misspecification, we believe that the
final trade-off is worth taking this risk.
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sive financing costs and weaker product demand increase firms’ financial vulnerability. We
propose an econometric strategy to distinguish the product market channel from the direct
transmission of banks funding shocks to the borrowing firms (i.e. the credit channel). In
order to measure how much the wholesale funding shock affected borrowers’ ability to repay
their loans, we compare firms that predominantly borrow from stressed banks (i.e. banks
more exposed to a wholesale funding shock) to otherwise-similar firms that borrow from
non-stressed banks. To identify whether firms are otherwise-similar we control as much as
we can on the product demand they face. To this purpose, we consider several geographic-
product markets where firms are exposed to similar demand shocks and compare their
loan-repayment performance within the same market. Thanks to this identification strategy,
we try to disentangle the direct credit supply channel from the product demand channel. We
present a simple example to better explain our identification strategy. In an ideal empirical
setting, we would compare the performance, before and after July 2011, of two otherwise-
identical firms that differ only for the bank they borrow the money from. Consider two FIAT
car dealers, dealer A and dealer B. They operate in the town of Olbia, in the north-east coast
of Sardinia. Assume both dealers have similar total assets and non-financial cost structures,
and that before July 2011 the two dealers share equally the same consumer market, that is,
the market of people that would purchase new FIAT cars in Olbia. This implies that dealer
A and dealer B are both subject to the same macro-demand shocks. The two dealers only
differ for the banks they borrow the money from. Assume dealer A borrows money only
from bank C while dealer B only borrows the money from bank D. For simplicity, we further
assume that bank C and D only differ along one dimension. Bank C can only fund itself
on the wholesale market through collateralized repo transactions with other private banks
or the central bank. Bank D, on the contrary, is able to additionally fund all it loans with
a combination of deposits and equity. If capital markets are efficient before the crisis, the
sources of funding (equity and deposits or wholesale funding) should be equivalent. As a
further simplification, we assume that before July 2011 both banks charged an interest rate
of 4% for a credit line of e500,000 (granted); after July 2011 bank D charges 5% while bank
C charges 8% and unilaterally reduces its granted credit line to e200,000. The two dealers
struggle more to repay their pre-existing debts because the shock on July 2011 impacted the
cost of borrowing and the demand of cars in Olbia. However, we expect dealer B to struggle
more because of the marked increased in bank C’s interest rate and the restricted access to
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credit.
We implement this strategy using ordinary least squares on semi-annual data at the firm
level. The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals 1 if, in a given period, the firm
is recorded as non-performing in Italy’s Credit Register and equals 0 if the firm is recorded
as performing. As a treatment variable for assessing the impact of the funding shock on loans
repayment we use a measure for the firms’ exposure to lenders’ financial distress (henceforth
referred as firms’ exposure). Moreover, we also use the same measure of the firms’ exposure
interacted with a binary variable that equals 0 before July 2011 and equals 1 afterwards.
This should capture the impact of the Italian sovereign debt crisis. To disentangle the credit
channel from the aggregate-demand channel, we control for market-time fixed effects in order
to focus our analysis on the residual variation left each period within the same geographic-
product market.
This econometric specification suffers from three main issues. Firstly, there could be feed-
back effects in our treatment variable in response to the funding shock, as banks can adjust
their funding practices. To control for this possibility, we instrument our treatment variable
by its equivalent in June 2010.
The second issue concerns the empirical identification of the channels underlying the fund-
ing shock to the banks. As mentioned above, the sovereign debt crisis is likely to have hit
harder financial institutions that heavily relied on wholesale funding. We measure firms’
exposure to the funding shock by using the weighted-average of the funding gap of the firms’
lenders. Banks’ funding gap captures their reliance on wholesale markets whose functioning
was severely affected during the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, our data show substantial
variation in this variable across Italian banks so it is likely to represent a valid treatment
variable for our purposes. However, by limiting the treatment of the shock to the funding gap
only we neglect other potential transmission channels.3 To control for other dimensions of
banks’ heterogeneity, we use other observable characteristics of banks, such as Tier 1 capital
ratio, ROA and total assets.
3The sovereign debt crisis is likely to have hit harder financial institutions that non only heavily relied
on wholesale funding but that also (i) held a considerable proportion of eligible collateral in Italian
government bonds, and (ii) did not have a comfortable buffer of eligible securities to post as additional
collateral to meet higher haircuts and margin calls. Ideally, we would measure the extent to which
each Italian bank suffered from this funding shock using an index that considers all three dimensions
of dependence on wholesale funding, exposure to Italian government bonds and spare capacity to post
collateral. However, the lack of variation in bond holdings across Italian banks prevents us to fully exploit
these three dimensions.
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Finally, our identification strategy is valid only if firms that operate in the same market
were trending similarly before the crisis. To account for this possibility, we include the most
significant firms’ characteristics that we observe from balance sheet data such as total assets,
ROA, EBIT and leverage.
Holding all included variables constant, the results suggest that one standard-deviation in-
crease (around 8%) in our measure of firms’ exposure to financial distress marginally increases
firms’ probability to be non-performing by about 0.4%. This is our estimate for the size of
the credit channel. Interestingly, the aggregate demand channel lead to a 2.4% increase in
the share of non-performing loans.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a summary of the
related literature. Section 4.3 explains our data and section 4.4 provides summary statis-
tics. Section 4.5 explains the identification strategy. Section 4.6 presents the econometric
model and the results, followed by robustness checks in section 4.7. Finally we make some
concluding remarks.
4.2. Literature Review
Non-performing loans (NPLs) have recently gained substantial attention both in policy and
academic circles. During the last five years the banking sector has been greatly exposed to
the financial and economic turmoil. Indeed, banks suffered significant financial stress because
asset prices substantially declined and an increasing number of outstanding loans defaulted.
Although the financial crisis provides new reasons to study NPLs, in the last decade the
literature has already focused on several issues that were central to policymakers’ discussions.
For the sake of exposition and without any pretence of strict methodological classification,
we prefer to divide the literature in four main strands. Although there are some inevitable
overlaps, each strand has different research questions, and uses different datasets as well as
different econometric techniques. Moreover, we only consider the more recent works as they
relate more closely to our research questions.
4.2.1. NPLs and firm-level characteristics
This strand of literature aims to estimate the probability to default (PD) of small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) as a function of some observable firm characteristics. The famous
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Z-score in Altman [1968] initiates the conventional use of financial ratios as a predictor for
bankruptcy.
Behr et al. [2004] estimate PDs for German SMEs using a logit scoring model on a loan level
dataset provided by a SME financier. They find that indebtedness profitability, liquidity and
regional location are all significant factors where estimates have all intuitive signs. Recently,
Fidmuc and Hainz [2010] obtain similar results using a probit model on loan level data from a
Slovakian commercial bank for the period 2000-2005. While the former paper highlights how
relationship lending may lead to monopoly rents for banks, the latter stresses how Slovakian
default rates converged to the levels found in more developed economies.
Dietsch and Petey [2004] and Jacobson et al. [2005] use different PD’s models to test the
validity of some implicit assumptions in the Basel II framework. The former work uses default
data for German and French SMEs from two European financial information providers to
estimate a one-factor credit risk model and assess default correlations. The latter adopts a
non-parametric Monte-Carlo technique to illustrate how SMEs are significantly riskier than
other corporate credit.
Recently, McCann and McIndoe-Calder [2012] build a cross-sectional dataset of loan-level
exposures and borrowers’ balance sheet characteristics for approximately 6,000 Irish SMEs.
They run several probit regressions controlling for financial and economic characteristics
(leverage, liquidity, profitability, exposure, firm size, economic sector) and they get results
qualitatively consistent with the previous literature.
4.2.2. NPLs and bank characteristics
Another strand of literature looks at NPLs differences across banks, rather than firm-level
(borrower) heterogeneity. The main focus is on the internal organization, collateral require-
ments, and sector specialization of banks. Although macroeconomic variables are included
in the analysis, they are used as exogenous covariates with respect to NPLs. In Section 4.2.3
we discuss why this partial equilibrium framework has been criticized in several works that
prefer to model NPLs dynamics through a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach.
Berger and Young [1997] use Granger-causality techniques to consider the relationships
among loan quality, cost efficiency and bank capital for US commercial banks in the 1985-
1994 period. As they consider aggregate variables, they do not control for individual loan
characteristics or other bank related specificities. A more comprehensive analysis has been
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carried out by Salas and Saurina [2002] thanks to a loan-level panel data of Spanish banks
in the 1985-1997 period. They find that macroeconomic variables have strong explanatory
power for NPLs but they also highlight the importance of some microeconomic factors such
as the banks’ rapid credit and branch expansion, portfolio composition, size, net interest
margin, capital ratio and market power. In particular, they stress the difference between
commercial and savings banks.
Jimenez and Saurina [2004] use Spanish Credit Register data over the period 1988-2000 to
assess how borrowers’ PD depend on collateral used, the type of lender and previous bank-
borrower relationships. They report that saving banks have riskier loan portfolios, that closer
bank-borrower relationship seem to increase lender’s willingness to take more risk and that
collateralized loans have a higher default probability. Jimenez et al. [2006] conduct a more
thorough study of the effects of collateral on loan PD. They analyse a sample of Spanish
bank loans from 1984 to 2002 and they claim that collateral usage is higher among riskier
borrowers, i.e. those who previously defaulted or new borrowers who default after receipt of
the loan. As a result, the signalling theory of collateral posting seems to have some validity
only for younger cohorts of borrowers.
Quagliariello [2007] builds a large panel dataset of Italian financial intermediaries to study
the cyclical behaviour of NPLs over the business cycle. His analysis confirms that macroeco-
nomic conditions have a significant and long-standing impact on NPLs. In the same spirit,
Louzis et al. [2012] consider a panel dataset of loans originated in the Greek banking sector
from 2003 to 2009. The authors estimate NPLs responsiveness to macroeconomic variables
for consumer loans, business loans and mortgages (the latter being the less responsive) and
they conclude that NPLs are mainly explained by macroeconomic factors and management
quality.
Beyond macroeconomic factors, Jimenez and Saurina [2006] stress how expansionary credit
policies have a statistically significant effect on future NPLs. Indeed, they report a strong
positive relationship between rapid credit growth and subsequent NPLs. Finally, Jimenez et
al. [2007] focus on the interplay between banking competition and NPLs. They provide some
empirical evidence in support of the “charter value” hypothesis (see Keeley [1990], Repullo
[2004]), i.e. a positive relationship between market competition in banking and their credit
risk profile.
105
4.2.3. NPLs and macro shocks
All works in Section 4.2.2 assume macroeconomic variables to be exogenous with respect to
bank losses. However, an extensive literature in macroeconomics highlights the importance
of the credit channel as a powerful amplifying mechanism (see Bernanke and Gertler [1989],
Kiyotaki and Moore [1997]). In a nutshell, as NPLs directly erode banking capital, credit
supply may significantly decline and have a negative effect on employment and output.
A first strand of literature estimates VAR models to capture the simultaneous determination
of NPLs and macroeconomic variables. Data include aggregate variables, with no reference
to microeconomic characteristics at the loan level for borrowers and lenders.
Gambera [2000] use US quarterly data from 1987 to 1999 to estimate a bivariate VAR and
assess the impact of regional and national macroeconomic variables on different types of loans
(agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential). He reports how a limited number of
macroeconomic variables well predict NPLs behaviour. Hoggarth et al. [2005] consider the
interaction between banks’ write-offs to loan ratio and several macroeconomic variables over
the period 1988-2004. They found a negative relationship between changes in output and the
write-offs ratio, while the feedback effect from NPLs to output is much weaker. Filosa [2007]
and Marcucci and Quagliariello [2008] study credit cycles in the Italian economy. The former
finds that the behaviour of NPLs is weakly pro-cyclical and it explains only a modest fraction
of the historical variability in bad loans dynamics. Moreover, he finds statistically signifi-
cant feedback effects from bad loans to real economic activity. The latter work highlights
the importance of macroeconomic shocks on the banking sector while they find a somewhat
weaker feedback effect.
Marcucci and Quagliariello [2009] use a threshold regression methodology on a panel dataset
for Italian bank borrowers’ default rates to detect possible asymmetries in the relationship
between credit risk and macroeconomic variables. They report that negative effects of the
business cycle on credit risk are more pronounced during downturns and for riskier banks.
Another strand of literature uses single-equation time series approach to assess the macroe-
conomic determinants of NPLs. Arpa et al. [2001] focus on a sample of Austrian banks over
the 1990-199 period and they find that output growth, interest rates and real estate price
dynamics have a good explanatory power. Recently Bofondi and Ropele [2011] use a similar
econometric technique to study how different macroeconomic shocks impact households and
firms. In particular, they find significant differences between the two groups in terms of
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endogenous persistence and time-response to shocks. Finally Caporale et al. [2013] adopt
a Structural VAR approach to study whether “excessive” loans during expansionary phases
can explain the more than proportional increase in NPLs during recessions.
4.2.4. Panel VAR models
Panel Vector Auto Regressive (PVAR) models4 aim to combine the salient features of the
strands of literature discussed in Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. Indeed, this approach allows to
consider the endogenous relationship between macroeconomic variables and NPLs while, at
the same time, it allows to control for some idiosyncratic characteristics. As a result, it is
possible to assess the relative contribution of common and idiosyncratic factors to NPLs’
determination.
Espinoza and Prasad [2010] estimates a PVAR model on a dataset for Gulf Cooperation
Council countries over the period 1995 to 2008. He finds evidence of a strong but short-
lived feedback effect of NPLs on non-oil growth. Similarly, Nkusu [2011] considers a panel
dataset of developed countries over the period 1998 to 2009 and he reports strong linkages
between macroeconomic and financial variables. Finally, Inessa and Rima [2013] control for
bank specific characteristics in a dataset of Egyptian banks for the period 1993-2010. They
stress the importance of the credit channel in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks to
the banking sector. Moreover, they point out that capital inflows have significant effects on
banks’ loan portfolio quality.
4.3. Data and sample selection
4.3.1. The database
Our analysis uses three main pieces of information: data on individual firms, data on bank-
firm relationships, and data on banks’ balance sheets. We collect this data from January
2006 to June 2012.
As for data on individual firms, we use the Company Accounts Data Service (henceforth
CERVED), a commercial dataset which virtually includes all Italian corporations. Our sam-
ple only takes into account non-financial companies where information on financial liabilities
4A recent introduction to this methodology is Canova and Ciccarelli [2013].
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such as financial leverage is available.5 The CERVED dataset provides detailed information
on firms’ geographic location and sector of economic activity as well as annual accounting
information on revenues, total assets, liquidity and financial liabilities. In the CERVED
dataset there are about 280,000 firms over the time period considered.
Data on bank-firm relationships for our sample of CERVED corporations comes from
the Italian Credit Register (henceforth CR). This database lists all performing loans above
e30,000 and the universe of non-performing loans from banks operating in Italy, including
branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. This dataset is updated monthly and every finan-
cial intermediary reports granted and drawn amounts for each single borrower. Moreover,
it assigns to each borrower one out of five possible statuses: performing, past-due,6 restruc-
tured,7 sub-standard,8 and bad debt.9 The global position of a borrower with respect to the
whole Italian banking system follows the Basel 2 classification:
• Bad debt: 10% or more out of total cash credit used is reported as bad debt.
• Sub-standard: 20% or more out of total cash credit used is reported as sub-standard
or bad debt.
• Restructured: 20% or more out of total cash credit used is reported as restructured,
sub-standard or bad debt.
• Past-due: 50% or more out of total cash credit used is reported as past-due, restruc-
tured, sub-standard or bad debt.
• Performing: None of the above condition applies.
At this exploratory stage of the work, we simplify the analysis by studying the variation
of the binary outcome variable NPLit which equals 0 if the global position of borrower i
at time t with respect to the whole Italian banking system is classified as performing and
equals 1 otherwise (whence the acronym NPL for non-performing loan). For every firm in
the CERVED sample we consider its global borrowing status in each semester (ending in
June and in December).
5It is a necessary requirement to meaningfully analyze non-performing loans. The vast majority of corpo-
rations provide this information.
6Debt repayment at least 90 days late.
7Renegotiated contractual terms.
8Temporary problem to reimburse debt that might be solved within an “appropriate” time lapse.
9Insolvency status or situations de facto comparable.
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Lastly, we collect balance-sheet information on Italian banks from the Supervisory Reports
submitted by financial intermediaries to the Bank of Italy. If a financial intermediary is part
of a banking group in a given period we only consider aggregated data referred to the whole
group because the parent bank controls funding decision for all subsidiaries. In the remainder
of the work we generically use the term “bank” to refer to an economic unit that controls its
own funding and lending decisions, irrespective of its specific legal status. There are about
1,050 credit institutions in our sample. Some of them are foreign banks such as BNP-Paribas
or Deutsche Bank. Branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks are treated separately because
of their peculiar status. To measure how the sovereign debt crisis affected each Italian bank,
we construct several standard accounting ratios at the bank level such as ROA, ROE, Tier
1 and Tier 2 Capital ratios10 and we introduce a variable more closely related to the specific
“distress” episode caused by the Italian sovereign debt crisis:
• Funding gap: It is the ratio to total assets of the difference between lending and retail
funding. Data is available monthly for the whole sample period.11
To have semi-annual observations all monthly data is aggregated by semester with a simple
average.
4.3.2. Sample selection
Our dataset does not provide enough information to directly observe firms’ product demand.
Therefore, our identification strategy relies on the ability to construct groups of non-financial
corporations that face similar demand shocks. Using information on the geographic location
and sector of economic activity, we control for unobserved market-demand factors in those
sectors where firms predominantly serve a local geographic market and sell sufficiently homo-
geneous products. As a consequence, we restrict attention to only those firms that operate
in local markets. Examples of such markets can be found in constructions and services to
10For Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital ratios we have information from June 2008 to June 2013 at semi-annual
frequency.
11It follows the definition in the Bank of Italy Financial stability Report (November 2012). Lending includes
bank loans net of provisions and securitized loans repurchased in the form of liabilities issued by the
securitization vehicle. Retail funding includes residents’ deposits and other forms of retail fund-raising
(such as bank bonds subscribed by households) but it excludes liabilities related to securitization. Repos
with central counter-parties are excluded both from lending and funding.
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mention a few. Bresnahan and Reiss [1988] and Bresnahan and Reiss [1991] use a similar
approach to identify the “relevant market” for the sake of competition law issues.12
In the CERVED dataset there are about 280,000 firms over the time period considered,
which represent about 2.9 million firm - half-year observations. We drop firms who work in
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors as these are traditionally export-intensive sectors
in Italy and we have information on exports for none of the firms present in the sample. This
leaves only firms that work in the construction and services sectors which are traditionally
(more) local businesses. These firms represent roughly 70% of the sample and constitute
about 1.9 million firm - half-year observations.
We also drop all firms that in a given half-year borrowed a positive amount from a foreign
bank as we have detailed information on the balance sheet of the Italian subsidiary but not
equivalent information for the foreign group as a whole. We also drop all firms that in a
given half-year borrowed a positive amount from a credit institution for which we have no
information on the funding gap (about 925 small financial institutions such as leasing or
factoring companies). Our sample only includes firms that borrow from the 92 Italian banks
for which we have complete data.13 Further, we drop those firms for which total assets is
smaller than 10,000 euros as we believe the accounting data reported by these firms is not
fully reliable. There are about 200 such observations (less than 1% of the sample). This
leaves us with about 1.2 million observations.
Finally, our identification strategy requires to comparing firms that in a given period op-
erate in the same market. Given the information available in CERVED, we define a market
as a combination of a geographic market and a product market. The geographic market is
defined as a province, such as Milan or Rome. There are 103 provinces considered in the
sample (see Appendix C.1). The product market is defined using the ATECO-2007 Classi-
fication of Economic Activity provided by Italy’s National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
ATECO-2007 classifies each economic activity as a 6-digit code. We use the full 6-digit code
to define a product market as this represents the more homogeneous unit of geographic-
product market we are able to identify given the information available in CERVED. For
example, the 6-digit code for the services sector can tell whether a firm operates in the retail
12For example, Bresnahan and Reiss [1988] consider thirteen retail and professional service industries: farm
equipment dealers, movie theatres, new or used tire dealers, beauty shops, barbers, plumbers, electricians,
new auto dealers, physicians, veterinarians, dentists, drugstores, and optometrists and opticians.
13The 92 Italian banks we consider represent a big share of the Italian market covering roughly 77% of the
amount of credit granted annually to the firms in CERVED between 2005 and 2012.
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sale of beverages or in the retail sale of packaged fruit and vegetables. There are about 800
product markets in our sample which in combination with the 103 provinces form about
25,000 geographic-product market pairs.14 For our identification strategy to work, we only
keep those markets that in a given half year have at least two active firms present in the
sample. In this way, we are able to compare firms that share the same (or potentially the
same) demand shocks. This leaves us with about 130,000 firms and 1 million firm - half-
year observations. Appendix C.2 shows how the selected sample differs from the original
CERVED sample. Median firms do not differ significantly across the two samples. However,
our selection removes very large firms as one can see by comparing the maximum statistics
of the firm-level characteristics. This is mainly due to the fact that we remove firms that
borrow from foreign banks as well as very large manufacturing firms which represent the
bulk of the top-exporters of the “made-in-Italy”.
4.4. Descriptive statistics
Our identification strategy aims to assess whether the sovereign debt crisis contributed to
worsen firms’ borrowing status. To achieve this goal we consider four main factors:
• Distribution of the share of firms recorded as non-performing (i.e., NPL) across geo-
graphic areas, sectors and over time
• Individual bank exposure to the sovereign debt crisis and firm-level credit linkages to
the banking sector
• Product market demand
• Firm financial and economic characteristics
The first factor is the outcome we aim to explain. The second factor describes the extent
to which the sovereign shock affected banks’ wholesale funding opportunities and, in turn,
how this shock got transmitted to firms as a function of their credit links to the banking
system. Together, they determine the direct credit supply shock to the firms that we hope
to identify. The last two factors play a fundamental role to determine borrowers’ ability to
14However, not all product markets are present in every province.
111
repay their loans but they are not directly related to the wholesale funding shock. Therefore,
we need to control for these last two dimensions if we hope to identify the shock.
In this section, we present some descriptive statistics.
4.4.1. Distribution of non-performing loans (NPLs)
The outcome variable we study in this chapter is the binary variable NPLit which equals
1 if firm i is recorded as non-performing in Italy’s Credit Register in period t and equals 0
otherwise.
Table 4.1 reports the distribution of the share of non-performing loans in our selected
sample of firms by geography and by sector. The share of non-performing loans is markedly
larger in Central and Southern Italy and for the construction sector.
Table 4.2 reports the semi-annual time series of the share of non-performing loans in our
selected sample. There is a positive trend for the whole series, with some marked jumps
starting from the second half of 2008 when Lehman Brothers collapsed. In the second half
of 2011 the share of non-performing loans jumped by 1.1% relative the previous half year.
At the end of 2012 the share of non-performing loans in our selected sample reached 7%.
On the top of Table 4.3 we report the share of non-performing loans in our selected sample of
firms for three time periods: the period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the period
between the collapse of Lehman and the Italian sovereign debt crisis, and the period post
Italian crisis. The share of non-performing loans increased markedly after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and it increased again after the Italian crisis. On the bottom of Table 4.3
we report the same statistics for the periods before and after the Italian sovereign debt crisis,
as the focus of this chapter is on the Italian sovereign debt crisis. The share of non-performing
loans almost doubled following the Italian crisis compared to the previous period.15
Table 4.4 completes the analysis of the distribution of non-performing loans before and after
the Italian crisis by filtering the series with respect to geographic areas and sectors. It shows
that the impact of the Italian crisis, as measured by the change of the share of non-performing
loans after the crisis, is larger for Central and Southern Italy as well as for the construction
sector.
15At this preliminary stage, we do not model the dynamics of the share of non-performing loans. However,
one can imagine that there is strong persistence in the series: firms that become non-performing stay
in this state for a long time over the sample. In our estimation we allow arbitrary correlation between
disturbance terms by clustering at the market level.
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4.4.2. Banks’ financial distress and firms’ exposure
The literature uses different variables to capture banks’ vulnerability to different types of
shocks. Typical measures of banks’ distress include bank solvency and liquidity ratios as
well as profitability and credit quality indicators (see Jimenez et al. [2012]).16 The sovereign
debt crisis is likely to have hit harder financial institutions that heavily relied on wholesale
funding. We therefore focus our identification strategy on the banks’ reliance on wholesale
funding which we measure with the difference between each bank’s lending and retail funding
over its total assets and call it the funding gap.
Table 4.5 reports a summary of balance-sheet characteristics for the 92 Italian banks for
which we have compete information, using bank - half-year as unit of observation. At the
bottom of Table 4.5 one can see summary statistics for the funding gap and the share of
risky bonds both expressed as a percentage. The standard deviation of the funding gap is
more than eight-times its mean, while that for the share of risky bonds is about one-eighth
of the mean. This provides a rough indication of the difference in the cross-bank variation
in the two measures of distress.
Table 4.6 compares two groups of banks before and after the Italian crisis. The first group
of banks are those that as of June 2010 had a negative funding gap. A negative gap can be
interpreted as banks with stable sources of funding as they do not crucially rely on wholesale
funding. The second group of banks are those that as of June 2010 had a positive funding
gap. This separation is only indicative of different banks’ exposure to the wholesale funding
shock. In the top part of Table 4.6 we report the change in the ratio between the total
value of non-performing loans over the bank’s total assets. The share of non-performing
loans increased more (about 2.2% increase) for the group of banks that in June 2010 had a
positive funding gap compared to the other group (which experienced an increase of about
1.2%). At the bottom of Table 4.6 we report the change in the difference between a bank’s
total loans (in euros) in the current half year and the previous one over the bank’s total
assets. The change in total loans has become negative for the group of banks that in June
2010 had a positive funding gap compared to the other group where this change has only
decreased but remained positive. Although the bank’s amount of total loans is determined
by demand and supply, these numbers provide an overview of the dynamics going on during
the Italian crisis.
16For our same purposes, Bofondi et al. [2013] use a dummy for foreign banks.
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Let DISTRESSj,t be the index of banks’ financial distress (i.e., the funding gap).
DISTRESSj,t summarizes the funding vulnerability of bank j at time t. In our baseline
model we use data where the unit of observations is a firm-time pair. As the firms in our data
normally borrow from more than one lender, we aggregate our index DISTRESSj,t at the
firm level. For each non-financial corporation i and each period t, we construct EXPi,t as the
weighted average of the index DISTRESSj,t for those banks with credit relationship with
firm i in period t. Bank j’s weight in EXPi,t depends on the share of credit granted by bank
j to firm i out of the total credit granted by the banking sector to firm i at time t. Table 4.7
reports summary statistics for the firm’s exposure to its lenders funding gap (i.e., EXPi,t).
The first variable in the Table (Exposure to Funding gap) is a time-dependent variable, while
the second variable (Exposure to Funding gap at June 2010) is the corresponding value of the
firm’s exposure in June 2010. This last variable is used as an instrumental variable to control
for possible feedbacks effects in the treatment variable EXPi,t in response to the funding
shock of July 2011. Figure 4.2 provides the histogram of firms’ exposure to their lenders’
distress which looks about normally distributed with mean 6.5% and standard deviation
8.4%, i.e. in our sample firms were exposed on average to banks with a funding gap of 6.5%
of total assets.
4.4.3. Product market demand
In the selected sample of about 130,000 firms and about 1 million semi-annual firm-level
observations, there are 103 provinces and about 600 product markets at 6 digits of the
ATECO code. Over the entire sample, these make about 140,000 market-time combinations
that we use as fixed effects. In each half year, the number of firms operating in a given
geographic-product market ranges from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of about 2,000, with
a median number of 14, an average number of 83 and a standard deviation of about 220
firms.
4.4.4. Firm-level characteristics
Table 4.8 reports the main firm characteristics used in our analysis. The median firm in our
sample has annual assets of about 1.2 million euros, a return on assets of about 4%, and
a leverage ratio, measured by the annual share of financial debt over the sum of financial
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debt plus equity, of about 74%. 17 The median firms in our selected sample borrow from
two different banks. We also report HHI, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of a firm’s loans
portfolio across its lenders in a given half year. HHI can take values between 10,000/No
banks when the firm borrows an equal amount from each of its lenders, and 10,000 when
the firm only borrows from one bank. The median value of HHI in our data is about 5,700
which is very close to 5,000 (= 10,000/2). This suggests that the median firms in our sample
distribute their borrowed funds evenly across lenders.
4.5. Identification strategy
The goal of this work is to assess whether the Italian crisis significantly aggravated the per-
formance of borrowers linked to banks that suffered a more severe restriction on their funding
opportunities. To identify this question empirically, one needs to consider the following is-
sues.
Firstly, we need to construct a measure of the firms’ exposure to their lenders’ financial
distress, as measured by the funding gap, and map this into a deterioration of the borrow-
ing status of the same firms in credit relationships with more liquidity constrained banks
(i.e. our treatment variable). For each firm i we compute a weighted average of its lenders’
funding gap in every half year t, EXPi,t.
18 In the analysis, we lag the treatment EXPi,t one
period (i.e., EXPit−1) because we believe that bank i’s credit supply as well as loan-portfolio
management decisions at time t are based on the information available to the bank at the
end of period t− 1, which also includes the bank’s reliance on the wholesale funding market
in t− 1 (i.e., its funding gap). Thus, EXPit−1 is the relevant metrics for approximating firm
i’s exposure to the credit-supply shock in period t and, thus, for assessing its impact on the
performance of borrower i.19 In addition to the firm’s exposure, EXPit−1, our treatment also
includes the interaction between EXPit−1 and the binary variable Crisist which equals 0
before July 2011 and equals 1 afterwards. The interaction is intended to capture the regime
change in response to the Italian crisis. We consider the Italian sovereign debt crisis of July
17The negative values of the leverage ratio are puzzling as well as values of the leverage that are greater
than 100%. These cases represent about 7% of the observations.
18The weight for each lender b in period t is computed as the share of the credit granted by lender b to firm
i over firm i’s total credit granted in period t.
19In general, longer lags of EXPit−1 might be relevant to explain banks’ decisions but at this exploratory
stage of the work we only focus on the first lag.
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2011 because it is an ideal case-study of unanticipated shock to the wholesale funding oppor-
tunities of Italian banks. The rapid increase in the interest rate spread between Italian and
German bonds pushed the market value of Italian government bonds down (see Figure 4.1).
In turn, this event worsened banks’ conditions to obtain liquidity on the interbank market
or through central bank refinancing operations because it led to additional margin calls and
higher haircuts. Therefore, to get the same cash amount banks had to post a higher nominal
amount of Italian bonds. This shock was particularly severe because collateralized borrowing
represented at the time of the shock the main wholesale venue to raise additional funds. In
fact, other venues were de facto shut down for Italian banks: unsecured short-term liquidity
had not recovered from the 2007-08 interbank market freeze, while longer term financing on
capital markets was prohibitively expensive.
Secondly, there is a fundamental economic issue if one intends to disentangle the impact of
the shock on the firms’ access to credit from the impact of the shock on the firms’ product de-
mand. Periods of aggregate credit contraction are positively correlated with economic down-
turns. During these periods, more expensive financing costs and weaker product demand
increase firms’ financial vulnerability. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle the relative
contributions of weak product demand or heightened credit constraints. We distinguish the
product market channel from the direct transmission of funding shocks on banks to the bor-
rowing firms (i.e., the credit channel) by comparing firms that predominantly borrow from
stressed banks (i.e. banks more exposed to a wholesale funding shock) to otherwise-similar
firms that borrow from non-stressed banks. To identify whether firms are otherwise-similar
we control as much as we can on the product demand they face. To this purpose, we consider
several geographic-product markets where firms are exposed to similar demand shocks and
compare their loan-repayment performance.
This identification strategy works if three conditions hold. Firstly, the banks should not
adjust their reliance on the wholesale market in response to the shock of the Italian crisis.
In other words, there should be no feedback effect in our treatment variable EXPit−1 in
response to the funding shock of July 2011. This assumption is obviously too restrictive
as non-performing loans directly erode banking capital and in turn might induce banks to
reduce credit supply and adjust their funding strategies (see section 4.2.3).20 We control
for this possibility by instrumenting our treatment EXPit−1 by its equivalent computed on
20Hoggarth et al. [2005] document that feedbacks affects from non-performing loans to output is much weaker
than the reverse effect.
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June 2010, EXPi,6−2010.21 For each firm i, EXPi,6−2010 is a time-invariant variable which
summarizes firm i’s exposure to its lenders distress at June 2010. We choose June 2010 be-
cause, on the one side, it represents a moment in time that is close enough to the sovereign
debt crisis shock of July 2011 to provide a good picture of the firm’s exposure before the
crisis and, on the other hand, it is far enough from July 2011 to believe that on June 2010
the shock of July 2011 was unexpected by banks and companies. The intuition behind this
instrumental variable is the following: had the crisis not occurred, two similar firms would
have been trending similarly.
The second issue concerns the empirical identification of the channels underlying the fund-
ing shocks to the banks. As mentioned previously, the sovereign debt crisis started in the
wholesale money market and is likely to have hit harder financial institutions that heavily
relied on wholesale funding. We therefore measure the firms’ exposure to the funding shock
in the wholesale money market of July 2011 by using the weighted-average of the funding
gap of the firms’ lenders, EXPi,t, as we believe that the funding gap is a necessary channel
of transmission of the shock from the wholesale market to the individual banks. By limiting
the treatment of the shock to the funding gap, we neglect other channels through which the
shock might have hit the Italian banks. This leaves plenty of cross-banks heterogeneity out
of our analysis. In our dataset, we observe many time-variant characteristics of the banks
such as total assets, return on assets (ROA), capital requirements such as Tier 1 and Tier
2 capital ratios, the amount of non-performing loans as a share of total assets, as well as
the share of the “risky” bonds over the total bonds used by the banks as collateral in the
wholesale money market.22 Therefore, we use the firms’ exposure on June 2010 to these
other dimensions of banks’ heterogeneity as a simple way to control for other possible trans-
21We instrument the interaction EXPit−1 ∗ Crisist with EXPi,6−2010 ∗ Crisist.
22Securities holdings by country of counter-party and pledge status is a crucial dimension for assessing the
impact of the Italian sovereign debt crisis on the amount of credit supplied by each individual bank.
However, this measure does not exhibit the cross-sectional variation that would be necessary to identify
its contribution to the credit supply shock in our data. For example, the median share of bank’s holding
in “risky bonds” over the total bonds is roughly 95%. Also 90% of the times the share of risky securities
exceeds 80% (see Appendix C.3). The national focus of our data could explain the lack of cross-sectional
variation in bonds holdings across banks. In principle, we could exploit cross-sectional variation between
Italian and foreign groups but the balance-sheet information we observe for foreign banks operating in
Italy is incomplete as it only refers to the balance sheet of the Italian subsidiary of the foreign group.
As documented in Battistini et al. [2013], banks tend to hold a large share of national securities relative
to securities of foreign governments. To have the sufficient cross-sectional variation in banks’ securities
holdings, one would ideally have cross-country data where banks of different nationalities are likely to
have different holdings of sovereign securities.
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mission channels of the shock. Although very rudimental, we believe this approach provides
valid insights to understand how the liquidity shock can propagate into the economy using
detailed micro-economic data.
Finally, the identification strategy summarized by the ordinary least-squares specification
with time-dependent treatment EXPit−1 and market-time fixed effects is valid only if firms
that operate in the same market were trending similarly before the crisis. If the firms did
not show similar patterns before the Italian crisis, then our identification strategy might not
work. For example, if firms that borrowed from banks with heavy reliance on the wholesale
funding market had been systematically highly or slightly leveraged our estimates will be
biased. In Appendix C.4, we report the results of ordinary-least squares regressions of annual
firm-level characteristics, such as the leverage ratio or the total assets, on our treatment vari-
ables. The regressions show that even within the same market, firms with different exposure
to their lenders’ distress were trending differently before the crisis. For example, firms with
higher exposure to the banks’ funding gap at June 2010 were significantly less leveraged than
firms less exposed to banks’ distress.23 Although this evidence might reinforce the impact of
our treatment variable as firms that borrowed from highly distressed banks were likely to be
the “healthiest” before the crisis (for instance, less leveraged), the possible presence of dif-
ferent firm-level trends before the crisis can bias our results. To account for this possibility,
one would ideally control for firm fixed effects (αi) as well as firm-specific time trends (for
instance, αi ∗ time). Given the large dimensionality of our panel dataset, one would have
to compute more than 100,000 firm-specific fixed effects and as many linear trends. Due to
time and technological constraints, we are not able to estimate fixed effects and time trends
for each individual firm. Therefore, we opt for a simple solution and so include the most
significant firms’ characteristics that we observe in the data.24
23This result might seem puzzling but this is what the data say. We computed the same regressions dropping
the doubtful observations where firms have negative leverage or leverage larger than 100% and we still
get the same result.
24Although the inclusion of firms’ characteristics do not control for the full individual trend, we can get an
idea of the direction of the bias induced by not controlling for firm-specific trends.
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4.6. Econometric model and results
In order to identify the impact of the funding shock to Italian banks following the Italian
crisis on the ability of the borrowing firms to repay their loans, we run the following regression
P(NPLit = 1) = NPLit = β0EXPit−1 + β1EXPit−1 ∗ Crisist + µmt +Xitγ + it (4.1)
where EXPit−1 is our measure of firm i’s exposure to banks’ financial distress in period t−1.
The binary variable Crisist equals 1 after July 2011 and 0 otherwise. The market-time fixed
effect µmt equals 1 if firm i operates in market m at time t and equals 0 otherwise. µmt
captures unobserved demand conditions and it helps to separate the pure credit channel of
the shock from the general aggregate demand channel.25 Xit is a vector that includes firm
characteristics such as liquidity and solvency ratios, as well as the firm’s exposure to several
dimensions of its lenders’ financial health such as Tier 1 capital ratios, total assets and ROA.
it is an idiosyncratic error term which is allowed to exhibit arbitrary correlations within the
same province and product market (defined using the first three digits of the ATECO code),
but it is assumed to be uncorrelated across markets. Parameters β0 and β1 are the main
parameters of interests as they measure the marginal effects of the firms’ exposure to their
lenders’ financial distress before and after the funding shock of July 2011.
Table 4.9 reports the results of our estimation. Column (1) reports the estimates of
the ordinary least squares regression of NPLit on the treatment variables EXPit−1 and
EXPit−1 ∗ Crisist with no additional controls. The results suggest that, before July 2011,
the firms’ exposure to the banks’ funding gap in the previous period is negatively correlated
with the probability that the firm enters the non-performing status. This relation reverts
after the start of the Italian crisis as the correlation becomes positive.
Column (2) reports the estimates of the ordinary least squares regression of NPLit on the
treatment variables EXPit−1 and EXPit−1 ∗ Crisist with the addition of market-time fixed
effects µmt to control for unobserved shocks to product demand. Comparing the results in
column (2) to those in column (1), we can see that the measure of exposure has a weaker
impact on the firm’s credit performance once we look at the residual variation within mar-
kets. Moreover, the impact of the firm exposure remains negative even following the start
of the Italian crisis. The presence of feedbacks effects from the dependent variable to our
25Section 4.4.3 provides some statistics about the markets.
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treatment variable can explain part of this result. It is easy to believe that current and past
values of the lagged dependent variable, NPLit, are correlated with EXPit−1. Simple pair-
wise correlation shows a coefficient of -4% between EXPit and NPLit, which is consistent
with a downward bias in our model specification in column (2). This links to the results in
column (3).
Column (3) reports the estimates of the two-stage least squares regression of NPLit on
the treatment variables EXPit−1 and EXPit−1 ∗ Crisist, with market-time fixed effects
µmt, where the treatment variables are instrumented with their respective values at June
2010, EXPi,6−2010 and EXPi,6−2010 ∗ Crisist. The F-stats of excluded instrument are sig-
nificantly larger than 10 for both the plain treatment EXPit−1 and its interaction term
EXPit−1 ∗ Crisist. In particular, the estimates in column (3) look quite reasonable. The
firms’ exposure is negatively related to the firms’ financial performance before the crisis and
it is positively correlated after the Italian crisis. One problem with the results in column
(3) is represented by the net sign of the marginal effect of EXPit−1 post-crisis which is
about −.03, a negative number. This is against what we expect from the understanding of
the channels underlying the funding shock as more distressed banks should have tightened
money supply in response to shock more than less distressed banks. The model in column
(3), however, suffers from two additional issues: unaccounted complexity of the mechanisms
of transmission of the shock, and the fact that some firms within the same market could
have been trending differently already before the Italian crisis started.
Column (4) reports the estimates of the second stage of the two-stage least squares regressions
of NPLit on the treatment variables with market-time fixed effects, when other dimensions
of the firms’ exposure to banks’ heterogeneity (all computed at June 2010) are included.
Looking at the estimates, the measure of exposure has no significant impact on the firms’
credit performance before the start of the Italian crisis but it has a significant and positive
impact after the Italian crisis. This result is what we expect to see from our understanding
of the transmission mechanisms.
Finally, column (5) reports the same specification as in column (4) with the addition of an-
nual firm characteristics. The estimates in column (5) looks very similar to those in column
(4), though the coefficient of the interaction EXPit−1 is larger. This last result might suggest
that the exclusion of firm-specific time trends creates a downward bias in our estimates. To
make sense of this, we need to consider the evidence provided in Appendix C.4 where the
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results of several least squares regressions of firms’ annual characteristics on our treatment
variables are reported. These Tables suggest that the healthiest firms, for example those with
low leverage, are likely to have borrowed from the most distressed banks before the Italian
crisis started. To understand how this can affect the size of the estimates in column (5), we
have to compare the setting we have in our data with a hypothetical situation where firms
are randomly allocated to banks. In this second scenario the impact of the shock should on
average be stronger than what we observe in the data as the financial health of the firms
that borrow from distressed banks is lower in the hypothetical case compared to what we
observe in the data.
To make sense of the estimates, we consider the specification in column (5) as our baseline
model. The coefficient of our treatment variable EXPit−1 suggests that before the start of
the Italian crisis of July 2011 the financial health of the lenders have no significant impact on
the financial performance of the borrowing firms. Following the Italian crisis, this relation
becomes positive and significant. We find that, holding all control variables constant, one
standard-deviation increase (about 8%) in our measure of the firms’ exposure to their lenders’
financial distress increases the probability that the firm becomes non-performing by about
0.4%. From Table 4.3, we see that the rate of non-performing loans in Italy increased by
about 2.8% (6.2%-3.4%) points following the start of the Italian crisis in July 2011. If we
consider this change as the total effect of the funding shock on the financial performance
of the borrowing firms in Italy, and we accept the estimates of column (5) in Table 4.9 as
reasonable, we can say that the size of the credit channel of the funding shock of July 2011
is about 0.4% points while the size of aggregate demand shock is about 2.4% points.26
4.7. Robustness checks
In this section, we discuss some issues that might be left unsolved with our identification
strategy as well as some downsize in the data.
We do not observe the statistical units or plants of production for the firms we have in
26The estimates of the other control variables look reasonable apart two of them: the exposition to the
share of risky bonds at June 2010 and to the firms’ total assets. We still do not have a clear explanation
for why this is the case, but we believe this might be the consequence of unobserved heterogeneity and
non-linearity in the mechanisms of transmission of the shock that are not controlled for in our model
specification.
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the data. This can make the definition of the markets using provinces and the full 6-digit
ATECO code problematic as some firms might have production plants in several markets
that we do not observe. To partially control for this, we run an additional specification of
the baseline specification of column (5) in Table 4.9 where only small and medium sized
firms are included. The firms are classified as small or medium sized if either their total
assets or their total revenues for a particular year are below the median we observe in the
data. The results of this regression are reported in Appendix C.5 and are very similar to the
estimates in our baseline model. The intuition behind this robustness check is the following:
smaller firms are more likely to operate in a local market which could be roughly included
within the border of an Italian province, making our market-time fixed effects more effective
in controlling shocks to product demand.
In the estimations we use data from 2006 to 2012. It is natural to question whether
feedbacks effects between the firms’ exposure to the banks’ distress and the firms’ financial
status (i.e., performing vs non-performing) already existed before the start of the Italian
crisis in July 2011. In Appendix C.5 we show the results of our baseline model specification
where we use only data from December 2010 to December 2012 as this makes our instrument
at June 2010 exempt of any feedback effect from the dependent variable. The results of this
regression are very similar to those of our baseline model specification of Table 4.9.
One could argue why we do not analyse the impact of the collapse of Lehman Brothers
instead. The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 2008 seems to have hit Italian banks
to a lesser extent compared to banks based in the UK and in the US as the former were much
less exposed to collateralized-debt obligations such as sub-prime mortgage-backed securities.
Moreover, Italian banks continued to fund part of their operations in the repo market where
Italian government bonds are pledged as collateral. In the context of our analysis, this
can be interpreted as follows: Italian banks believed that the wholesale money market in
Europe, where government bonds are heavily used as collateral, was sufficiently liquid. After
July 2011 the banks drastically changed these beliefs as the spread between Italian bonds
and German bonds jumped to values never seen in recent history, making Italian bonds a
riskier asset than what was previously believed. Appendix C.5 shows three regressions of
the baseline model specification for three different periods: before Lehman collapse, between
Lehman and the Italian crisis, and after the start of the Italian crisis. The regressions show
that the sign of the coefficient of the treatment variable exposure changes over time and
122
becomes significantly positive only after the start of the Italian crisis.
4.8. Conclusions
In this work we study how wholesale funding shocks may affect the credit performance
of banks’ borrowers. We construct a novel dataset of bank-firm relationships that provides
detailed information on bank and firm characteristics. We also propose an empirical strategy
to estimate the impact that a worsening in banks’ wholesale funding opportunities has on
firms’ ability to repay their loans. We exploit the Italian sovereign debt crisis of July 2011 as a
significant funding shock to Italian banks. To capture how each bank has been affected by the
sudden increase on Italian yields, we use the monthly difference between each bank’s lending
and retail funding over its total assets. This measure captures each bank’s dependence on the
wholesale funding market and, thus, its exposure to the sovereign-debt shock. We distinguish
how much firms suffered from more restrictive credit conditions rather than from a significant
reduction in firms’ product demand by considering firms that borrow from stressed banks
(i.e., banks that were more vulnerable to a wholesale funding shock) to otherwise-similar
firms that borrow from non-stressed banks and compare their loan-repayment performance.
To compare firms that are otherwise-similar, we control for several firm-level characteristics
and we create several geographic-product markets where firms are likely to face the same
demand shocks. We find that, following the funding shock of July 2011, a standard-deviation
increase in our measure of the firms’ exposure to the banks’ financial distress increases the
probability that the firm is recorded as non-performing in Italy’s Credit Register by about
0.4% (i.e., the size of the credit channel). The results also suggest that the aggregate demand
channel lead to a 2.4% increase in the share of non-performing loans.
To conclude the chapter, we highlight some other limitation of our methodology and pro-
vide suggestions for future research.
Another limitation of our identification strategy is the focus on the constructions and ser-
vices sectors to control for the lack of information on firms’ exports. A more comprehensive
dataset that includes exports would provide a more complete view of the impact of the Italian
crisis on the performance of the borrowing firms as this would allow the econometrician to
include sectors other than constructions and services such as agricultural and manufacturing.
Further, we do not observe balance sheet information of foreign bank groups nor we have
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cross-country data. A dataset which includes information on foreign groups and informa-
tion on the performance of firms in other countries would provide more variation in several
dimensions of banks’ heterogeneity, such as the share of risky bonds that could help the
researcher to better identify the mechanisms of transmission of the funding shock.
In the analysis of this chapter, we never used the average interest rate charged by the banks
to their clients. Bank of Italy has this info in the TAXIA database which can be merged to
the information already used in the work and see how the results would change if we control
for the interest rates.
Also, we know that some firms within the same product market were already trending differ-
ently before the crisis and that some of them were already borrowing from distressed banks.
Although we included annual firm characteristics, future research should develop methods
for dealing with multi-way fixed effects and instrumental variables in high-dimensional panel
data models in order to fully control for the unobserved heterogeneity present in the data.
Finally, we only discussed the impact of the funding shock in July 2011 in a static framework.
In some of our investigation, we find that the outcome variable NPLit exhibits inertia as
firms that enter the status non-performing stay in that status for a very long time. Future
research should study the dynamics and persistence of non-performing loans, or better study
the full dynamics of the five borrowing statuses enlisted in the Basel 2 classification with the
use of dynamic ordered models.
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Figure 4.1.: Time series BTP-BUND spread
This chart is taken from Zoli [2013].
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Table 4.1.: Distribution of NPLs by geography and by sector
NPLs
Macro areas Percent Obs. Tot. obs.
Central 4.4 10,090 227,327
North East 3.5 8,274 234,854
North West 3.1 9,487 310,693
Southern-Insular 6.0 11,832 198,398
Total 4.1 39,683 971,272
NPLs
Sector Percent Obs. Tot. obs.
Constructions 5.0 14,031 279,522
Services 3.7 25,652 691,750
Total 4.1 39,683 971,272
Notes. The number of observations refers to those
firm - half-year combinations where the firms are
recorded as non-performing in a given geographic
area or sector.
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Table 4.2.: Time-series of NPLs - semi-annual data
NPLs
Year Half Percent Obs. Tot. obs.
2006 1st 1.5 630 41,231
2006 2nd 1.5 657 42,756
2007 1st 1.6 810 51,471
2007 2nd 1.6 865 54,125
2008 1st 1.7 1,136 65,070
2008 2nd 2.3 1,565 68,527
2009 1st 3.1 2,058 66,293
2009 2nd 3.8 2,531 67,007
2010 1st 5.1 4,840 94,395
2010 2nd 5.9 6,084 103,336
2011 1st 4.9 4,189 86,083
2011 2nd 6.0 5,083 84,474
2012 1st 5.5 4,010 72,695
2012 2nd 7.1 5,225 73,809
Total 4.1 39,683 971,272
Notes. The number of observations refers to
the number of firms that in a given half year
are recorded as non-performing.
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Table 4.3.: Distribution of NPLs before and after the crises
NPLs
Percent Obs. Tot. obs.
Before Lehman 1.6 4,098 254653
Between Lehman and Italian crisis 4.4 21,267 485,641
After Italian crisis 6.2 14,318 230,978
Total 4.1 39,683 971,272
NPLs
Percent Obs. Tot. obs.
Before Italian crisis 3.4 25,365 740,294
After Italian crisis 6.2 14,318 230,978
Total 4.1 39,683 971,272
Notes. The number of observations refers to those firm - half-year
combinations where the firms are recorded as non-performing in
a given geographic area or sector.
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Macro areas Percent Obs. Tot. obs. Percent Obs. Tot. obs.
Central 3.7 6,867 184,033 7.0 4,111 58,733
North East 2.9 5,557 188,515 5.5 3,533 64,070
North West 2.5 6,300 247,996 4.9 3,987 81,953
Southern-Insular 5.1 8,440 164,128 9.3 4,666 50,088
NPLs
Before After
Sector Percent Obs. Tot. obs. Percent Obs. Tot. obs.
Constructions 4.0 8,512 213,777 8.4 5,519 65,745
Services 3.2 16,853 526,517 5.3 8,799 165,233
Notes. The number of observations refers to those firm - half-year combinations
where the firms are recorded as non-performing in a given geographic area or
sector before or after the Italian crisis.
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Table 4.5.: Banks’ characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Total assets 1,204 31,636 106,424 69 3,866 849,759
Total loans 1,204 19,771 63,127 1 2,454 488,078
% NPLs/Assets 1,085 3.2 3.2 0 2.5 40.1
% Tier 1 ratio 868 11.4 5.7 1.6 10.0 44.6
% Tier 2 ratio 868 13.4 5.1 3 12.1 44.6
% ROA 1,204 1.7 1.7 -5.7 1.3 14.9
% ROE 1,204 3.9 10.2 -71.4 3.5 65
% Funding gap 1,204 2.8 23.6 -84.1 3 111.5
% Risky share 333 90.8 11.1 43.3 94.8 100
Notes. The unit of observation is a bank - half-year pair. Total assets and total
loans are expressed in millions of euros. NPLs/Assets is the share of a bank’s
non-performing loans over its total assets. Tier 1 ratio and Tier 2 ratio are
capital requirements imposed by Basel II. ROA is the return on assets. ROE is
the return on equity. Funding gap is the ratio to total assets of the difference
between lending and retail funding. Risky share is the ratio to total Bond
holding of the bonds that are considered “risky” by the regulator. All ratios are
expressed as percentages.
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Table 4.6.: Change in banks’ NPLs and total loans before and after the Italian crisis grouped
by sign of funding gap at June 2010
NPLs/Assets
Before After
Funding gap June 2010 Percent Observations Percent Observations
Negative 2.4 315 3.6 112
Positive 2.6 459 5.8 199
Total 2.6 774 5.0 311
Delta loans/Assets
Before After
Funding gap June 2010 Percent Observations Percent Observations
Negative 3.7 324 3.2 123
Positive 4.5 460 -1.1 204
Total 4.2 784 0.5 327
Notes. The unit of observation is a bank - half-year pair. NPLs/Assets is the
share of a bank’s non-performing loans over its total assets. Delta loans/Assets
is the change of a bank loans between two half-year over its total assets in the
first half-year. All ratios are expressed as percentages. The table reports how
NPLs/Assets and Delta loans/Assets changed before and after the Italian crisis
for two groups of banks: those banks with a liquidity surplus at June 2010
(i.e. negative funding gap) and those with a liquidity deficit at June 2010 (i.e.
positive funding gap).
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Table 4.7.: Firms’ exposure to banks’ financial distress
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Exposure to % Funding gap 971,272 6.5 8.4 -65.5 6.7 108.1
Exposure to % Funding gap at June 2010 971,272 5.1 7.5 -65.8 6.3 98.4
Notes. The unit of observation is a bank - half-year pair. Exposure to funding gap is a firm-level
average of its lenders funding gap in a given half-year. The weights used for averaging are the share
of the credit granted by a bank to the firm over the firm’s total credit granted in a given half year.
Exposure to funding gap at June 2010 is the value of Exposure to funding gap at June 2010. All
ratios are expressed as percentages.
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Figure 4.2.: Exposure to funding gap
The histogram is computed using firm - half-year as unit of observation, for the selected sample of firms.
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Table 4.8.: Firm characteristics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
EBIT 971,272 127 3,143 -1,478,188 39 559,607
% EBITDA/Assets 971,272 6 24.4 -5,240 6.3 848
HHI 971,272 6,417 2,950 0 5,669 10,000
% Leverage 971,272 67.7 395.8 -69,300 74.1 138,900
% Liquidity 971,272 5.8 9.6 0 1.8 100
No banks 971,272 2.6 1.8 1 2 30
% ROA 971,272 2.7 34 -9,203 3.7 10,851
Total assets 971,272 4,080 55,419 10 1,166 20,900,000
Notes. EBIT is annual earnings before interests and taxes. EBIT and Total assets are
annual firm-level variables expressed in thousands of euros. EBITDA is annual earnings
before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA/Assets is EBITDA over
total assets. Leverage is the annual share of financial debt over the sum of financial debt
plus equity. Liquidity is the annual fraction of a firm’s cash holdings over its total assets.
ROA is returns on assets. EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, Liquidity and ROA are annual firm-
level indicators expressed as percentages. The number of banks is the number of lenders
a firm borrow from in a given half year. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of a
firm’s loans portfolio across its lenders in a given half year. HHI can take values between
10,000/No banks when the firm borrows an equal amount from each of its lenders, and
10,000 when the firm only borrows from one bank.
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Table 4.9.: Main regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Selected Selected Selected Selected Selected
Type of Regression OLS OLS 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Dependent Variable NPL NPL NPL NPL NPL
Treatment Expo. Funding Gap -0.1293*** -0.0606*** -0.1142*** -0.002 0.0023
(0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0122) (0.0202) (0.02)
Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis 0.1631*** -0.0922*** 0.0765*** 0.0461** 0.0507***
(0.0078) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0182) (0.0181)
Banks characteristics Expo. ROA June 2010 -0.0423*** -0.0428***
(0.0031) (0.0034)
Expo. ROE June 2010 -0.0008* -0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Expo. Tier 2 Ratio June 2010 -1.1056*** -1.1508***
(0.1277) (0.1352)
Expo. Risky Share June 2010 -0.0005*** -0.0004***
(0.00004) (0.00004)
Expo. NPLs/Assets June 2010 -0.0039*** -0.0039***
(0.0009) (0.001)
Expo. Tier 1 Ratio June 2010 0.1761 0.2229*
(0.1237) (0.1334)
Expo. Total Assets June 2010 -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
















F-stat 1 8,531 3,149 4,140
F-stat 2 (interaction) 6,128 6,499 6,828
Firm dummy No No No No No
Market6-Time dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Market6-Time dummies 0 132,708 132,708 122,689 107,266
Other controls No No No No No
Clustering Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time
Observations 971,272 971,272 971,272 864,272 751,930
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm - half-year pair. NPL is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm is recorded as non-performing in a
given period and equals 0 otherwise. Expo. Funding Gap is the time-variant one-period lagged firm’s exposure to its lenders funding gap, and
Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis its interaction with the binary variable Crisis which equals 1 for after July 2011 and equals 0 before. Expo. Funding
Gap is expressed as a fraction of the total assets (not as a percentage). In columns (3)-(5) Expo. Funding Gap and Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis
are instrumented using the respective measures computed at June 2010. The variables Expo. Var June 2010, for Var equal to ROA, Tier 1 and
Tier 2 ratios, Risky Share, NPLs/Assets, and Total Assets is the time-invariant firm’s exposure to its lenders Var at June 2010. EBIT is annual
earnings before interests and taxes. EBIT and Total assets are annual firm-level variables expressed in thousands of euros. EBITDA is annual
earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA/Assets is EBITDA over total assets. Leverage is the annual share of
financial debt over the sum of financial debt plus equity. Liquidity is the annual fraction of a firm’s cash holdings over its total assets. ROA is
returns on assets. EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, Liquidity and ROA are annual firm-level indicators expressed as number (not percentages). The
number of banks is the number of lenders a firm borrow from in a given half year. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of a firm’s loans
portfolio across its lenders in a given half year. HHI can take values between 10,000/No banks when the firm borrows an equal amount from
each of its lenders, and 10,000 when the firm only borrows from one bank. Market6-Time dummy represent market-time fixed effects where the
time is represented by an half year and a market is defined as a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the product
market is defined using the full 6-digit ATECO 2007 code. Market3 is a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the
product market is defined using the first 3 digits of the ATECO 2007 code. We always cluster standard errors with respect to Market3 to allow
for arbitrary correlations between disturbances within a broad definition of market. The number of observations in columns (4) and (5) differs
because the included variables are missing for some firms and we need to drop some more markets that are left with only one firm.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions
This thesis applies econometric methods to analyze different economic research questions
using microeconomic data. The first essay (chapter 2) analyzes consumer searching behavior
in a grocery context. The second essay (chapter 3) studies the implications of the introduction
of a bonus scheme in a principal-agent context using data from furniture sales. The third
essay (chapter 4) proposes an empirical strategy to estimate the impact that a worsening in
banks’ wholesale funding opportunities (such as the Italian sovereign debt crisis of 2011) has
on borrowers’ ability to repay their loans. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and provides some
directions for future work.
Chapter 2 contributes to the understanding of the consumer decision journey. We estimate
the effect of search intensity on the price a consumer pays within a particular category using
data from RFID tags on supermarket shopping carts. Recording search in a physical store
environment is generally challenging and even our detailed data is only able to capture total
search-time, but not which options the consumer evaluated. The technology does however
have the advantage of not interfering in any way with the consumer’s natural shopping
experience and might be the best possible way to gain insights into consumer search in a brick-
and-mortar store. To the best of our knowledge this work is the first to use direct data on
search effort to analyze consumer search within a brick-and-mortar environment. Due to the
limited amount of observations per category in the data our evidence comes from regressions
which are pooled across categories. Going forward, with path-data over a longer time-horizon
for only one category it should be possible to model the search process in more detail (possibly
by means of a structural model). In particular, our approach only looks at the effect on price
paid and does not directly analyze the role of other product characteristics. We are therefore
not able to make any statements about the effect of search on consumer utility. However,
we believe that the effect of search-time on price is a dimension of the search process which
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is particularly relevant for informing optimal supply-side behavior. Our findings imply that,
due to the limited amount of search, the use of marketing tools such as feature advertising and
in-store displays can be very effective. Furthermore, firm behavior that influences consumer
search interacts in an interesting way with pricing decisions. Because more searching makes
finding a lower price or promoted product more likely, firms have an incentive to encourage
search when running a promotion.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature in incentives when the agent is given control over
price. To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first empirical papers that exploits
variation in both the nature of the incentive scheme and price delegation. Using data on
the staff of a furniture firm, I show that when a bonus scheme conditional on revenues was
introduced, it increased the revenues generated by all of the sales employees, but I find no
significant heterogeneous effect of the bonus scheme depending on whether the employee is
given control over price or not. Moreover, I show that giving the sales staff control over
price does not significantly increase revenues. The effects of the bonus scheme and of price
delegation on gross profits minus paid bonuses, commissions, and wages were similar. These
results are robust to a number of checks, and are consistent with a model of moral hazard and
price delegation. We can interpret these results in light of the theoretical model presented
in this chapter. The results suggest that the agent might have some private information but
this is not enough to fully off-set the negative impact of moral hazard on pricing. Although
these results are robust to alternative model specifications, empirical challenges might be
important. For example, the small sample size does not allow to perfectly controlling for
all observed heterogeneity. Future works should provide more transparent evidence by using
larger data-sets, variation across firms and industries or even engineering ad-hoc randomized-
control trials that clearly generate the variation in the data necessary for identifying the
implications of the bonus scheme and of price delegation.
Chapter 4 explores the impact of the Italian sovereign debt crisis of summer 2011 on the
real economy using detailed microeconomic data on credit linkages between firms and banks.
We find that, following the funding shock of July 2011, a standard-deviation increase in
our measure of the firms’ exposure to the banks’ financial distress increases the probability
that the firm is recorded as non-performing in Italy’s Credit Register by about 0.4% (i.e.,
the size of the credit channel). The results also suggest that the aggregate demand channel
lead to a 2.4% increase in the share of non-performing loans. At this exploratory stage of
142
the research we recognize some limitations of our analysis that can be improved in future
works. Examples of these limitations include the lack of information on firms’ exports, on
balance sheet information of foreign bank groups, on other countries, and on interest rates.
Our analysis is also affected by limitations in available techniques for estimating multi-way
fixed effects estimators in highly-dimensional panel data models with endogenous variables
as well as dynamic panel data modes for discrete outcome variables. Although our results
represent the outcome of an exploratory study, we believe they provide a solid basis for the







Appendix A. Appendix to chapter 2
A.1. Linking Sales and Path Data
One of the interesting features of our dataset is the linkage of sales to trip records. As part
of the RFID tracking process, the data reports when the consumer arrives at the checkout.
Independently, the sales data also has a time-stamp for each shopper’s transaction at the
checkout. Comparing the timestamp of a particular path with the sales data allows to
define a set of ”candidate” checkout product baskets that occured at a similar point in time.1
Matching which trip goes with which specific transaction involves considering the physical
location (i.e., longitude = x and latitude = y relative to the store map) of all the UPCs in
each candidate basket. Based on how many of those locations lay on the path we are trying
to match, a score is created for the baskets and the highest scoring one is matched to the
path.2 The matches do not necessarily yield a perfect score as consumer might occasionally
leave the cart and pick up an item. Because of this we might not see the path of the consumer
going past a specific item, even if the item part of her matched purchase basket. In this case
no information on search-time will be available for the particular item.
Finally, when recording the data the location of products within the store is established
once at the beginning of the sample period. As it is to costly to continuously track product
placement at a daily level, there is a (small) level of noise in the data. The big majority of
products in the store do not move within the short time window of our data. However, some
movement does occur, primarily due to special promotional displays (end of aisle displays
1The path-data timestamp that record the arrival at the checkout can be noisy as the consumer will be
stationary when standing in line at the cashier. Therefore checkout baskets within a certain time-window
after the consumer became stationary in the check-out area qualify as possible matches.
2The data provider did not disclose the precise algorithm to us.
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for instance). Overall we (and the data provider) believe that this is a relatively minor issue
regarding the quality of our data.
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A.2. Tables
Table A.1.: The Effect of Trip-Duration and Within-Trip Decile on Search-Time and Speed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Speed Speed Speed Search-Time Search-Time Search-Time
1st Decile 0.758*** 0.707*** 0.601*** -2.250*** -1.737*** -1.324***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.239) (0.237) (0.238)
2nd Decile 0.128*** 0.109*** 0.098*** -0.230 -0.001 -0.068
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.239) (0.235) (0.228)
3rd Decile 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.067 0.178 0.153
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.232) (0.227) (0.220)
4th Decile omitted
category
5th Decile 0.013 0.019 0.028 -0.204 -0.218 -0.383*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.230) (0.225) (0.218)
6th Decile 0.033* 0.040** 0.043** -0.293 -0.364 -0.445**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.229) (0.224) (0.216)
7th Decile 0.029 0.027 0.033* -0.435* -0.460** -0.603***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.226) (0.221) (0.214)
8th Decile 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.051*** -0.491** -0.430** -0.447**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.222) (0.217) (0.210)
9th Decile 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.105*** -0.586*** -0.504** -0.525**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.221) (0.217) (0.210)
10th Decile 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.119*** -1.651*** -1.511*** -1.665***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.208) (0.209) (0.208)
Below 15 Minutes 0.416*** 0.391*** 0.381*** -3.830*** -3.532*** -3.281***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.190) (0.188) (0.183)
15 to 30 Minutes 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.158*** -2.629*** -2.490*** -2.295***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.182) (0.179) (0.174)
30 to 45 Minutes 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.049*** -1.530*** -1.550*** -1.420***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.195) (0.191) (0.185)
45 to 60 Minutes 0.029 0.027 0.028 -1.017*** -1.037*** -0.941***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.226) (0.221) (0.214)
Above 60 Minutes omitted
category
Constant 2.025*** n/a n/a 13.268*** n/a n/a
(0.019) (0.226)
Category FEs No Yes No No Yes No
Location coordinate FEs No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 28,603 28,603 28,603 28,603 28,603 28,603
We regress speed and search-time and dummies for trips of different length and deciles within the
trip. The omitted categories are pegged to the trip / decile with the slowest speed: above 60
minutes trips and the 4th decile. We add category fixed effects (149) in columns (2) and (5) and a
fixed effect for every unique product location coordinate (974) in columns (3) and (6).
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Appendix B. Appendix to chapter 3
B.1. Compensation schemes
Figure B.1.: Compensation Scheme I



























Figure B.2.: Compensation Scheme II


































Figure B.3.: Compensation Scheme III
































Base salary + bonus 
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Figure B.4.: Compensation Scheme IV

























Base salary + bonus 
Base salary + 2 * bonus 
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Figure B.5.: Compensation Scheme V






















Base salary + bonus 
Base salary + 3 * bonus 
Base salary + 2 * bonus 
RT2 RT3 
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B.2. Theoretical model: numerical example
Table B.1.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 0
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £219 0 7,000 £1,531,250 £691,250 £642,469 £279.3 0 5,063 £1,413,948.07 £806,440 £758,715
Advantage 23,554 £587 0 18,777 £11,018,038 £8,764,794 £8,630,631 £279.3 0 28,617 £7,992,483 £4,558,485 £4,451,553
4,711 £292 0 9,355 £2,735,114 £1,612,465 £1,552,849 £279.3 0 9,773 £2,729,655 £1,556,849 £1,497,283
2,355 £256 0 8,178 £2,089,839 £1,108,514 £1,054,706 £279.3 0 7,418 £2,071,802 £1,181,645 £1,127,999
-2,355 £182 0 5,822 £1,059,348 £360,672 £316,138 £279.3 0 2,707 £756,094.62 £431,236 £389,431
-4,711 £145 0 4,645 £674,132 £116,781 £75,714 £279.3 0 352 £98,241.16 £56,032 £20,147
-5,061 £140 0 4,470 £624,263 £87,923 £47,305 £279.3 0 2 £436.56 £249 -£34,755
Bonus No No advantage 0 £219 0 7,000 £1,531,250 £691,250 £644,766 £279.2 0 5,065 £1,414,302 £806,443 £760,836
Advantage 23,554 £587 0 18,777 £11,018,038 £8,764,794 £8,647,158 £279.2 0 28,620 £7,990,682 £4,556,333 £4,461,403
4,711 £292 0 9,355 £2,735,114 £1,612,465 £1,556,952 £279.2 0 9,776 £2,729,578 £1,556,421 £1,500,950
2,355 £256 0 8,178 £2,089,839 £1,108,514 £1,057,841 £279.2 0 7,421 £2,071,940 £1,181,432 £1,130,893
-2,355 £182 0 5,822 £1,059,348 £360,672 £317,727 £279.2 0 2,710 £756,664 £431,454 £390,779
-4,711 £145 0 4,645 £674,132 £116,781 £76,725 £279.2 0 355 £99,027 £56,465 £20,723
-5,061 £140 0 4,470 £624,263 £87,923 £48,241 £279.2 0 4 £1,254 £715 -£34,294
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Table B.2.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 5
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £220 10 7,025 £1,542,073.65 £699,110 £650,231 £281 13 5,076 £1,425,616 £816,473 £768,643
Advantage 23,554 £588.9 26 18,843 £11,095,920 £8,834,725 £8,699,862 £281 13 28,630 £8,040,635 £4,605,003 £4,497,637
4,711 £293.4 13 9,388 £2,754,448 £1,627,838 £1,568,048 £281 13 9,787 £2,748,620 £1,574,179 £1,514,442
2,355 £256.5 12 8,207 £2,104,611 £1,119,824 £1,065,883 £281 13 7,432 £2,087,118 £1,195,326 £1,141,542
-2,355 £182.6 8 5,843 £1,066,836 £365,695 £321,094 £281 13 2,721 £764,114 £437,620 £395,743
-4,711 £145.7 7 4,661 £678,897 £119,580 £78,470 £281 13 365 £102,612 £58,767 £22,844
-5,061 £140.2 6 4,485 £628,676 £90,444 £49,786 £281 13 15 £4,265 £2,443 -£32,596
Bonus No No advantage 0 £219 8 7,021 £1,540,262 £697,794 £651,242 £280 11 5,077 £1,424,013 £814,794 £769,113
Advantage 23,554 £588.5 22 18,832 £11,082,882 £8,823,017 £8,704,895 £280 11 28,631 £8,030,760 £4,595,051 £4,499,821
4,711 £293.2 11 9,383 £2,751,211 £1,625,263 £1,569,629 £280 11 9,788 £2,745,362 £1,570,845 £1,515,255
2,355 £256.3 10 8,202 £2,102,138 £1,117,930 £1,067,164 £280 11 7,432 £2,084,687 £1,192,819 £1,142,184
-2,355 £182.5 7 5,839 £1,065,582 £364,854 £321,862 £280 11 2,721 £763,338 £436,768 £396,043
-4,711 £145.6 5.5 4,658 £678,100 £119,111 £79,025 £280 11 366 £102,663 £58,742 £22,972
-5,061 £140.1 5.3 4,483 £627,937 £90,021 £50,312 £280 11 16 £4,439 £2,540 -£32,493
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Table B.3.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 10
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £222 20 7,100 £1,575,242.18 £723,261 £674,084 £286 26 5,117 £1,461,560 £847,513 £799,359
Advantage 23,554 £595 54 19,045 £11,334,582 £9,049,199 £8,912,188 £286 26 28,671 £8,189,201 £4,748,665 £4,639,962
4,711 £297 27 9,489 £2,813,693 £1,675,032 £1,614,708 £286 26 9,828 £2,807,088 £1,627,744 £1,567,480
2,355 £259.2 23 8,294 £2,149,879 £1,154,558 £1,100,209 £286 26 7,472 £2,134,324 £1,237,629 £1,183,420
-2,355 £185 17 5,905 £1,089,782.46 £381,142 £336,334 £286 26 2,762 £788,795.79 £457,398 £415,299
-4,711 £147.2 13.2 4,711 £693,499.88 £128,199 £86,958 £286 26 406 £116,031.70 £67,283 £31,239
-5,061 £142 12.7 4,533 £642,198.27 £98,208 £57,429 £286 26 56 £16,010.29 £9,284 -£25,860
Bonus No No advantage 0 £221 17 7,083 £1,567,780 £717,819 £671,061 £284 21 5,111 £1,453,793 £840,494 £794,590
Advantage 23,554 £594 45 19,000 £11,280,885 £9,000,922 £8,881,315 £284 21 28,665 £8,153,831 £4,714,042 £4,617,888
4,711 £296 22 9,466 £2,800,363 £1,664,402 £1,608,400 £284 21 9,822 £2,793,801 £1,615,203 £1,559,250
2,355 £258.6 19 8,275 £2,139,694 £1,146,733 £1,095,686 £284 21 7,466 £2,123,797 £1,227,848 £1,176,920
-2,355 £184 14 5,891 £1,084,619.66 £377,659 £334,525 £284 21 2,755 £783,789.51 £453,139 £412,260
-4,711 £146.9 11.0 4,700 £690,214.45 £126,255 £86,078 £284 21 400 £113,785.69 £65,784 £29,930
-5,061 £141 10.6 4,522 £639,155.89 £96,456 £56,662 £284 21 50 £14,174.66 £8,195 -£26,911
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Table B.4.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 15
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £226 30 7,229 £1,632,950.34 £765,504 £715,807 £294 40 5,185 £1,524,817 £902,597 £853,873
Advantage 23,554 £606 82 19,391 £11,749,819 £9,422,950 £9,282,202 £294 40 28,739 £8,451,432 £5,002,722 £4,891,659
4,711 £302 41 9,661 £2,916,771 £1,757,440 £1,696,189 £294 40 9,896 £2,910,140 £1,722,622 £1,661,431
2,355 £264 36 8,445 £2,228,639 £1,215,250 £1,160,192 £294 40 7,541 £2,217,478 £1,312,609 £1,257,652
-2,355 £188 25 6,013 £1,129,706 £408,202 £363,034 £294 40 2,830 £832,155 £492,584 £450,095
-4,711 £150 20 4,796 £718,906 £143,344 £101,874 £294 40 474 £139,494 £82,572 £46,316
-5,061 £144 19 4,616 £665,725 £111,860 £70,869 £294 40 124 £36,514 £21,614 -£13,715
Bonus No No advantage 0 £225 25 7,190 £1,615,309 £752,561 £705,446 £291 33 5,168 £1,505,714 £885,614 £839,321
Advantage 23,554 £603 68 19,286 £11,622,883 £9,308,618 £9,186,446 £291 33 28,722 £8,368,931 £4,922,341 £4,824,574
4,711 £300 34 9,609 £2,885,261 £1,732,209 £1,675,570 £291 33 9,878 £2,878,358 £1,692,959 £1,636,371
2,355 £262 30 8,399 £2,204,562 £1,196,662 £1,145,128 £291 33 7,523 £2,192,036 £1,289,286 £1,237,846
-2,355 £187 21 5,980 £1,117,502 £399,905 £356,524 £291 33 2,812 £819,393 £481,941 £440,795
-4,711 £149 17 4,770 £711,139 £138,695 £98,361 £291 33 457 £133,071 £78,268 £42,270
-5,061 £143 16 4,591 £658,533 £107,668 £67,729 £291 33 107 £31,034 £18,253 -£16,980
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Table B.5.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 20
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £232 42 7,417 £1,719,223 £829,157 £778,684 £307 55 5,281 £1,621,247 £987,584 £937,992
Advantage 23,554 £622 112 19,896 £12,370,588 £9,983,044 £9,836,709 £307 55 28,835 £8,852,909 £5,392,757 £5,278,081
4,711 £310 56 9,913 £3,070,871 £1,881,309 £1,818,671 £307 55 9,991 £3,067,579 £1,868,618 £1,806,010
2,355 £271 49 8,665 £2,346,383 £1,306,569 £1,250,451 £307 55 7,636 £2,344,413 £1,428,101 £1,372,001
-2,355 £193 35 6,169 £1,189,391 £449,073 £403,368 £307 55 2,925 £898,080 £547,066 £503,984
-4,711 £154 28 4,921 £756,887 £166,317 £124,505 £307 55 570 £174,914 £106,549 £69,975
-5,061 £148 27 4,736 £700,897 £132,589 £91,281 £307 55 220 £67,399 £41,056 £5,450
Bonus No No advantage 0 £230 34 7,344 £1,685,568 £804,257 £756,615 £302 45 5,247 £1,583,671 £954,049 £907,172
Advantage 23,554 £616 92 19,701 £12,128,429 £9,764,369 £9,638,406 £302 45 28,801 £8,693,063 £5,236,951 £5,136,753
4,711 £307 46 9,816 £3,010,757 £1,832,896 £1,775,316 £302 45 9,958 £3,005,550 £1,810,630 £1,753,088
2,355 £268 40 8,580 £2,300,451 £1,270,865 £1,218,612 £302 45 7,602 £2,294,611 £1,382,339 £1,330,130
-2,355 £191 29 6,109 £1,166,108 £433,072 £389,326 £302 45 2,891 £872,732 £525,759 £484,213
-4,711 £152 23 4,873 £742,071 £157,309 £116,744 £302 45 536 £161,793 £97,469 £61,255
-5,061 £147 22 4,689 £687,176 £124,459 £84,305 £302 45 186 £56,096 £33,794 -£1,627
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Table B.6.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 30
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £250 68 8,014 £2,007,162 £1,045,445 £992,380 £353 95 5,553 £1,962,599 £1,296,242 £1,243,579
Advantage 23,554 £672 181 21,498 £14,442,441 £11,862,698 £11,697,716 £353 95 29,107 £10,287,363 £6,794,517 £6,666,930
4,711 £335 90 10,711 £3,585,187 £2,299,864 £2,232,598 £353 95 10,264 £3,627,552 £2,395,897 £2,328,249
2,355 £293 79 9,363 £2,739,360 £1,615,840 £1,556,186 £353 95 7,908 £2,795,076 £1,846,070 £1,785,914
-2,355 £208 56 6,666 £1,388,593 £588,678 £541,181 £353 95 3,198 £1,130,123 £746,415 £701,244
-4,711 £166 45 5,318 £883,652 £245,540 £202,587 £353 95 842 £297,647 £196,587 £158,908
-5,061 £160 43 5,117 £818,284 £204,228 £161,863 £353 95 492 £173,880 £114,843 £78,278
Bonus No No advantage 0 £245 55 7,825 £1,913,617 £974,578 £925,226 £338 76 5,474 £1,848,315 £1,191,489 £1,142,627
Advantage 23,554 £656 148 20,991 £13,769,344 £11,250,433 £11,112,163 £338 76 29,028 £9,802,083 £6,318,767 £6,210,252
4,711 £327 74 10,458 £3,418,098 £2,163,084 £2,102,448 £338 76 10,184 £3,439,069 £2,216,945 £2,156,152
2,355 £286 64 9,142 £2,611,691 £1,514,664 £1,460,077 £338 76 7,829 £2,643,692 £1,704,217 £1,649,389
-2,355 £203 46 6,509 £1,323,877 £542,825 £497,896 £338 76 3,118 £1,052,938 £678,761 £635,864
-4,711 £162 37 5,192 £842,469 £219,404 £178,086 £338 76 763 £257,561 £166,033 £129,101
-5,061 £156 35 4,996 £780,148 £180,571 £139,720 £338 76 413 £139,311 £89,805 £53,760
161
Table B.7.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 40
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £282 102 9,032 £2,549,428 £1,465,557 £1,407,612 £458 165 5,934 £2,719,574.85 £2,007,446 £1,947,970
Advantage 23,554 £757 273 24,228 £18,344,289 £15,436,876 £15,236,778 £458 165 29,488 £13,513,754.36 £9,975,136 £9,818,512
4,711 £377 136 12,071 £4,553,780 £3,105,201 £3,029,217 £458 165 10,645 £4,878,410.75 £3,600,984 £3,522,078
2,355 £330 119 10,552 £3,479,440 £2,213,215 £2,146,900 £458 165 8,290 £3,798,992.80 £2,804,215 £2,735,024
-2,355 £235 85 7,513 £1,763,742 £862,226 £811,352 £458 165 3,579 £1,640,156.89 £1,210,677 £1,160,915
-4,711 £187 67 5,993 £1,122,385 £403,222 £358,121 £458 165 1,224 £560,738.94 £413,908 £373,861
-5,061 £180 65 5,767 £1,039,356 £347,305 £302,951 £458 165 873 £400,259.36 £295,450 £256,848
Bonus No No advantage 0 £269 81 8,615 £2,319,527 £1,285,680 £1,233,284 £410 123 5,791 £2,376,907.73 £1,681,996 £1,629,169
Advantage 23,554 £722 217 23,110 £16,690,046 £13,916,822 £13,756,647 £410 123 29,345 £12,044,759.96 £8,523,359 £8,398,023
4,711 £360 108 11,514 £4,143,132 £2,761,410 £2,695,336 £410 123 10,502 £4,310,478.17 £3,050,268 £2,982,940
2,355 £315 94 10,065 £3,165,673 £1,957,889 £1,899,147 £410 123 8,146 £3,343,692.95 £2,366,132 £2,306,054
-2,355 £224 67 7,166 £1,604,693 £744,784 £697,749 £410 123 3,436 £1,410,122.50 £997,860 £952,284
-4,711 £179 54 5,716 £1,021,171 £335,200 £292,542 £410 123 1,080 £443,337.28 £313,723 £275,398
-5,061 £172 52 5,501 £945,630 £285,519 £243,427 £410 123 730 £299,603.07 £212,011 £174,764
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Table B.8.: Theoretical model: solution for d = 50
Bonus scheme Information structure Pricing scheme
Decentralized Centralized
µ p E q R GP GP-SC p E q R GP GP-SC
Bonus Yes No advantage 0 £337 152 10,795 £3,641,748 £2,346,326 £2,278,550 £797 359 6,425 £5,123,071 £4,352,092 £4,270,984
Advantage 23,554 £905 407 28,957 £26,204,027 £22,729,144 £22,458,307 £797 359 29,979 £23,904,788 £20,307,320 £20,057,177
4,711 £451 203 14,428 £6,504,879 £4,773,565 £4,680,021 £797 359 11,136 £8,879,414 £7,543,137 £7,428,223
2,355 £394 177 12,611 £4,970,231 £3,456,863 £3,377,131 £797 359 8,780 £7,001,242 £5,947,615 £5,849,604
-2,355 £281 126 8,979 £2,519,430 £1,441,955 £1,384,280 £797 359 4,069 £3,244,899 £2,756,569 £2,692,365
-4,711 £224 101 7,163 £1,603,278 £743,749 £694,319 £797 359 1,714 £1,366,727 £1,161,046 £1,113,746
-5,061 £215 97 6,893 £1,484,676 £657,549 £609,187 £797 359 1,364 £1,087,495 £923,836 £879,049
Bonus No No advantage 0 £309 116 9,901 £3,063,154 £1,875,088 £1,817,114 £589 221 6,199 £3,649,690 £2,905,810 £2,843,438
Advantage 23,554 £830 311 26,558 £22,040,785 £18,853,876 £18,653,570 £589 221 29,753 £17,517,279 £13,946,910 £13,780,530
4,711 £413 155 13,232 £5,471,397 £3,883,563 £3,807,527 £589 221 10,910 £6,423,207 £5,114,030 £5,030,856
2,355 £361 136 11,566 £4,180,571 £2,792,620 £2,726,266 £589 221 8,554 £5,036,448 £4,009,920 £3,937,147
-2,355 £257 97 8,235 £2,119,148 £1,130,966 £1,080,073 £589 221 3,844 £2,262,931 £1,801,701 £1,749,729
-4,711 £205 77 6,569 £1,348,553 £560,255 £515,141 £589 221 1,488 £876,172 £697,591 £656,019




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Revenues Qrt Revenues Qrt Revenues Qrt Revenues Qrt Revenues Qrt Revenues
Linear Time Trend Yes No No No No No No
Quadratic Time Trend No Yes No No No No No
Quarter dummy No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year dummy No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Employee dummy No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 254 254 254 254 254 254 254
R-squared 0.0075 0.0105 0.0429 0.0698 0.1125 0.3988 0.5160
Notes. Revenues are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year.
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10% 110,877 27,592 Obs 64
25% 241,573 57,057 Sum of Wgt. 64
50% 407,286 Mean 500,355
Largest Std. Dev. 403,359
75% 690,259 1,041,000
90% 872,090 1,212,018
95% 1,041,000 1,368,864 Skewness 2
99% 2,554,629 2,554,629 Kurtosis 12
Notes. Gross Profits-SC is annual, individual-level data. Gross Profits-
SC equals annual gross profits minus bonuses, commissions, and annual
salaries, which occur to be negative once. Gross Profits-SC is deflated
using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year.
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Table B.11.: The effect of incentives and price delegation controlling for employee FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 237,046*** 101,992*** 105,058*** 2,010*** -86
(41,589) (20,641) (20,614) (468) (60)
PD -162,556 -11,454 -8,301 -2,019 86
(155,823) (66,794) (64,905) (1,442) (76)
Bonus*PD 120,736* 48,644* 44,627 -222 59
(67,693) (27,906) (27,124) (685) (52)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No No No No
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 254 254 254 254 241
Notes. All outcomes are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. All specifica-
tions are clustered by employee to allow for serial correlation in individual error terms.
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Table B.12.: The effect of incentives and price delegation controlling for target on revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 179,982** 35,597 37,946* 1,546** -106**
(77,703) (21,123) (20,646) (616) (45)
PD 28,007 1,626 -2,495 568 -62
(59,232) (21,919) (21,612) (550) (46)
Bonus*PD -62,291 20,197 23,662 -1,084 164***
(90,110) (28,051) (26,714) (679) (53)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy No No No No No
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 254 254 254 254 241
Notes. Other controls include the annual target on revenues. All outcomes are deflated using
country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. All specifications are clustered by employee to allow
for serial correlation in individual error terms.
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Table B.13.: The effect of incentives and price delegation controlling for salary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 381,399*** 123,911*** 120,234*** 2,331*** -9
(111,505) (41,896) (40,738) (670) (39)
PD -96,338 -53,042 -53,493 81 -115
(104,631) (46,328) (45,512) (752) (78)
Bonus*PD 13,024 50,822 51,253 -813 202**
(129,318) (50,284) (48,963) (870) (80)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy No No No No No
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 254 254 254 254 241
Notes. Other controls include the annual salary. All outcomes are deflated using country-specific
CPI with 2005 as base year. All specifications are clustered by employee to allow for serial corre-
lation in individual error terms.
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Table B.14.: Gender distribution by pricing group
Sex Centralized pricing Delegated pricing Total
Male 120 96 216
Female 28 12 40
Total 148 108 256
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Table B.15.: Differences in ex-ante characteristics of employment contracts
Centralized pricing Delegated pricing
Variable Mean Mean
Target on revenues 2,020,750 1,549,152
Annual salary 33,504 39,990
Expected annual commissions 11,091 11,318
Commissions-total compensation ratio 23.03% 21.17%
Min commission rate 0.59% 0.70%
Max commission rate 1.95% 2.38%
Difference between min and max commission rates 1.36% 1.68%
Expected annual commission rate 0.73% 0.86%
Observations 148 106
Notes. Target on revenues, annual salary and expected annual commissions
are in 2005 country-currency. Expected commissions are computed plugging
expected revenues into compensation scheme. Expected revenues are provided
by the firm.
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Table B.16.: Distribution of bonus scheme across pricing groups
Centralized pricing Delegated pricing
Variable Mean Mean
Bonus dummy 59% 48%
Observations 148 106
Table B.17.: Size of expected amount of bonus by pricing groups
Centralized pricing Delegated pricing
Variable Mean Mean
Expected annual bonus 3,526 3,761
Observations 88† 51†
Notes. Expected annual bonuses are in 2005 country-
currency. Expected bonuses are computed plugging ex-
pected revenues into compensation scheme. Expected rev-
enues are provided by the firm. † I only include employees
that are offered the bonus scheme.
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Table B.18.: Price-elasticity of demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Pooled Pooled Centralized Centralized Delegated Delegated
Type of Regression IV: 1st IV: 2nd IV: 1st IV: 2nd IV: 1st IV: 2nd
Dependent Variable log(1+Price) log(1+Quantity) log(1+Price) log(1+Quantity) log(1+Price) log(1+Quantity)
Qrt Unit Cost 0.0063*** 0.0060*** 0.0064***
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009)
log(1+Qrt Unit Price) -1.1248*** -2.0245*** -0.4797***
(0.2958) (0.5005) (0.1473)
F-Stat 104 44 35
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 241 241 142 142 99 99
Notes. All variables are in 2005 country-currency.
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Table B.19.: Price-elasticity for a static monopolist by pricing group
Channel Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Centralized 2.90866 1.06057 142
Delegated 2.55374 1.11427 99
Notes. Elasticities are computed
structurally plugging equilibrium
prices and marginal costs into static-
monopolist’s first-order conditions.
Table B.18 provides the least square regression of the logarithm of quantity on the log-
arithm of price for the two pricing groups separately. As price is usually endogenous in a
supply-demand system1, I use the unit cost as an instrument for price. The estimates in
Table B.18 clearly show a marked difference in the price elasticity across the two pricing
groups. A price elasticity that is between -1 and 0 can be problematic in a static context2.
Alternatively, we can reverse-engineer the price elasticity from the first-order conditions of
profit-maximizing static monopolist. For a static monopolist, standard first order conditions
would yield:
(p−mc)/p = 1/ (B.1)
Table B.19 shows the price-elasticity of demand obtained by plugging prices and unit costs
into the first-order condition of a static monopolist and than averaging across individuals for
the two pricing groups. A two-sample t-test rejects the null of equal mean-elasticity across
pricing groups against the alternative hypothesis that the elasticity is larger for the group of
observations where price is centralized at any level of significance3.
1For example, see Hamilton [1994], chapter 9 for an explanation of the simultaneous equation bias in
estimating demand elasticity.
2A price elasticity that is between -1 and 0 can be rationalized by dynamic monopoly pricing in the presence
of learning by doing. In this chapter, we do not model dynamic pricing.
3This is just an attempt to test whether price elasticity differs across the two pricing groups.
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Table B.20.: Impact on outcomes using robust regression with bi-weighting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression BiW RREG BiW RREG BiW RREG BiW RREG BiW RREG
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 254,125*** 86,807*** 89,042*** 892*** -2
(64,567) (24,223) (23,476) (289) (20)
PD -20,198 -3,044 -6,998 -536** 16
(49,293) (18,493) (17,922) (221) (15)
Bonus*PD -58,468 2,688 6,878 -293 31
(64,757) (24,295) (23,545) (290) (20)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy No No No No No
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering BiW RREG BiW RREG BiW RREG BiW RREG BiW RREG
Observations 254 254 254 254 241
Notes. In the robust regression with bi-weighting, all cases with a non-zero residual get down-weighted at
least a little. All outcomes are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. All specifications
are clustered by employee to allow for serial correlation in individual error terms. The list of controls includes
the price-delegation dummy (PD) and its interaction with the time dummy.
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Table B.21.: Impact on outcomes using Hubert’s robust estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression Hubert M Hubert M Hubert M Hubert M Hubert M
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 245,729*** 79,722*** 81,605*** 1,195*** -20
(62,378) (19,760) (19,021) (299) (21)
PD -21,833 -8,853 -12,778 -209 1
(46,059) (18,861) (17,780) (232) (17)
Bonus*PD -52,001 7,698 11,877 -580* 64**
(62,220) (25,009) (23,977) (303) (27)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy No No No No No
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Hubert M Hubert M Hubert M Hubert M Hubert M
Observations 254 254 254 254 241
Notes. Hubert’s robust estimator weights observations depending on the size of the regression residuals (i.e.,
the larger the size, the smaller the weight). All outcomes are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as
base year. All specifications are clustered by employee to allow for serial correlation in individual error terms.
The list of controls includes the price-delegation dummy (PD) and its interaction with the time dummy.
Table B.20 shows the estimates of our main specification using robust-regression with
bi-weighting and Table B.20 shows the estimates of our main specification using Hubert’s
robust M-estimator. The intuition behind these estimators is to weight aberrant observations
in the regression less in order to preserve the importance of the normal observations.4 Both
estimators produce results similar to those presented in our main specification in Table 3.10.
4See Blankmeyer [2006] for a detailed description of the high-breakdown robust estimators.
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Table B.22.: Impact on annual outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 1,028,052** 291,183 117,373*** 7,529** -25
(476,602) (170,404) (41,251) (2,931) (30)
PD -80,240 -87,442 25,276 1,422 8
(361,612) (167,752) (47,517) (2,636) (32)
Bonus*PD -290,433 63,233 9,561 -4,464 65
(523,754) (205,252) (63,242) (3,280) (39)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy No No No No No
Employee dummy No No No No No
Other controls No No No No No
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 64 64 64 64 64
Notes. All outcomes are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. All specifi-
cations are clustered by employee to allow for serial correlation in individual error terms. Other
controls include the price-delegation dummy (PD) and its interaction with the year dummy.
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Table B.23.: Impact on outcomes including observations with negative revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Type of Regression OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable Qrt Revenues Qrt Gross Profits Qrt Gross Profits-SC Qrt Quantity Qrt Unit Price
Bonus 257,013** 72,796* 74,673* 1,882** -77*
(111,350) (39,812) (38,768) (685) (44)
PD -20,060 -21,860 -25,584 356 -74
(84,484) (39,192) (38,475) (616) (63)
Bonus*PD -72,608 15,808 19,681 -1,116 164**
(122,366) (47,953) (46,197) (766) (64)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee dummy No No No No No
Other controls No No No No No
Clustering Employee Employee Employee Employee Employee
Observations 254 254 254 254 241
Notes. All outcomes are deflated using country-specific CPI with 2005 as base year. All specifications are
clustered by employee to allow for serial correlation in individual error terms. Other controls include the
price-delegation dummy (PD) and its interaction with the time dummy.
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C.1. Geographic markets
Table C.1.: ISTAT classification of regions and provinces in Italy
Region Code Region Name Province Code Province Acronym Province Name
01 PIEMONTE 001 AL ALESSANDRIA
01 PIEMONTE 002 AT ASTI
01 PIEMONTE 003 BI BIELLA
01 PIEMONTE 004 CN CUNEO
01 PIEMONTE 005 NO NOVARA
01 PIEMONTE 006 TO TORINO
01 PIEMONTE 007 VB VERBANIA
01 PIEMONTE 008 VC VERCELLI
02 VALLE D’AOSTA 009 AO AOSTA
03 LOMBARDIA 010 BG BERGAMO
03 LOMBARDIA 011 BS BRESCIA
03 LOMBARDIA 012 CO COMO
03 LOMBARDIA 013 CR CREMONA
03 LOMBARDIA 014 LC LECCO
03 LOMBARDIA 015 LO LODI
03 LOMBARDIA 016 MN MANTOVA
03 LOMBARDIA 017 MI MILANO
03 LOMBARDIA 018 PV PAVIA
03 LOMBARDIA 019 SO SONDRIO
03 LOMBARDIA 020 VA VARESE
04 LIGURIA 021 GE GENOVA
04 LIGURIA 022 IM IMPERIA
04 LIGURIA 023 SP LA SPEZIA
04 LIGURIA 024 SV SAVONA
05 TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE 025 BZ BOLZANO-BOZEN
05 TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE 026 TN TRENTO
06 VENETO 027 BL BELLUNO
06 VENETO 028 PD PADOVA
06 VENETO 029 RO ROVIGO
06 VENETO 030 TV TREVISO
06 VENETO 031 VE VENEZIA
06 VENETO 032 VR VERONA
06 VENETO 033 VI VICENZA
07 FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA 034 GO GORIZIA
07 FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA 035 TS TRIESTE
07 FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA 036 UD UDINE
07 FRIULI VENEZIA GIULIA 037 PN PORDENONE
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 038 BO BOLOGNA
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 039 FE FERRARA
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 040 FC FORLI’
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 041 MO MODENA
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 042 PR PARMA
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 043 PC PIACENZA
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 044 RA RAVENNA
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 045 RE REGGIO EMILIA
08 EMILIA-ROMAGNA 046 RN RIMINI
09 TOSCANA 047 AR AREZZO
09 TOSCANA 048 FI FIRENZE
09 TOSCANA 049 GR GROSSETO
09 TOSCANA 050 LI LIVORNO
09 TOSCANA 051 LU LUCCA
09 TOSCANA 052 MS MASSA
09 TOSCANA 053 PI PISA
09 TOSCANA 054 PT PISTOIA
09 TOSCANA 055 PO PRATO
09 TOSCANA 056 SI SIENA
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Table C.2.: ISTAT classification of regions and provinces in Italy
Region Code Region Name Province Code Province Acronym Province Name
10 UMBRIA 057 PG PERUGIA
10 UMBRIA 058 TR TERNI
11 MARCHE 059 AN ANCONA
11 MARCHE 060 AP ASCOLI PICENO
11 MARCHE 061 MC MACERATA
11 MARCHE 062 PU PESARO
12 LAZIO 063 FR FROSINONE
12 LAZIO 064 LT LATINA
12 LAZIO 065 RI RIETI
12 LAZIO 066 RM ROMA
12 LAZIO 067 VT VITERBO
13 ABRUZZO 068 CH CHIETI
13 ABRUZZO 069 AQ L’AQUILA
13 ABRUZZO 070 PE PESCARA
13 ABRUZZO 071 TE TERAMO
14 MOLISE 072 CB CAMPOBASSO
14 MOLISE 073 IS ISERNIA
15 CAMPANIA 074 AV AVELLINO
15 CAMPANIA 075 BN BENEVENTO
15 CAMPANIA 076 CE CASERTA
15 CAMPANIA 077 NA NAPOLI
15 CAMPANIA 078 SA SALERNO
16 PUGLIA 079 BA BARI
16 PUGLIA 080 BR BRINDISI
16 PUGLIA 081 FG FOGGIA
16 PUGLIA 082 LE LECCE
16 PUGLIA 083 TA TARANTO
17 BASILICATA 084 MT MATERA
17 BASILICATA 085 PZ POTENZA
18 CALABRIA 086 CZ CATANZARO
18 CALABRIA 087 CS COSENZA
18 CALABRIA 088 KR CROTONE
18 CALABRIA 089 RC REGGIO CALABRIA
18 CALABRIA 090 VV VIBO VALENTIA
19 SICILIA 091 AG AGRIGENTO
19 SICILIA 092 CL CALTANISSETTA
19 SICILIA 093 CT CATANIA
19 SICILIA 094 EN ENNA
19 SICILIA 095 ME MESSINA
19 SICILIA 096 PA PALERMO
19 SICILIA 097 RG RAGUSA
19 SICILIA 098 SR SIRACUSA
19 SICILIA 099 TP TRAPANI
20 SARDEGNA 100 CA CAGLIARI
20 SARDEGNA 102 SS SASSARI
20 SARDEGNA 101 NU NUORO
20 SARDEGNA 103 OR ORISTANO
181
C.2. Sample selection
Table C.3.: Original sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Drawn 2,870,937 2,415 27,400 0 453 9,030,000
EBIT 2,870,937 411 27,565 -1,478,188 47 12,000,000
% EBITDA/Assets 2,870,937 6 97.2 -43,800 6.6 39,500
Granted 2,870,937 3,709 51,000 0 688 18,000,000
HHI 2,870,937 5,717 3,065 0 5,084 10,000
% Leverage 2,870,937 65.7 838.9 -220,300 71.5 482,067
% Liquidity 2,870,937 5.9 9.8 0 1.9 100
No banks 2,870,937 3.3 2.7 1 3 59
NPL 2,870,937 0.05 0.21 0 0 1
Revenues 2,870,937 8,111 151,137 0 1,251 53,000,000
% ROA 2,870,937 1.8 123 -65,200 3.7 39,500
Total assets 2,870,937 9,974 332,277 1 1,466 84,000,000
Table C.4.: Selected sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Drawn 971,272 1,223 8,537 0 349 1,920,000
EBIT 971,272 127 3,143 -1,478,188 39 559,607
% EBITDA/Assets 971,272 6 24.4 -5,240 6.3 848
Granted 971,272 1,686 10,300 0 518 2,110,000
HHI 971,272 6,417 2,950 0 5,669 10,000
% Leverage 971,272 67.7 395.8 -69,300 74.1 138,900
% Liquidity 971,272 5.8 9.6 0 1.8 100
No banks 971,272 2.6 1.8 1 2 30
NPL 971,272 0.04 0.19 0 0 1
Revenues 971,272 3,870 41,375 0 949 5,779,045
% ROA 971,272 2.7 34 -9,203 3.7 10,851
Total assets 971,272 4,080 55,419 10 1,166 20,900,000
Notes. Drawn is the total amount of credit in thousands of euros used by a firm in a
given half year, while Granted is the corresponding amount granted to the firm. EBIT is
annual earnings before interests and taxes. EBIT, Revenues and Total assets are annual
firm-level variables expressed in thousands of euros. EBITDA is annual earnings before
interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA/Assets is EBITDA over total
assets. Leverage is the annual share of financial debt over the sum of financial debt plus
equity. Liquidity is the annual fraction of a firm’s cash holdings over its total assets. ROA
is returns on assets. EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, Liquidity and ROA are annual firm-level
indicators expressed as percentages. The number of banks is the number of lenders a firm
borrow from in a given half year. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of a firm’s loans
portfolio across its lenders in a given half year. HHI can take values between 10,000/No
banks when the firm borrows an equal amount from each of its lenders, and 10,000 when
the firm only borrows from one banks. NPL is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm
is recorded as non-performing in a given half year and equals 0 otherwise.
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C.3. Share of risky bonds
Figure C.1.: Share of risky bonds
The histogram is computed using bank - half-year as unit of observation, for the sample of Italian credit
institutions for which we have complete information.
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C.4. Validity of the instrumental variable
Table C.5.: Testing validity of the instrumental variable I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Selected Selected Selected Selected
Type of Regression OLS 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV
Dependent Variable EBIT EBIT EBITDA/Assets EBITDA/Assets
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010 1.9164** 0.4588
(7.6406) (0.6581)
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010*Crisis 7.7659 -2.5359**
(1.4894) (1.0417)
Expo. Funding Gap 2.5346** 0.6067
(1.0093) (0.871)
Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis 1.2225 -3.5047**
(2.1091) (1.4385)
F-stat 1 8,531 8,531
F-stat 2 (interaction) 6,128 6,128
Firm dummy No No No No
Market6-Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Market6-Time dummies 132,708 132,708 132,708 132,708
Other controls No No No No
Clustering Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time
Observations 971,272 971,272 971,272 971,272
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm - half-year pair. Expo. Funding Gap is the time-variant one-period
lagged firm’s exposure to its lenders funding gap, and Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis its interaction with the
binary variable Crisis which equals 1 for after July 2011 and equals 0 before. Expo. Funding Gap is expressed
as a fraction of the total assets (not as a percentage). EBIT is annual earnings before interests and taxes.
EBIT, Revenues and Total assets are annual firm-level variables expressed in thousands of euros. EBITDA
is annual earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA/Assets is EBITDA over
total assets. Market6-Time dummy represent market-time fixed effects where the time is represented by an
half year and a market is defined as a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the
product market is defined using the full 6-digit ATECO 2007 code. Market3 is a geography-product pair
where the geography is a province while the product market is defined using the first 3 digits of the ATECO
2007 code. We always cluster standard errors with respect to Market3 to allow for arbitrary correlations
between disturbances within a broad definition of market.
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Table C.6.: Testing validity of the instrumental variable II
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample Selected Selected Selected Selected
Type of Regression OLS 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV
Dependent Variable HHI HHI Leverage Leverage
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010 -2.069 -1.4354**
(1.4992) (5.6588)
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010*Crisis -1.848*** 1.0607
(1.0887) (1.9139)
Expo. Funding Gap -2.7365 -1.8985**
(1.9758) (7.4962)
Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis -2.5932*** 0.4383
(1.5293) (2.6591)
F-stat 1 8,531 8,531
F-stat 2 (interaction) 6,128 6,128
Firm dummy No No No No
Market6-Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Market6-Time dummies 132,708 132,708 132,708 132,708
Other controls No No No No
Clustering Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time
Observations 971,272 971,272 971,272 971,272
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm - half-year pair. Expo. Funding Gap is the time-variant one-period
lagged firm’s exposure to its lenders funding gap, and Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis its interaction with the
binary variable Crisis which equals 1 for after July 2011 and equals 0 before. Expo. Funding Gap is expressed
as a fraction of the total assets (not as a percentage). Leverage is the annual share of financial debt over the
sum of financial debt plus equity. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of a firm’s loans portfolio across its
lenders in a given half year. HHI can take values between 10,000/No banks when the firm borrows an equal
amount from each of its lenders, and 10,000 when the firm only borrows from one banks. Market6-Time
dummy represent market-time fixed effects where the time is represented by an half year and a market is
defined as a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the product market is defined
using the full 6-digit ATECO 2007 code. Market3 is a geography-product pair where the geography is a
province while the product market is defined using the first 3 digits of the ATECO 2007 code. We always
cluster standard errors with respect to Market3 to allow for arbitrary correlations between disturbances
within a broad definition of market.
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Table C.7.: Testing validity of the instrumental variable III
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample Selected Selected Selected Selected
Type of Regression OLS 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV
Dependent Variable Liquidity Liquidity No banks No banks
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010 1.4013*** 0.6844***
(0.3961) (0.0804)
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010*Crisis -0.3075 0.7982***
(0.3488) (0.0564)
Expo. Funding Gap 1.8533*** 0.9052***
(0.5244) (0.1048)
Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis -0.3274 1.1633***
(0.4812) (0.0804)
F-stat 1 8,531 8,531
F-stat 2 (interaction) 6,128 6,128
Firm dummy No No No No
Market6-Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Market6-Time dummies 132,708 132,708 132,708 132,708
Other controls No No No No
Clustering Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time
Observations 971,272 971,272 971,272 971,272
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm - half-year pair. Expo. Funding Gap is the time-variant one-
period lagged firm’s exposure to its lenders funding gap, and Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis its interaction with
the binary variable Crisis which equals 1 for after July 2011 and equals 0 before. Expo. Funding Gap is
expressed as a fraction of the total assets (not as a percentage). Liquidity is the annual fraction of a firm’s
cash holdings over its total assets. The number of banks is the number of lenders a firm borrow from in a
given half year. Market6-Time dummy represent market-time fixed effects where the time is represented by
an half year and a market is defined as a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while
the product market is defined using the full 6-digit ATECO 2007 code. Market3 is a geography-product pair
where the geography is a province while the product market is defined using the first 3 digits of the ATECO
2007 code. We always cluster standard errors with respect to Market3 to allow for arbitrary correlations
between disturbances within a broad definition of market.
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Table C.8.: Testing validity of the instrumental variable IV
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Sample Selected Selected Selected Selected
Type of Regression OLS 2SLS-IV OLS 2SLS-IV
Dependent Variable ROA ROA Total assets Total assets
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010 0.9815* 6.8176***
(0.5587) (1.8316)
Expo. Funding Gap June 2010*Crisis -2.9454** 3.4319
(1.3987) (3.7811)
Expo. Funding Gap 1.2987* 9.0169***
(0.7395) (2.4157)
Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis -4.038** 5.2828
(1.939) (5.3806)
F-stat 1 8,531 8,531
F-stat 2 (interaction) 6,128 6,128
Firm dummy No No No No
Market6-Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of Market6-Time dummies 132,708 132,708 132,708 132,708
Other controls No No No No
Clustering Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time
Observations 971,272 971,272 971,272 971,272
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm - half-year pair. Expo. Funding Gap is the time-variant one-period
lagged firm’s exposure to its lenders funding gap, and Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis its interaction with the
binary variable Crisis which equals 1 for after July 2011 and equals 0 before. Expo. Funding Gap is expressed
as a fraction of the total assets (not as a percentage). ROA is returns on assets (not as percentage). Market6-
Time dummy represent market-time fixed effects where the time is represented by an half year and a market
is defined as a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the product market is defined
using the full 6-digit ATECO 2007 code. Market3 is a geography-product pair where the geography is a
province while the product market is defined using the first 3 digits of the ATECO 2007 code. We always
cluster standard errors with respect to Market3 to allow for arbitrary correlations between disturbances




Table C.9.: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Sample Selected Selected Selected
Period 2006 to 2012 2006 to 2012 12/2010 to 12/2012
Type of Regression 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Dependent Variable NPL NPL NPL
Treatment Expo. Funding Gap 0.0023 0.0172 -0.0058
(0.02) (0.0271) (0.0208)
Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis 0.0507*** 0.0585** 0.0738***
(0.0181) (0.0243) (0.0177)
Banks characteristics Expo. ROA June 2010 -0.0428*** -0.0537*** -0.0417***
(0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0044)
Expo. ROE June 2010 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0009
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Expo. Tier 2 Ratio June 2010 -1.1508*** -1.4732*** -1.2826***
(0.1352) (0.1807) (0.1668)
Expo. Risky Share June 2010 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0004***
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Expo. NPLs/Assets June 2010 -0.0039*** -0.0036*** -0.0013
(0.001) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Expo. Tier 1 Ratio June 2010 0.2229* 0.3312* 0.4172**
(0.1334) (0.1838) (0.1681)
Expo. Total Assets June 2010 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firms characteristics EBIT -0.000001*** -0.00002* -0.0000***
(0.0000003) (0.00001) (0.0000)
EBITDA/Assets -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0003*
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0001)
HHI -0.000006*** -0.00001*** -0.0000***
(0.000001) (0.000001) (0.0000)
Leverage 0.000006*** 0.000004** 0.0000***
(0.000002) (0.000002) (0.0000)
Liquidity -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0010***
(0.0001) (0.00007) (0.0001)
No banks -0.0082*** -0.0147*** -0.0059***
(0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0010)
ROA -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0015***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Total assets 0.00000003* 0.00001*** 0.0000***
(0.00000001) (0.000001) (0.0000)
F-stat 1 4,140 4,553 52,122
F-stat 2 (interaction) 6,828 6,066 7,106
Firm dummy No No No
Market6-Time dummy Yes Yes Yes
No of Market6-Time dummies 107,266 69,602 49,279
Other controls No No No
Clustering Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time
Observations 751,930 417,094 365,143
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm - half-year pair. NPL is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm is recorded as non-
performing in a given period and equals 0 otherwise. Expo. Funding Gap is the time-variant one-period lagged firm’s exposure
to its lenders funding gap, and Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis its interaction with the binary variable Crisis which equals 1 for after
July 2011 and equals 0 before. Expo. Funding Gap is expressed as a fraction of the total assets (not as a percentage). The
variables Expo. Var June 2010, for Var equal to ROA, Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, Risky Share, NPLs/Assets, and Total Assets is
the time-invariant firm’s exposure to its lenders Var at June 2010. EBIT is annual earnings before interests and taxes. EBIT
and Total assets are annual firm-level variables expressed in thousands of euros. EBITDA is annual earnings before interests,
taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA/Assets is EBITDA over total assets. Leverage is the annual share of financial
debt over the sum of financial debt plus equity. Liquidity is the annual fraction of a firm’s cash holdings over its total assets.
ROA is returns on assets. EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, Liquidity and ROA are annual firm-level indicators expressed as number
(not percentages). The number of banks is the number of lenders a firm borrow from in a given half year. HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of a firm’s loans portfolio across its lenders in a given half year. HHI can take values between 10,000/No
banks when the firm borrows an equal amount from each of its lenders, and 10,000 when the firm only borrows from one bank.
Market6-Time dummy represent market-time fixed effects where the time is represented by an half year and a market is defined
as a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the product market is defined using the full 6-digit ATECO
2007 code. Market3 is a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the product market is defined using
the first 3 digits of the ATECO 2007 code. We always cluster standard errors with respect to Market3 to allow for arbitrary
correlations between disturbances within a broad definition of market. Column (2) uses the sample of firms with total assets or
total revenues below their respective medians (i.e., small firms). Column (3) uses the selected sample of firms between December
2010 and December 2012.
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Table C.10.: Lehman collapse vs Italian crisis
(1) (2) (2)
Sample Selected Selected Selected
Period Before Lehman Between Lehman and Italian crisis After Italian crisis
Type of Regression 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV 2SLS-IV
Dependent Variable NPL NPL NPL
Treatment Expo. Funding Gap -0.0196 0.0062 0.0572**
(0.0306) (0.0199) (0.0279)
Banks characteristics ROA June 2010 -0.0326*** -0.049*** -0.0354***
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.005)
Expo. ROE June 2010 -0.00003 -0.001* -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Expo. Tier 2 Ratio June 2010 -0.7697*** -1.226*** -1.240***
(0.1298) (0.1549) (0.1923)
Expo. Risky Share June 2010 -0.0002*** -0.0005*** -0.0004***
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.0001)
Expo. NPLs/Assets June 2010 -0.006*** -0.0058*** 0.0013
(0.001) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Expo. Tier 1 Ratio June 2010 0.0266 0.1517 0.5172***
(0.1167) (0.1584) (0.1891)
Expo. Total Assets June 2010 -0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Firms characteristics EBIT -0.00000001 -0.000001*** -0.000002***
(0.0000002) (0.0000003) (0.000001)
EBITDA/Assets -0.0003*** -0.0002* -0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
HHI -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.00001***
(0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001)
Leverage 0.00003* 0.00001** 0.00001**
(0.00002) (0.000002) (0.000004)
Liquidity -0.0003*** -0.0007*** -0.001***
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
No banks -0.0109*** -0.0087*** -0.0049***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012)
ROA -0.00003 -0.0013*** -0.0017***
(0.00003) (0.0002753663) (0.0005)
Total assets 0.00000002 0.00000003* 0.00000001**
(0.00000002) (0.00000002) (0.00000003)
F-stat 790 22,041 4,133
Firm dummy No No No
Market6-Time dummy Yes Yes Yes
No of Market6-Time dummies 23,931 55,113 28,222
Other controls No No No
Clustering Market3-Time Market3-Time Market3-Time
Observations 145,636 403,538 202,756
Notes. The unit of observation is a firm - half-year pair. NPL is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm is recorded as non-
performing in a given period and equals 0 otherwise. Expo. Funding Gap is the time-variant one-period lagged firm’s exposure
to its lenders funding gap, and Expo. Funding Gap*Crisis its interaction with the binary variable Crisis which equals 1 for after
July 2011 and equals 0 before. Expo. Funding Gap is expressed as a fraction of the total assets (not as a percentage). The
variables Expo. Var June 2010, for Var equal to ROA, Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, Risky Share, NPLs/Assets, and Total Assets is
the time-invariant firm’s exposure to its lenders Var at June 2010. EBIT is annual earnings before interests and taxes. EBIT
and Total assets are annual firm-level variables expressed in thousands of euros. EBITDA is annual earnings before interests,
taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA/Assets is EBITDA over total assets. Leverage is the annual share of financial
debt over the sum of financial debt plus equity. Liquidity is the annual fraction of a firm’s cash holdings over its total assets.
ROA is returns on assets. EBITDA/Assets, Leverage, Liquidity and ROA are annual firm-level indicators expressed as number
(not percentages). The number of banks is the number of lenders a firm borrow from in a given half year. HHI is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index of a firm’s loans portfolio across its lenders in a given half year. HHI can take values between 10,000/No
banks when the firm borrows an equal amount from each of its lenders, and 10,000 when the firm only borrows from one bank.
Market6-Time dummy represent market-time fixed effects where the time is represented by an half year and a market is defined
as a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the product market is defined using the full 6-digit ATECO
2007 code. Market3 is a geography-product pair where the geography is a province while the product market is defined using
the first 3 digits of the ATECO 2007 code. We always cluster standard errors with respect to Market3 to allow for arbitrary
correlations between disturbances within a broad definition of market. Column (1) only uses observations before the collpse of
Lehman Brothers in Septemebr 2008. Column (2) only uses observations between the collpse of Lehman Brothers in Septemebr
2008 and the start of the Italian crisis in July 2011. Column (3) only uses observations after the start of the Italian crisis in July
2011.
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